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Abstract 
 
Medication administration errors (MAEs) in hospitals account for the majority of reported 
medication-related patient harm in the UK.  Research suggests error-prevention strategies 
should focus on reducing error-producing conditions associated with systems and processes.  
However, medication administration is complex, and potential systems and process variations 
exist across the National Health Service (NHS) which present a barrier to prioritising and 
developing interventions to reduce error.   
 
This thesis investigates variations in hospital medication systems and their potential effects on 
the safety of medication administration.  It also includes a systematic review summarising 
hospital MAE rates and the effects of methodological variations on reported MAE rates. 
 
An initial observational study of nurses administering medications on one ward identified 
several process variations and system factors that may contribute to MAEs, including potential 
inefficiencies and dose omissions related to medication storage.  A novel meta-analysis of the 
literature revealed an MAE rate of 5.6% of non-intravenous doses. Dose omission was most 
common, of which 52-67% were because the drug was unavailable.  A census of ward-based 
medication systems in English NHS hospitals identified the extent of inter- and intra-hospital 
variation, particularly in medication storage and medication safety related processes.  A 
separate observational study documented variations among nurses in how they utilised 
systems, including the use of ‘temporary’ drug trolley alternatives.  An ethnographic study of 
drug administration in three different hospital medication systems then revealed systems-
related factors that both facilitated and hindered medication administration. 
 
Overall, the extent of a number of variations in hospital medication systems has been 
described, including more subtle variations than previously reported.  Many variations were 
associated with both positive and negative effects on the safety of medication administration, 
which were often affected by situational factors.  This emphasises the importance of 
considering potential unintended consequences of sociotechnical interactions when 
developing and implementing systems-based interventions to reduce MAEs. 
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Glossary   
Adverse drug event Adverse drug events are injuries resulting from medication 
use (Bates et al., 1995) 
Circumstance A situation or factor that may influence an event, agent or 
person(s) (Runciman et al., 2009) 
Contributing factor A circumstance, action or influence which is thought to have 
played a part in the origin or development of an incident or 
to increase the risk of an incident (Runciman et al., 2009) 
Error Failure to carry out a planned action as intended or 
application of an intended but incorrect plan (Reason, 1990; 
Runciman et al., 2009) 
Harm Impairment of structure or function of the body and/or any 
deleterious effect arising there from.  Harm includes disease, 
injury, suffering, disability, and death (Runciman et al., 2009) 
Human factors These are factors that can influence human behaviour and 
includes individual (such as perception and cognition), 
environmental (such as equipment design, interruptions, and 
distractions), and organisational characteristics (such as 
teamwork and culture) (Carthey & Clarke, 2009) 
Incident An event or circumstance which could have resulted, or did 
result in unintended or unnecessary harm to a person and/or 
a complaint, loss, or damage (Runciman, 2006) 
Medication administration error  
Any dose of medication administered (or omitted) that 
deviates from the patient’s medication order” (Allan & 
Barker, 1990) 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Reducing harm from medication use is a global patient safety priority (World Health 
Organization, 2008; Institute of Medicine, 2007; Department of Health, 2004; Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2008). In hospitals, medication errors 
are estimated to harm 1-2% of inpatients (Neale et al. 2001; Bates et al. 1995) and 
contributes to an increased length of stay of 4.6-10.3 days for each affected patient 
(Bates et al., 1993; Vincent et al., 2001; Pinilla et al., 2006).  According to medication 
incident reports, medication administration errors (MAEs) account for the majority of 
patient harm and deaths (Cousins et al. 2007; Hicks et al. 2004), most probably because 
there are more ‘acts’ at the medication administration stage than at prescribing, 
dispensing, or monitoring stages, thus increasing the opportunities for error.  
Furthermore, MAEs are least likely to be intercepted before they reach the patient 
(Leape et al. 1995; Bates et al. 1995; Marino et al. 2000) which makes reducing MAEs an 
important priority for increasing medication safety.   
 
While an unsafe act at the medication administration stage may precede a medication-
related incident, it is widely recognised that systemic organisational and environmental 
factors associated with the workplace, in addition to person-specific factors, also play a 
role in contributing to error-producing conditions (O’Shea, 1999; Carlton & Blegen, 
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2006; Mcbride-Henry, 2006; Fry & Dacey, 2007; Hughes & Blegen, 2008; Brady et al., 
2009; Chaudhury et al., 2009).    In the United Kingdom (UK) and worldwide, key national 
policies and research suggest error-prevention strategies should address underlying 
latent error-producing conditions associated with systems and processes in hospitals 
(Kohn et al., 1999; Department of Health, 2000a; Australian Council for Safety and 
Quality in Health Care, 2002).   However, systems and processes associated with 
medication administration are complex, and it is recognised that complexity can hinder 
the identification of latent error-producing conditions (Kohn et al., 1999).  Thus, there is 
a need for further research to better understand the systems factors that contribute to 
MAEs to facilitate the development of effective systems-based interventions.   
 
Furthermore, as most health care processes were not designed but have evolved 
(Vincent, 2011), it is suspected that system and process variations exist across the UK 
National Health Service (NHS).  However, unlike in the United States (US) (Pedersen et 
al., 2012), there is no published data in the UK on the types of hospital medication 
systems and processes used to support medication administration.  A recent survey of 
hospital medication procurement and distribution in Europe identified 37.5% of UK 
hospital pharmacies provided a unit-dose service (Frontini et al., 2012).  No other 
sources of data on the current types of hospital medication systems or processes 
associated with medication administration in use in the NHS were available.  Thus, the 
extent to which different types of systems and processes associated with medication 
administration exist was unknown.  This presents a barrier for identifying, prioritising, 
and developing system-based interventions to reduce error.   
 
A further problem associated with developing system-based interventions to reduce 
MAEs is the methodological approach used to evaluate interventions.  It is known that 
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differences in definitions and MAE rate calculations exist between studies (Allan &  
Barker, 1990) and these can affect the reported MAE rates, which is generally the 
primary measure in intervention studies.  However, the extent of methodological 
variations between studies on reported MAE rates are unknown.  Furthermore, while 
assessing MAE rates provide one useful indicator of medication safety, measuring MAE 
rates alone in intervention studies do not provide information about the potential 
situational contributory factors that exist.  Medication administration is not a single task, 
but a process which comprises multiple interconnected tasks, some of which contribute 
directly to the act of administering the dose to the patient, and some are defence 
barriers against MAEs.  It is therefore important that multiple components of the 
medication administration process is measured and used to evaluate systems-based 
interventions.   
 
This thesis explores variations in hospital medication administration-related processes 
and systems that exist across the NHS in England and investigates their potential effects 
on the safety of medication administration.  The empirical research begins in the next 
chapter with a preliminary observational study that describes variations in processes 
and defence barriers associated with medication administration.  An overall quality and 
safety measure is presented and the challenges of interpreting MAE rates are discussed.  
This is followed by a systematic literature review to summarise UK MAE studies, the 
methodological variations that exist between studies, and their effects on reported MAE 
rates in chapter three.  A census of hospital medication systems in English NHS hospitals 
is presented in chapter four.  This describes the extent of variations in a number of 
systems and processes used to support medication administration in hospitals, to 
provide a national perspective on potential priority areas for further research.  Drawing 
on the findings in chapters two to four, a quantitative study focusing on ward-based 
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medication storage systems was conducted at three hospitals of one acute NHS trust to 
explore potential inter-hospital variation that exists and their effects on successful dose 
retrieval during drug rounds by nursing staff (chapter five).  Variations in how nurses 
utilised available ward-based medication storage systems were investigated, which 
highlighted the complexity of other interacting systems and processes within the ward 
environment that potentially affected the safety of medication administration.  An 
ethnographic study was then conducted on three wards, each located at a different 
hospital, using distinctly different systems, to explore the system factors that facilitate 
and/or hinder medication administration in more detail (chapter six).  The present thesis 
then ends with an overall discussion summarising the main findings, limitations, 
together with implications for practice and recommendations for future research in this 
field (chapter seven).     
 
The remainder of this chapter is a summary of the medication safety literature, with 
particular emphasis on MAEs, hospital medication systems and processes associated 
with medication administration, and theoretical concepts used to direct the research in 
this thesis.   
 
1.2 Medication safety  and patient harm 
This thesis is focused on medication safety at the administration stage.  However, MAEs 
are only part of the overall medication error picture.  Thus, this section provides an 
overview of the scale of the medication error problem and the associated economic 
burden on hospitals to provide the context before focusing on MAEs in section 1.3.  
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1.2.1 The scale of the problem 
Medication errors are a threat to patient safety.  Studies published as early as the 1960s 
have reported on the problem of medication errors (Barker & McConnell, 1962; Hill & 
Wigmore, 1967).  However, published research establishing medication errors as a cause 
of patient harm was not available until much later (Bates et al. 1995; Wilson et al. 1995; 
Vincent et al. 2001). 
 
In the study by Bates et al (1995), the researchers used a combination of self-reports, 
informal twice weekly interviews with staff, and daily review of patient charts over a 6-
month period at two large hospitals in the US to identify cases of actual and potential 
adverse drug events (ADEs).  An ADE is defined as an injury or patient harm resulting 
from medication use (Bates et al. 1995), and the relationship between medication errors 
and ADEs is illustrated in figure 1.1 (Bates 1995; Morimoto et al. 2004).   
 
 
Figure 1.1 The relationships between medication errors, actual adverse drug events 
(ADEs), and potential ADEs.  Actual ADEs comprises those which are preventable, 
ameliorable, and unpreventable (adverse drug reactions, ADRs).  Adapted from Bates 
(1995) and Morimoto (2004).   
 
 
Medication errors 
(comprising errors at 
all stages of the 
medication process) 
Actual 
ADEs 
Potential 
ADEs 
Preventable 
ADEs 
Ameliorable 
ADEs 
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As depicted in figure 1.1, a preventable or ameliorable ADE is therefore harm which is 
the result of a medication error.  Overall, the researchers identified ADEs in 6.5% of 
hospital inpatients and potential ADEs in 5.5% of hospital patients.  Of 247 actual ADEs, 
28% were judged preventable, and of the preventable ADEs, 20% were classified as life-
threatening in severity, 43% as serious, and 37% as significant.  Additional analysis in an 
accompanying paper revealed errors at the prescribing and administering stages 
accounted for the majority (39% and 38%, respectively) of all preventable ADEs (Leape 
et al., 1995). 
 
In the study by Wilson et al (1995), the researchers reviewed over 14,000 patient case 
records and identified a much lower ADE rate of 1.6% of hospital inpatients in Australia.  
Of these, 36% were judged preventable.  According to the researchers, the lower ADE 
rate in this study, compared with the 6.5% reported by Bates et al (1995), was probably 
due to the strict adverse event definition they used in comparison to the Bates et al 
(1995) study, thus limiting the number of included ADEs.   
 
More recently, in the UK, a review of 840 patient records revealed a preventable ADE 
rate of 1% of inpatients (Neale et al., 2001).  This translates to approximately 116,000 
cases each year in England alone, based on the 11.6 million ordinary episodes in English 
hospitals between December 2011 and November 2012 (The Information Centre for 
Health and Social Care, 2012).   
 
1.2.2 Economic burden of medication errors  
In addition to patient harm, medication errors also contribute to the use of additional 
health care resource and pose a substantial financial burden on the limited health care 
budget.  Based on studies conducted in the US, UK, and Spain, it was estimated that 
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preventable ADEs contributes to an increased length of hospital stay of 4.6-10.3 days for 
each affected patient (Bates et al., 1993; Vincent et al., 2001; Pinilla et al., 2006).   
 
In the US, Bates et al (1997) estimated that ADEs cost USD $5.6 million and preventable 
ADEs cost USD $2.8 million annually (at 1993 price values) in a 700-bed teaching 
hospital.  The costs include additional bed days, hospital charges for a range of care, and 
pharmacy costs. Extrapoloating these figures, each ADE was estimated by the 
researchers to incur a direct additional cost of USD $2,595, which almost doubled to 
USD $4,685 for each preventable ADE.  The higher cost associated with preventable 
ADEs was unexpected by the researchers who attributed this to preventable ADEs being 
associated with more severe patient harm. 
 
In the UK, the cost of preventable harm from medicines to the NHS has been estimated 
at over GBP £750 million (at 2005 price values) each year in England alone (Cousins et 
al., 2007). The estimate included costs from preventable hospital admissions due to 
medications, costs incurred from additional bed days due to adverse drug reactions 
(ADRs, rather than ADEs or preventable ADEs) during the hospital admission, and costs 
associated with litigation.  The ADR rate was adjusted by a factor of 0.72 by the 
researchers as this was the rate of avoidable ADRs identified from a separate paper 
(Pirmohamed et al., 2004).  This led to an avoidable ADR rate of 5.0%.  However, these 
figures were based on definitions which suggest that patient harm due to factors other 
than medication errors were also included, which is perhaps not at first obvious because 
the term ‘preventable harm from medicines’ is often used to mean ‘harm due to 
medication error’ rather than ‘drug treatment that is inconsistent with present day 
knowledge of good medical practice’ (Pirmohamed et al., 2004).   A more recent and 
 Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
27 of 321 
specific estimate of medication error costs in the UK was provided by Karnon et al 
(2008) (all at 2006 price values): 
• GBP £0-6 for each detected medication error  
• GBP £65-150 for each significant preventable ADE that does not result in 
increased length of stay 
• GBP £810-1,232 for each serious preventable ADE  
• GBP £1,232-1,760 for each severe, life-threatening or fatal preventable ADE 
 
In addition to the above direct health care costs, the researchers also calculated the 
monetary value of lost health and costs associated with litigation, which ranged from  
GBP £16-180,000, depending on the severity of harm.  Overall, Karnon et al (2008) 
estimated that preventable ADEs costs GBP £600,000 in annual health service treatment 
or GBP £17.8 million in combined annual health service treatment and monetary value 
of lost health, for a 400-bed hospital alone.  This suggests the financial burden of 
medication errors on the NHS is substantially higher than that previously reported.  
Although the specific cost of MAEs is unknown, it is likely that reducing MAEs would 
result in considerable cost savings to the NHS.   
 
1.3 Medication administration errors (MAEs) 
Having established the scale of the medication error problem and the associated 
economic costs for health care, this section summarises the current knowledge base 
associated with the incidence, severity, and causes of MAEs.  As the majority of MAE 
studies were based in the US and UK, the data presented here are generally from these 
two countries. This section is divided into the following subsections: (1) incidence of 
MAEs, (2) patient harm from MAEs, and (3) aetiology of MAEs. 
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1.3.1 Incidence of MAEs 
Medication administration is the last stage of the medication use process before a dose 
reaches a patient, but errors are common.  An MAE has been defined as “any dose of 
medication administered (or omitted) that deviates from the patient’s medication 
order” (Allan & Barker, 1990).  The incidence of MAEs in hospitals varies depending on 
the method of detection used (Barker & McConnell, 1962; Allan & Barker, 1990; Flynn et 
al., 2002).  For example, a study by Flynn et al (2002) compared the MAE rates detected 
using three methods in 36 US hospitals: observation, chart review, and incident report 
review.  Of the same 2,556 doses included in the study, the observation method 
identified an MAE rate of 11.7% of doses, chart review 0.7%, and incident report review 
0.04%.  This illustrates the importance of considering the method for detecting MAEs 
when interpreting reported MAE rates.  The strengths and limitations of three main 
methods reported in quantitative MAE studies are summarised in table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1  Comparison of three methods for detecting medication administration 
errors (MAES)  (Barker & McConnell, 1962; Allan & Barker, 1990; Flynn et al., 2002; 
Dean & Barber, 2001) 
 Direct observation Chart and/or medical 
notes review 
Incident report 
Strengths • Most accurate method 
for detecting MAEs 
• Is a validated method 
for detecting MAEs  
• In the United Kingdom, 
MAEs are detected in 
real time which is a 
strength in that the 
observer can intervene 
to prevent patient harm 
but is also a limitation 
as it may influence the 
nurse’s subsequent 
behaviour 
• Relatively quick 
compared to direct 
observation  
• Allows review of 
sequential errors which 
may not be possible 
with observation unless 
consecutive drug 
rounds are observed 
• Data can be collected at 
relatively flexible times 
 
• Can provide rich data on 
specific events 
• Within hospitals, incident 
reports provides regular 
information about some 
aspects of medication 
safety within the 
organisation in general 
• Lower cost than the 
other two methods 
Limitations • Time-consuming  
• Relatively inflexible 
data collection times 
• Costly 
• Training is required 
• Potential observer 
effects on nurse 
behaviour which may 
affect MAEs 
• Risk of observer-fatigue 
influencing detected 
MAEs 
• Impractical for regular 
monitoring purposes 
• Less accurate method 
than observation for 
detecting MAEs 
• Does not capture errors 
that were not 
documented by 
individuals 
• Dependent on accurate 
documentation that 
reflects the true nature 
of what happened  
• Relatively time-
consuming 
 
• Least accurate method 
for detecting MAEs 
primarily due to under-
reporting for the 
following reasons: 
- Does not capture 
errors that were not 
known to individuals 
- Actual and/or 
perceived lack of time 
to report 
- Psychological barriers 
to reporting such as 
fear of disciplinary 
action and/or 
perceived waste of 
time  
 
 
Overall, research suggests observation is the most accurate method for detecting MAEs 
(Barker & McConnell, 1962; Allan & Barker, 1990; Flynn et al., 2002; Dean & Barber, 
2001).  However, observation is also associated with a number of limitations which have 
the potential to influence reported MAE rates (table 1.1).  Mainly, observation relies on 
the observer to apply a  consistent level of real-time objectivity in such a way that their 
presence and behaviour do not influence the behaviour of the observed.  In practice, the 
effect of having an observer is difficult to quantify and will most probably vary among 
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different observers and the individuals being observed.  Thus, adequate training and 
pilot observations are likely to be important precursors to increase the accuracy of MAEs 
detected in observational studies.  Research suggests that the potential observer effect 
on MAE rates is low provided that the observer is discreet, non-judgemental and tactful 
in their approach (Dean & Barber 2001).  Given that observation is the gold standard 
method for detecting MAEs, the incidence of MAEs in hospitals as detected by this 
method is next reported.   
 
A key literature review of early MAE studies revealed observed error rates (excluding 
wrong time errors) between 1.6-20.6% of opportunities for error (OE) in American and 
Canadian hospitals (Allan & Barker, 1990). An OE was defined as “any dose given plus 
any dose ordered but omitted”, and each dose could only be either correct or incorrect 
in order to prevent the error rate from exceeding 100%.   The MAE rates were based on 
nine studies that used methods considered by the reviewers to produce valid and 
reliable results. However, the researchers highlighted that methodological variations 
were found between studies, including differences in MAE subcategory definitions 
which suggests that there may be some differens in inclusion/exclusion criteria that 
limits their comparability, and probably accounts for some of the variation in reported 
MAE rates.  In their comprehensive literature review, Allan and Barker (1990) also 
summarised the advantages and disadvantages of the different methods used to detect 
MAE rates, and suggested a set of operational definitions for an MAE, OE, and MAE 
subcategories.  These have since been used in several subsequent MAE studies, 
including some that were conducted in the UK and elsewhere (Keers et al., 2013).   
 
In addition to individual studies of MAEs since the 1960s, there has also been several 
subsequent literature reviews reporting on the incidence of MAEs in hospital, each using 
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slightly different methods and/or present data on a specific patient cohort (Ghaleb et 
al., 2006; Institute of Medicine, 2007; Vincent et al., 2009; Kiekkas et al., 2011; Keers et 
al., 2013).   In the most recent systematic literature review of 91 observational studies 
by Keers et al (2013), the reviewers identified a median MAE rate of 8.0% of OEs in 
hospital inpatients (interquartile range, IQR, range 5.1-10.9%).  For intravenous (IV) OEs 
only, the MAE rate was much higher, at a median MAE rate of 48% (IQR 45-49%).  
Include wrong time errors, and the figures increase to 19.6% (IQR 8.6-28.3%), and 85.9% 
(IQR 81.8-89.9%), for all OEs and IV OEs only, respectively.  The 91 included studies were 
conducted in hospitals and long-term care facilities in 16 countries, including eight in the 
UK.  While the  relevance of these figures to the UK hospital setting is unknown, the 
MAE rates excluding wrong time errors are comparable to the figures of 3.0-8.0% of all 
doses, and 49-94% of IV doses in UK hospitals reported by Vincent et al (2009). 
 
1.3.2 Patient harm from MAEs 
MAEs can cause substantial patient harm.  In the UK, evaluation of 59,802 medication 
incidents reported to the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) for England 
and Wales between January 2005 and June 2006, revealed that MAEs were associated 
with 28 confirmed cases of severe harm and 24 deaths (total 52; 57% of 92 cases of 
severe harm and death or 0.09% of all medication incidents) (Cousins et al., 2007).  The 
report highlighted that the numbers from incident reports were substantially lower than 
in research studies mainly due to under-reporting, and suggested that actual numbers of 
severe harm and death are likely to be much higher.  This is supported by the findings 
from a number of observational studies of MAEs that also assessed patient harm (table 
1.2). 
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Table 1.2 A comparison of three methods for assessing severity of patient harm in 
observational medication administration error studies.  Data were from observational 
studies reported by Keers et al (2013).   
 NCC MERP (1998;2001) Dean and Barber 
(1999) 
Folli et al (1987) 
Description 
of method 
Clinical severity of an error was 
classified according to nine 
categories (A-I), where A 
indicated an event that had the 
capacity to cause an error but 
an actual error did not occur, 
and I indicated that there was 
an error which contributed to 
patient death.   
Clinical severity of an 
error was scored on a 
visual-analogue scale 
from 0-10, by a group 
of healthcare 
professional judges, 
where 0 represented 
no potential effect, 
and 10 represented an 
incident that would 
result in patient death.   
 
Clinical severity of 
an error was 
classified into one 
of three categories: 
potentially lethal, 
serious, or 
significant. 
Number of 
studies that 
used this 
method 
6 6 
 
5 
Assessed 
actual or 
potential 
harm 
Unknown Potential Actual (2 studies) 
Potential (3 
studies) 
Main 
findings  
• 11.2% of errors were 
category B (error does not 
reach the patient) 
• 45-85% of errors were 
category C (error reaches the 
patient, no harm caused)  
• 2.7-55.1% of errors were 
category D (error reaches the 
patient, requires monitoring 
and/or intervention to 
preclude harm) 
• 1.1-9.1% of errors were 
category E (error may have 
contributed to or resulted in 
temporary harm requiring 
intervention) 
• 1.6% of errors were category 
F (error may have contributed 
to or resulted in temporary 
harm requiring initial or 
prolonged hospitalisation) 
• Data for categories A and G-I 
were not reported  
• One study reported no harm 
Based on mean scores 
(3 studies) 
• Mean scores 
between 1.8-2.7 
 
Based on 
categorisation of mean 
scores (3 studies) 
• 0.6-6.2% of errors 
were potentially 
severe 
• 57.2-60.0% of errors 
were moderate 
• 33.8-42.1% of errors 
were minor 
 
• 3.3-8.9% of 
errors were 
clinically 
significant  
 
Modified Folli et al 
(1987) criteria (2 
studies): 
• 10-21% of errors 
were potentially 
life-threatening 
• 26-42% were 
potentially 
clinically 
significant 
 
NCC MERP, National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention. 
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Overall, table 1.2 indicates that 0.6-21% of MAEs may lead to patient harm that either 
resulted in prolonged hospitalisation or were potentially life-threatening.  By definition, 
all MAEs are preventable or ameliorable, but require an understanding of the individual 
and systems factors that contribute to MAEs in order to address this problem. 
 
1.3.3 Aetiology of MAEs 
The aetiology of MAEs is complex.  Over the past few decades, a number of studies have 
advanced the collective understanding of the factors that contribute to MAEs.  However, 
before focusing on MAEs specifically, the concepts of human error in general are 
presented to provide context for understanding the causes of MAEs.   
 
Humans err and systems fail 
Research into the causes and factors that contribute to errors in health care has been 
greatly influenced by the works of Reason (1990), amongst others (Perrow, 1984; 
Norman, 1981; Rasmussen & Jensen, 1974), and a number of subsequent instrumental 
national policy documents in the UK and worldwide (Kohn et al., 1999; Department of 
Health, 2000a; Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2002).  These 
policy documents highlighted that while humans err, systems fail; with the latter 
potentially having wider implications on patient safety than the former.  For example, 
the Institute of Medicine (IOM), ‘To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System’ stated: 
“[the] primary focus [of this report generally] is not on "getting rid of bad 
apples," or individuals with patterns of poor performance. The underlying 
assumption is that lasting and broad-based safety improvements in an 
industry can be brought about through a systems approach.” 
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Thus, in order to increase patient safety, including that which is associated with the use 
of medicines, requires an understanding of human error within the context of the 
systems and the work environment.  
 
Error models of causation 
Reason (2000) described two approaches in which errors may be viewed: the person 
approach and the systems approach.  The person approach is focused on the unsafe acts 
of individuals at the ‘sharp end’, and attributes unsafe acts to an individual’s lack of 
knowledge, skill, attentiveness and/or motivation, and includes “aberrant mental 
processes” such as forgetfulness, carelessness, and recklessness.    An unsafe act is 
therefore seen as the cause of an incident and subsequent management inevitably 
targets human behaviour by methods such as re-training, disciplinary actions, threat of 
litigation, and/or wider measures such as writing another procedure.  In other words, 
unsafe acts are errors and procedural violations; the former may be the consequence of 
an unintended action (such as a slip or a lapse) or an intended action (i.e. a mistake due 
to carrying out a ‘wrong’ plan), while the latter is always the result of an intentional 
action (figure 1.2).   
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Figure 1.2 Adaptation of Reason’s (1990) summary of the types of unsafe acts and 
their psychological origins.  The outer box signifies the presence of a hazard to 
illustrate the importance of context in defining an unsafe act i.e. it is not an unsafe act 
if it does not occur in a potentially hazardous situation 
 
 
 
 
By comparison to the focus on unsafe acts in the person approach, human error is 
expected in the systems approach, even from the ‘best’ people in the ‘best’ 
organisations.  In the systems approach, errors are considered to be primarily the 
consequence of more “upstream” systemic factors from the individual.  These include 
environmental hazards associated with the equipment, the workplace, and the 
organisational processes such as management decisions and policies.   However, this 
fallible human perspective does not imply that individuals are blame-free but that 
individual accountability should be considered within the context of the systems and 
organisational environment in which one works (Vincent 2011).   
 
 Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
36 of 321 
Person and system factors that contribute to MAEs 
Based on the knowledge that contributory factors for errors are not solely due to unsafe 
acts, this section summarises the person and system factors that contribute to MAEs 
based on findings from eight literature reviews (O’Shea 1999; Armitage & Knapman 
2003; Carlton & Blegen 2006; Mcbride-Henry 2006; Fry & Dacey 2007; Hughes & Blegen 
2008; Brady et al., 2009; Chaudhury et al., 2009).  An overview of the individual and 
system factors highlighted in each of the eight literature reviews are presented in table 
1.3.    
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Table 1.3 Overview of person and system-based factors that contribute to medication 
administration errors (MAEs) as reported in eight literature reviews.   
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Mathematical skills of nurses          
Nurses’ knowledge of medications         
Length of nurse experience and/or education 
level 
         
Length of nursing shifts         
Workload, staffing levels, and/or skill mix           
Nursing care and medication delivery system          
Single-nurse drug administration         
Failure to adhere to policy and procedures          
Distractions and interruptions         
Quality of prescription and/or legibility of 
medication charts 
         
Patient acuity         
Drug classification, unit [setting] type, 
complexity of medication, and/or other 
pharmaceutical related issues 
          
Physical environment (lighting, drug preparation 
facilities) 
        
Organisational culture and climate          
Organisational communication channels         
Organisational routines         
Incident reporting culture         
Understanding of how errors occur         
Inadequate access to policies and procedures          
Care delivery model         
Reporting medication errors         
Fatigue and sleep loss         
Similar names of drugs         
Technologies         
Documentation of the medication administration 
process 
        
Equipment failure while administering 
medication 
        
Monitoring and assessing         
Medicines reconciliation          
Noise          
Lighting          
Ergonomics/furniture/equipment          
Design/layout          
Shaded rows indicate person factors that contribute to MAEs.  
Unshaded rows indicate systems factors that contribute to MAEs.  
 indicate contributory factor for MAE that was specified in the literature review. 
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The eight literature reviews included studies conducted in hospitals in the US, Canada, 
UK, Australia.  However, the following information were not reported: number of 
studies included in the review, design of studies, study settings, and methods for 
identifying causes or contributory factors, which limited interpretation of the literature 
reviews’ findings.  Nonetheless, the literature reviews identified a range of factors that 
contribute to MAEs.  These illustrate the multi-factorial nature of contributory factors 
for MAEs and the need for more research to better understand the person and systems 
factors that contribute to them.   
 
Related to understanding systems factors is the challenge of identifying them. It has 
been suggested that the complexity of hospital medication systems pose a challenge for 
detecting error-producing conditions as these latent errors are often unrecognised, but 
have the capacity to result in multiple active failures (Kohn et al., 1999).  Thus, in order 
to identify latent errors, it is important to investigate the complex sociotechnical 
interactions within the hospital medication systems that exist, and examine their effects 
on the safety of medication administration.    
 
1.4 Complexity of hospital medication systems and 
processes associated with medication administration 
The complexity of hospital medications systems and the challenges of identifying latent 
error-producing conditions was alluded to earlier in this chapter.  However, it has been 
suggested that technically it is not the system that is complex, but the interactions 
between processes that are complex (Perrow, 1984).  This section provides an overview 
of complexity in relation to medication administration in hospitals, which is divided into 
two subsections: (1) conceptualising the hospital medication system and processes 
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associated with medication administration, and (2) understanding the problems of 
complexity.   
 
1.4.1 Conceptualising the hospital medication system and processes 
associated with medication administration 
Before exploring the complexity of hospital medication systems and processes 
associated with medication administration, it is important to establish what is meant by 
the following key terms: system, hospital medication system, process, and medication 
administration process.   
 
The definition and description provided by the IOM offers an eloquent explanation and 
alludes to the complexity of studying systems (Kohn et al., 1999: p.52): 
"A system is a set of interdependent elements [or processes] interacting 
to achieve a common aim. The elements may be both human and non-
human (equipment, technologies, etc.).  Systems can be very large and 
far-reaching, or they can be more localized. In health care, a system 
can be an integrated delivery system, a centrally owned multihospital 
system, or a virtual system comprised of many different partners over a 
wide geographic area. However, an operating room or an obstetrical 
unit is also a type of system. Furthermore, any element in a system 
probably belongs to multiple systems. For example, one operating 
room is part of a surgical department, which is part of a hospital, which 
is part of a larger health care delivery system. The variable size, scope, 
and membership of systems make them difficult to analyze and 
understand.” 
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Based on the above, the hospital medication system referred to in this thesis comprises 
all the components and processes associated with medication administration on 
inpatient wards, including the individuals (staff and patients) within it.  This includes the 
prescribing system and drug distribution system which are considered part of the overall 
hospital medication system used to support medication administration.   
 
A process has been defined as follows (Nolan & Provost, 1990: p.2): 
 “A process can be defined as a set of causes and conditions that 
repeatedly come together to transform inputs into outcomes.  The inputs 
might include people, materials, or information.  The outcomes include 
products, services, behaviour, or people.” 
Thus, the medication administration process comprises all (but are not exclusive to) the 
causes and conditions associated with identifying medication orders, storing, retrieving, 
preparing, and administering medications.  These are required to transform the 
prescribed medication orders into successful administration of medication towards 
improving the health status or symptoms of the patients.  Processes are often depicted 
as flow diagrams which divide the causes and conditions into sequential tasks.  
However, there is more than one way of conceptualising the medication administration 
process (Grigg et al., 2011; Lane et al., 2006).  Grigg et al (2011) studied the workflow of 
nurses administering medications in one unit at a US hospital and identified four 
variations of medication administration process workflow.  Lane et al (2006) applied a 
hierarchical task analysis of the medication administration process which divided the 
process into more detailed tasks.  This resulted in the identification of a total of 165 
tasks: from checking the chart for medication details to administering the dose to the 
patient (includes administering medications via all routes).  Figure 1.3 shows one of 
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three flow diagrams from Lane et al (2006) of the medication administration process to 
illustrate the range of tasks required to administer a prescribed dose. 
Figure 1.3 A flow diagram of the medication administration process in a UK 
hospital derived from a hierarchical task analysis by Lane et al (2006: p.674).  This 
is one of three flow diagrams by Lane et al (2006).  The other two flow diagrams in the 
publication show a break down of tasks required to prepare, and administer the 
medication. Permission to reproduce this figure is covered under the publisher’s 
guidance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, it can be seen from the above that the medication administration 
process comprise a large number of components and activities.  Each has the 
potential to fail, and each may interact in predictable and unpredictable ways 
that contribute to error-producing conditions for MAEs.  The complexity of these 
interactions is next presented. 
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1.4.2 Understanding the problems of complexity  
Much of the understanding of system complexity and the susceptibility of health care 
systems to patient incidents in national reports (Kohn et al., 1999; Department of 
Health, 2000a) have been based on human error theory by Reason (1990), which in turn 
was partly built on the work by Perrow (1984), from his analysis of major accidents in 
high risk industries.  This section provides an overview of the work by Perrow (1984) on 
systems contributions to accidents and highlights the theoretical applications for 
understanding systems effects on MAEs. 
 
Perrow (1984) suggested that the susceptibility of a system to ‘accidents’ is attributable 
to two concepts: interactiveness, and coupling.  Interactiveness relates to the notions of 
linear and complex interactions within the system.  Linear interactions are the 
predominant interactions within a system and are characterised by predictable, visible, 
and one-to-one relationships between components, for example, A is always follwed by 
B which is followed by C, therefore if B is not working, then C will not function, and 
exploration into A or other upstream components is expected to reveal the cause.  By 
contrast, complex interactions are characterised by the opposite; the interactions 
involve sequences that are unfamiliar, unplanned, or unexpected, and are either not 
visible or are not immediately comprehensible.   As highlighted earlier, hospital 
medication systems and the medication administration process are dependent on a 
large number of components.  It can be seen from figure 1.3 that many of the 
components either are or  have the potential to be involved in a complex interaction.  
For example, checking the drug chart may involve first searching for the drug chart; 
availability of the drug chart is not always predictable and the subsequent actions taken 
to locate the drug chart is not always consistent.  This may be further complicated by 
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interruptions experienced during the task and subsequent actions are likely to be 
situation dependent and therefore unpredictable.  
 
Coupling is a mechanical term with origins in engineering and was used by Perrow 
(1984) to describe the flexibility of systems in response to unpredictable changes and 
failures.   In tightly coupled systems, there are more time-dependent processes; A is 
immediately followed by B and there is little waiting time in-between.  The sequence is 
invariable (B must follow A) and the overall process is designed to reach the goal in one 
way, with little slack or buffer in how resources are used.  Consequently, buffers and 
redundancies need to be designed into tightly coupled systems to support the recovery 
process if/when a component fails (regardless of whether the interactions are complex 
or linear).  By contrast, loosely coupled systems can accommodate time delays, the 
sequence can be reordered, there are multiple methods to achieve the same goal and 
resources may be ‘wasted’ without impacting greatly on the goal.  The arrangement of 
components in a loosely coupled system may also facilitate recovery from failure.  In 
general, health care is considered to be a loosely coupled system (Pinelle & Gutwin, 
2006), and this probably includes hospital medication systems due to the dynamic 
nature of the processes involved.  For example, in the drug distribution system, 
medications can be ordered within a range of times from the pharmacy, often via one of 
a selection of methods.  Furthermore, medications may be supplied to the ward at a 
range of times, and then put away in the relevant ward-based storage facilities at a time 
that is convenient for the nurse, rather than interrupt them.  If a new medication is 
prescribed and is not available on the ward, the system is generally sufficiently flexible 
to enable nurses to obtain the drug via an alternative method to avoid a dose omission.   
Conversely, due to the ‘looseness’ of the hospital medication system, a newly prescribed 
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dose may not be identified and/or supplied within the required period of time, thus 
potentially contributing to a dose omission error. 
 
As a potential problem, the notion of complex interactions suggest that the solution 
would be to simplify and make interactions more linear.  However, Perrow (1984) 
highlights that this is not the case; in practice, complex systems can be more efficient 
than linear systems (for example, due to multi-functional components).  Furthermore, it 
is not always possible to reduce complexity and produce the same ‘output’.  As with 
complex interactions, tight coupling in systems is sometimes necessary and not always 
seen as a problem.   However, in general, systems that have tightly coupled, complex 
interactions are more prone to accidents than loosely coupled linear interactions as 
there are less opportunities and time to recover from component failure.  Overall, the 
type of interactions and coupling within the hospital medication system and associated 
medication administration process are situation dependent.  This creates a challenge for 
developing systems-based interventions because potential latent error-producing 
conditions may not be recognised at the time of investigation (Kohn et al., 1999).  
Furthermore, as most health care processes were not designed but have evolved 
(Vincent, 2011), it is suspected that system and process variations exist across the NHS.  
This presents a barrier for identifying, prioritising, and developing system-based 
interventions to reduce error.   The concepts of variation are next discussed. 
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1.5 Variations in hospital medication systems and 
medication administration process 
Variation is inherent in all things (Nolan & Provost, 1990).  Exploring variations in 
hospital medication systems and medication administration processes may contribute to 
greater understanding of the interactions between individuals and the systems within 
which they work (sociotechnical interactions), and therefore how effective interventions 
may be developed to further increase medication safety.  This section is divided into the 
following: (1) variation in the components and performance of hospital medication 
systems, (2) common and special causes of variation, (3) unintended and unwanted 
variation, and (4) system and process improvement strategies to potentially reduce 
MAEs.  
 
1.5.1 Variation in the components and performance of hospital medication 
systems 
There are several ways in which variation can be explored.  In health care, a prominent 
type of variation is geographical variation in utilisation of resources and patient 
outcomes which is evident in the UK and worldwide (NHS Right Care, 2011; Public 
Health Wales Observatory, 2012; The Dartmouth Atlas Working Group, 2013; Health 
Quality and Safety Commission New Zealand, 2010).  However, the variation of 
relevance in this thesis is at a more micro level, those associated with hospital 
medication systems such as availability of specific resources among institutions (Berwick 
1991) and those associated with the performance of the medication administration 
process (for example, success rates of the same tasks between different hospitals) 
(Nolan & Provost, 1990).  The two are connected in that variation in the components of 
the hospital medication systems can lead to differences in their performance.  For 
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example, several studies have identified differences in MAE rates associated with 
different drug distribution systems (Means et al., 1975; Dean et al., 1995; Taxis et al., 
1999), and also with different technological systems used to support medication 
administration (Schwarz & Brodowy, 1995; Paoletti et al., 2007; DeYoung et al., 2009; 
Poon et al., 2010; Franklin et al., 2007).  Knowing the types of hospital medication 
systems-based variation that exists would therefore facilitate prioritisation of systems-
based interventions to reduce MAEs.   
 
In the US, the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) conducts regular 
national surveys of pharmacy practice in hospitals, including information on the types of 
hospital medication systems used to support medication administration, in addition to 
systems used for prescribing, transcribing, dispensing, and monitoring (Pedersen et al., 
2012; 2011; 2010).  From these surveys, it was estimated that, in 2011, 60% of hospitals 
had a centralised inpatient pharmacy drug distribution system which may have included 
a manual unit dose system, 40% had decentralised systems which included the use of 
automated dispensing cabinets and satellite pharmacies in some hospitals, 67% used 
electronic medication administration records (MARs), and 50% used bar-code-assisted 
medication administration (BCMA).   
 
In Europe, a recent survey of hospital medication procurement and distribution, 
conducted by the European Association of Hospital Pharmacists, identified 37.5% of UK 
hospital pharmacies provided a unit-dose service (Frontini et al., 2012).  However, it was 
unclear what was meant by a unit-dose service as no description was provided, i.e. 
whether it referred to the supply of single-dose medications when appropriate, or 
whether it was comparable to the unit-dose drug distribution system in the US which 
has been described as the following (ASHP, 2012: p.121): 
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“The unit dose system of medication distribution is a pharmacy-
coordinated method of dispensing and controlling medications in 
organised health-care settings.  The unit dose system may differ in form, 
depending on the specific needs of the organization. However, the 
following distinctive elements are basic to all unit dose systems: 
medications are contained in single unit packages; they are dispensed in 
as ready-to-administer form as possible; and for most medications, not 
more than a 24-hour supply of doses is delivered to or available at the 
patient-care area at any time.” 
 
No other data on hospital medication systems used in the UK are available.  This 
represented a gap in the knowledge of hospital medication systems used to support 
medication administration in the UK and a potential barrier for developing system-based 
interventions to reduce MAEs across the NHS.  This knowledge gap is addressed later in 
the present thesis.   
 
As discussed earlier, health care is a dynamic complex system that has a number of 
tightly and loosely coupled interactions.  There is often more than one way to do most 
things, and the ‘best’ method is likely to depend on a range of situational factors.  Thus, 
in addition to identifying variations associated with hospital medication systems, it is 
also important to recognise that there is inherent variation in the performance of 
systems and processes (Nolan & Provost, 1990).  This is so that potential differences in 
the performance (for example, MAE rates) can be interpreted accurately.   
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1.5.2 Common and special causes of variation 
Nolan and Provost (1990) suggest that there are two ways of interpreting variation: (1) 
variation that indicates good or bad performance, and (2) variation that results from 
common or special causes. The former is more common and is often used for assessing 
quality, performance, and decision-making in health care as well as other industries.  
However, a disadvantage of this interpretation is that the causes of variation are not 
considered and therefore it does not provide information about how improvements can 
be made.  By contrast, the common and special causes of variation approach recognises 
that some inherent variation exist within a system (or process) and should be separated 
from those variations that are caused by other factors external to the system (or 
process), but arise in specific situations.  These were named ‘common causes’ and 
‘special causes’, respectively, by Deming who based this classification on the innovative 
work of Shewhart’s statistical process control (SPC) (Berwick 1991).   
 
According to Shewhart, a process is in a state of statistical control or ‘stable’ if it only has 
common causes that affect its outcomes (Berwick 1991).  When the outcomes of a 
process are affected by common and special causes, the process is said to be ‘unstable’ 
i.e. the variations associated with the process are unpredictable.  Deming suggested that 
a stable process is advantageous for a number of reasons: (1) the predictability of 
variations facilitates future planning, (2) costs and quality are predictable, thus (3) 
productivity and efficiency can be maximised, and (4) effects of system or process 
changes can be measured with greater speed and reliability (Berwick 1991).  In the 
manufacturing industry, Shewhart’s and Deming’s work has been widely incorporated 
into management principles such as the Total Quality Management (TQM) techniques 
and Six Sigma with reported benefits on value, quality, and reliability (Bank, 1992).  
Subsequently, health care service providers worldwide have also sought to do the same.  
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The overall aims of TQM and other process improvement strategies such as Six Sigma is 
to eliminate unwanted variation, the rationale for reducing unintended variations in 
health care are next discussed.   
 
1.5.3 Unintended and unwanted variations 
In health care, it is recognised that unintended variations exist but not all imply poor 
quality.  Variations can be beneficial when the evidence base is poor and practitioners 
are given autonomy to innovate, monitor and provide evidence towards identifying 
‘best’ practice (Richards & Lilford, 2009; Hawkes, 2009).   However, when unintended 
variations are not measured or understood, underlying problems within the system may 
remain uncorrected.  The risk is that individuals may become used to problems 
associated with the system or processes, and flaw is expected, thus reducing efforts to 
improve, and consequently contributing to continuous waste (Berwick, 1991).   
 
Another problem of unintended variation is that it is compounded by the complexity of 
the systems and processes.   As Berwick (1991: p.1219) implied about hospitals: 
“Unable to understand the underlying causes of the variation they saw, 
managers changed systems in response to variations that were merely 
random or not caused by the system in the first place, thereby adding 
complexity but doing no good.  Systems got more and more complex, 
costs rose, and quality suffered.” 
 
It has been suggested that a problem of system complexity is that it is inversely related 
to reliability (Berwick, 1991; Botwinick et al., 2006).  Table 1.4 illustrates the relationship 
between the number of components in a system (or steps in a process) and the overall 
success rate if each component functioned properly for 95%, 99%, or 99.9% of the time.   
 Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
50 of 321 
Table 1.4 Relationship between number of components in a system or process steps 
and overall success rate if each component functioned properly for 95%, 99%, and 
99.9% of the time.  Adapted from Botwinick et al (2006) 
 Probability of success for each component/step 
Number of 
components/steps 
0.95 0.99 0.999 
1 0.95 0.99 0.999 
25 0.28 0.78 0.98 
50 0.08 0.61 0.95 
100 0.01 0.37 0.90 
 
 
From this statistical probability perspective, the overall performance of any system (or 
process) can be improved if the reliability of the components is increased and/or the 
number of components is reduced.  It has been suggested that one or both can be 
achieved by system-based changes (Botwinick et al., 2006).  The system-based changes 
suggested are at the process level and is also the foundation principle for a number of 
systems and process improvement strategies, such as Lean and Six Sigma.  These 
originated from the manufacturing industry and have been adopted by health care 
services to increase quality and efficiency (Womack et al., 2005; Westwood et al., 2007; 
Jones et al., 2006).   
 
Overall, irrespective of the level at which variation is studied, the main consequence of 
variation is that it can interfere with interpretation and therefore subsequent actions. 
While the focus of this thesis is on identifying systems variations and their effects on 
MAEs, it is important to recognise that process variations may also exist within the 
system.   These process variations can affect how systems variation is interpreted.  
Decisions are often based on whether the observed variation is considered to be within 
the ‘norm’ or indicative of something else that requires action.  In health care, the price 
of misinterpretation include blaming individuals for system-based problems, changing a 
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patient’s treatment when it would be better to continue (non-value processes), 
spending money on unnecessary equipment (wasted resources), and taking other 
actions when it was not needed (Nolan & Provost, 1990; Berwick, 1991).  All have the 
potential to reduce quality and safety of care.  However, the solution is not to eliminate 
all variations but to identify and eliminate unwanted variations that contribute to poor 
performance.  This requires a better understanding of the variations in hospital 
medication systems that exist in the NHS, and is the overarching aim of the present 
thesis. 
 
The next section describes the main theoretical concepts that underpinned the research 
approach used in this thesis. 
 
1.6 Theoretical concepts for analysing risk and safety in 
hospital medication systems 
In this section, a number of theoretical concepts considered for use in this thesis are 
described.  These were principally (1) Donabedian’s (1972; 2003) structure, process, 
outcome (SPO)  model for assessing quality in health care, and (2) Reason’s Swiss cheese 
model of accident causation (Reason 1990; 1995; Reason et al., 2001).  Additional 
theoretical concepts that were also considered are summarised in a separate section. 
 
1.6.1 Structure, process, outcome 
In Donabedian’s (1972) influential work on assessing quality in health care, he proposed 
that quality can be measured using three approaches which are inextricably linked: 
structure, process and outcome.  
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 ‘Structure’ refers to the conditions in which care is provided and includes 
availability of material resources, human resources and organisational features 
such as training, research, supervision etc.   
 ‘Process’ refers to the activities which are undertaken to provide the care such 
as diagnosis, treatment, patient education.   
 ‘Outcome’ refers to changes in which individuals and populations can attribute 
to health care such as changes in health status, changes in knowledge and/or 
behaviour acquired by patients and/or family members that may influence 
future care.   
 
While Donabedian’s SPO model was originally conceptualised to assess quality, the 
intuitiveness of the model has allowed researchers to adapt it accordingly for use in 
other related areas such as organising patient safety research (Battles & Lilford, 2003), 
evaluation of information technology (Cornford et al., 1994), and evaluation of 
interventions in complex health care systems (Brown et al., 2008).  For example, Battles 
and Lilford (2003) recognised the importance of considering the patient’s antecedent 
conditions on the overall outcome and therefore adapted the SPO model to reflect this 
(figure 1.4).  For studying variations in hospital medication systems, Donabedian’s SPO 
model provides a useful approach for conceptualising variation at the process and 
structure levels, i.e. the study of variations associated with medication administration 
processes should be considered within the context of the hospital medication structure.  
Using this model, MAEs are a consequence of the process and not a patient outcome, 
but the relationship between MAEs and patient outcomes is acknowledged.  Patient 
outcome related measures such as frequency of preventable ADEs and length of hospital 
stay are not specifically measured or explored in the current thesis as the focus is on 
understanding systems based variation. 
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Figure 1.4 A schematic of Donabedian’s structure, process, and outcome model 
adapted from Battles and Lilford (2003: p.ii3) for use in patient safety. Dotted line 
represents area of study in this thesis.   
 
 
1.6.2 Swiss cheese model 
While Donabedian’s SPO provided the analytic framework for much of the methods later 
described in this thesis, Reason’s Swiss cheese model provided the underlying theory for 
using a systems approach to studying the safety of medication administration.  Based on 
analysis of multiple major industrial accidents, Reason (1990) observed that the 
breakdown or failures in complex technological systems are analogous to the multi-
factorial aetiology of illnesses such as cancer and cardiovascular disease.  Thus, Reason 
(1990) suggested that latent failures in complex technological systems are similar to 
‘resident pathogens’ in the human body.  These resident pathogens may be dormant 
within systems and not cause any harm.  However, through some external 
circumstances, resident pathogens may combine with ‘local triggers’ to weaken the 
system’s defences and thus result in its breakdown. In his widely regarded Swiss cheese 
model of accident causation, Reason’s resident pathogens are represented by the holes 
in the layers of Swiss cheese, creating gaps in the system’s defences against hazards.  An 
accident occurs when a combination of unsafe acts (active failures) combine with latent 
failures to allow the ‘holes’ to align, thus providing a clear trajectory for the hazard 
through the system’s defences (figure 1.5).  The model emphasises the importance of 
Structure 
Process Outcome 
Patients’ 
antecedent 
conditions 
Adjust structure and process to 
minimise risks of health care 
associated incidents 
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targeting systemic resident pathogens to reduce accident-precipitating latent 
conditions.  Figure 1.6 shows the Swiss cheese model in more detail as an organisational 
accident causation model separating organisational factors from task factors and 
individuals (Reason, 1995).   
 
 
Figure 1.5 The “Swiss cheese” model of accident causation from Reason et al (2001: 
pii21).  Permission to reproduce this figure has been granted by the publisher. 
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Figure 1.6 Stages of development of organisational accident adapted from Reason 
(1995: p83).   
 
 
 
 
 
In the organisational accident model (figure 1.6), Reason (1995) shows the ‘slices’ of 
Swiss Cheese as being represented by four main domains: organisation, 
task/environment, individual, and defences/barriers.  The direction of accident causality 
begins from left to right, and signifies the transmission of latent failures that create 
error-producing conditions that lead to accidents.  Overall, Reason’s models highlight 
that system factors are likely to play a major role in contributing to error-producing 
conditions. 
 
1.6.3 Other theoretical concepts and frameworks  
Three other theoretical concepts and frameworks were also reviewed.  Table 1.5 
provides a description of each of these. 
 
Conditions which 
contribute to error 
and/or violation 
 
• workload 
• communication 
• equipment 
• skills / 
knowledge 
• interruptions 
 
 
 
Unsafe acts 
 
• Slips  
• Lapse 
• Mistake 
• Violations 
Task/environment Individual Defences / 
barriers 
Accidents 
/ Incidents 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Organisational 
processes 
 
Management 
decisions 
Organisation 
Latent failures in defences 
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Table 1.5 Overview of three other theoretical frameworks and considerations for their 
use to study hospital medication system variations in this thesis. 
Theoretical framework Description Considerations for use to 
study variation in hospital 
medication systems 
The framework for 
evaluating information 
systems (Cornford et al., 
1994)(table 1.6) 
 Based on Donabedian’s 
SPO model 
 The framework was 
originally developed for 
evaluating the efficiency, 
utility and overall impact 
of a computer-based 
medical decision-aid 
system, and could be 
applied to other 
technological systems 
Potentially useful for 
studying a specific system 
or process component but 
considered less useful for 
exploring multiple 
components and their 
variations in hospital 
medication systems. 
Modified structure, 
process, outcome model 
for evaluating interventions 
in complex systems / 
Lilford’s axiom for 
evaluating complex 
interventions (Brown et al., 
2008; Lilford, 2009) (figure 
1.6) 
 Based on Donabedian’s 
SPO model with causal 
links inspired by 
Reason’s organisational 
accident causation 
model 
 The purpose of the 
model is to 
conceptualise specific 
processes for developing 
and evaluating 
interventions to reduce 
adverse patient 
outcomes 
As a conceptual model that 
combined both theoretical 
concepts of relevance in 
this thesis, Brown et al’s 
(2009) model could have 
been used but the focus on 
interventions, and 
separation of management 
processes from clinical 
processes was not 
considered useful for this 
thesis.  
Vincent’s framework for 
analysing risk and safety in 
health care (Vincent et al., 
1998) (box 1.1) 
 Based on Reason’s 
organisational accident 
causation model 
 The purpose of the 
framework is to provide 
a comprehensive 
framework for analysing 
adverse events and 
identifying system and 
individual factors that 
are relevant to clinical 
practice 
 Researchers also suggest 
that the framework can 
be used to develop 
organisational risk 
assessment instruments  
An extensive framework 
that could have been used 
in this thesis but was 
considered too prescriptive 
for exploring variations in 
hospital medication 
systems, and the 
framework also included a 
large proportion of factors 
that are outside the scope 
of this thesis.  
SPO, structure, process, outcome 
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Table 1.6 Cornford et al’s (1994) framework for evaluating information systems 
 System functions Human perspectives 
(customer, actor, owner) 
Organisational 
context 
Structure Technical detail Work conditions and 
implied requirements 
Sustainability, 
opportunity costs, 
management needs, 
skill requirements 
Process Information 
processing; correct 
and valid 
Human participation in 
tasks; social interaction 
Altered delivery and 
practice 
Outcome Relevant, 
applicable, reliable 
Quality of service, and 
outcomes 
Effect in the world 
 
 
Figure 1.7 Modified structure, process, outcome model for evaluating interventions in 
complex systems / Lilford’s axiom for evaluating complex interventions (Brown 2009).  
The shaded boxes represent the end points that could be measured in an evaluation of a 
patient safety intervention. 
 
 
 
Structure Management 
processes 
(latent errors) 
Clinical 
processes 
(active errors) 
Patient 
outcomes 
Intervening 
variables, 
e.g. morale 
Fidelity Fidelity 
Generic 
intervention 
Specific 
intervention 
Through-
put e.g. 
number of 
patients 
treated 
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Overall, the theoretical frameworks described above provide a useful evidence-based 
structure for health services research, however in general, they were considered to be 
either too specific to a piece of technology or intervention, or too prescriptive for 
exploring variations relating to hospital medication systems and medication 
administration processes.  Thus, the main theoretical frameworks that were used in this 
thesis were Donabedian’s SPO model and Reason’s organisational accident causation 
model.   
 
1.7 Scope of the present thesis 
Overall, this chapter has highlighted that a considerable number of patients suffer 
preventable harm as a direct consequence of medication errors in hospitals, and that 
medication errors pose a substantial financial burden on health care services.  In 
Box 1.1  Seven health services specific factors that influence clinical practice, from 
Vincent et al (1998) 
 
1. Institutional context     
Economic and regulatory context  
 
2. Organisational and management factors 
Financial resources and constraints  
Organisational structure  
Policy standards and goals  
Safety culture and priorities  
 
3. Work environment  
Staffing levels and skills mix 
Workload and shift patterns  
Design, availability, and maintenance of 
equipment  
Administrative and managerial support  
 
4. Team factors 
Verbal communication  
 
Written communication  
Supervision and seeking help  
Team structure  
 
5. Individual (staff) factors  
Knowledge and skills  
Motivation  
Physical and mental health  
 
6. Task factors  
Task design and clarity of structure  
Availability and use of protocols  
Availability and accuracy of test results  
 
7. Patient characteristics  
Condition (complexity and seriousness)  
Language and communication  
Personality and social factors 
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particular, the incidence and severity of patient harm from MAEs was described.   
Research suggests error-prevention strategies should focus on reducing error-producing 
conditions associated with systems and processes.  However, as described earlier, 
systems and processes associated with medication administration are complex and the 
extent of potential variations and their effects on medication safety are unknown; these 
present a barrier to prioritising and developing interventions to reduce error.   
 
Thus the overall aim of this thesis was to investigate variations in NHS hospital 
medication systems and their potential effects on the safety of medication 
administration.  However, in describing the literature, it was apparent that it would not 
be practical to measure all the systems-based variations and their effects on the safety 
of medication administration.  Instead, the initial approach was to consider the core 
tasks and defence barriers associated with medication administration as a ‘whole’ 
(chapter two).  A preliminary observational study was therefore carried out to assess the 
overall quality and safety of medication administration and to identify potential areas 
for exploring systems variation.  This initial approach, together with findings from 
addressing the gap in knowledge about MAEs (chapter three) and application of 
Donabedian’s SPO framework, contributed to identifying a range of hospital medication 
system components for inclusion in a national survey (chapter four).  The findings from 
these three areas of research then contributed to the development of two further 
studies; one was focused on ward-based medication storage systems and dose retrieval 
(chapter five), and the other was focused on investigating the sociotechnical interactions 
between nurses and three different types of hospital medication systems (chapter six).  
This thesis was therefore conducted according to the following five interlinked research 
questions: 
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1. What are the main tasks and defence barriers associated with medication 
administration to hospital inpatients in the NHS? (chapter two) 
2. How do methodological variations between studies affect reported MAE rates in 
UK NHS hospitals? (chapter three) 
3. What variations exist (if any) in the types of medication systems used by staff in 
NHS hospitals to obtain, store, and administer medication for inpatient use? 
(chapter four) 
4. What variations exist (if any) in the types of ward-based medication storage and 
transport systems used by staff to retrieve medications for administration on 
general medical and surgical wards within one acute NHS trust? (chapter five) 
5. What systems-related factors facilitate and/or hinder safe medication 
administration in NHS hospitals? (chapter six) 
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Chapter 2.  Preliminary fieldwork to 
investigate the quality and safety of 
medication administration 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
In chapter one, the complexity of the medication administration process was described, and 
the use of a systems approach to identify potential underlying latent error-producing 
conditions was discussed.  It was decided that a preliminary observational study of the 
medication administration process as a whole would be useful to identify potential areas for 
exploring systems variation.  The core tasks and defence barriers associated with medication 
administration, rather than MAEs alone, would be measured and used to assess the overall 
quality and safety of medication administration.  At around the same time as this study, it was 
suggested that process improvement strategies such as Lean and Six Sigma, which have been 
used in health care to increase efficiency and reduce defects, would also reduce medication 
errors.  However no formal studies in this area were identified at the time.  Consequently, the 
present study was designed to form both (1) a preliminary observational study for assessing 
the overall quality and safety of medication administration  on one general medical ward of an 
acute NHS hospital, and (2) a quasi-experimental study of the medicines-related aspects of a 
national process improvement initiative called ‘The Productive Ward’ (NHS Institute for 
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Inovation and Improvement, 2009), that was to be implemented on the same ward.   
Implementation of the medicines-related aspects of ‘The Productive Ward’ were not 
subsequently made on the study ward due to changes within the study hospital, and therefore 
no post-intervention data were collected.  The study is therefore presented here as a 
preliminary observational study of medication administration on one general medical ward 
alone.  
 
2.2  Background 
Despite the recognition that MAEs are common and analysis into their causes often reveals 
multiple failures at the individual and organisational levels (Taxis & Barber, 2003a; Jylha et al., 
2011; Nichols et al., 2008), few studies have measured a range of parameters associated with 
the medication administration process. Those that have, have shown that procedural failures 
(such as not checking a patient’s identity and inaccurate documentation), and systems-based 
factors (such as drug not being available) are common and pose a potential problem for 
patient safety (Franklin et al., 2008).   Furthermore, potential variation in hospital medication 
systems has been associated with different effects on MAEs (Means et al., 1975; Dean et al., 
1995; Taxis et al., 1999; Schwarz & Brodowy, 1995; Paoletti et al., 2007; DeYoung et al., 2009; 
Poon et al., 2010; Franklin et al., 2007).  Thus, measuring a number of parameters associated 
with medication administration, rather than focus solely on MAEs, may reveal potential latent 
underlying error-producing conditions associated with different hospital medication systems. 
 
The tasks involved in medication administration in NHS hospitals have previously been 
conceptualised in a number of ways (Grigg et al., 2011; Lane et al., 2006).  Grigg et al (2011) 
identified four variations of medication administration process workflow in one unit at a US 
hospital.  Lane et al (2006) applied a hierarchical task analysis of the medication administration 
process which divided the process into more detailed tasks, and identified a total of 165 tasks 
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that could be associated with the medication administration process, depending on the 
number of problems encountered.  Overall, these revealed the complexities of studying the 
medication administration process as a whole and the types of error that may occur.  
However, the reliability of carrying out each task correctly was not assessed; thus limiting the 
practicality of using these to identify potential areas for investigating the effects of systems 
variation. 
 
Over the past few decades, process improvement initiatives from the manufacturing industry 
such as Lean and Six Sigma have become more widely adopted across the health care sector 
worldwide, including the NHS (Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2005; Jones & Mitchell, 
2006; Westwood et al., 2007).  The implementation of these strategies in NHS hospitals has 
been associated with a wide number of benefits.  These include reduced delays in processing 
laboratory specimens, reduced length of stay for hospital inpatients, and reduced hospital 
mortality in some groups of patients (Westwood et al., 2007).  A recent literature review on 
the effects of quality improvement strategies identified reductions in infection rates and 
increased operating room efficiency (Nicolay et al., 2012).  However, the potential effects of 
process change on medication safety are uncertain.  It was widely assumed that process 
improvement initiatives would increase medication safety as a consequence of streamlining 
workflow, reducing system defects, and detecting mistakes early in the process (Jones et al., 
2006; Womack et al., 2005).  A small number of case studies have reported a reduction in 
medication errors (Esimai, 2006; Chan, 2004; Castle et al., 2005) but these alone are 
insufficient to establish potential cause and effect.   
 
In 2008, the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement formally launched a process 
improvement toolkit called ‘Releasing time to care: The Productive Ward’ (NHS Institute for 
Inovation and Improvement, 2009).  The toolkit was based on Lean principles, which aimed to 
guide ward staff in the use of process improvement techniques to improve ward processes and 
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environments (including those relating to medication administration).  The overall objectives 
were to increase safety and efficiency on NHS hospital wards.  A report from the NHS Institute 
for Innovation and Improvement identified a number of efficiency gains from implementation 
of the Productive Ward: an increase of up to 40% in the time nurses spent on direct patient 
care, savings of up to £30,000 was achieved from more effective use of resources, drug round 
times were reduced by 50%, and nurses took less physical steps to carry out tasks such as 
preparing IV antibiotics (NHS Institute for Inovation and Improvement, 2009).   However, no 
direct safety measures were reported.  Nonetheless, the efficiency benefits were persuasive 
and under the ever increasing financial and workload pressure placed on the NHS, hospitals 
began piloting the implementation of The Productive Ward initiative.  This presented a timely 
opportunity to combine the preliminary observational study with an evaluation of the quality 
and safety of the medication administration process before and after implementation of the 
Productive Ward initiative. 
 
2.3  Aim and objectives 
The aim of this study was to describe and measure the reliability of a number of core tasks and 
defence barriers associated with medication administration, and to use these to assess the 
overall quality and safety of medication administration.  There were four objectives: 
1. To collect data on a number of core tasks and defence barriers associated with 
medication administration during non-IV drug rounds; 
2. To combine multiple sources of data into a medication administration process ‘quality 
filter’ as an approach to derive an overall quality measure; 
3. To evaluate the effect of The Productive Ward initiative on observed MAE rates using a 
before-and-after study design; 
4. To make recommendations for future work in this area. 
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2.4  Methodology 
Three main methodological considerations were identified and are discussed: (1) method of 
data collection, (2) MAE definition, denominator and subcategories, and (3) identifying the 
core tasks and defence barriers associated with medication administration 
 
2.4.1 Method of data collection  
The primary outcome measure of interest was the MAE rate; MAE rates can be measured 
using direct observation, chart review, and/or self-report.  Direct observation was chosen as it 
is a valid and reliable method that is also widely considered to be the gold standard for 
collecting MAE data (Allan & Barker, 1990; Dean & Barber, 1999).  This method also allowed 
other quality measures to be collected at the same time by the researcher (MM) who had 
previous experience in observing drug rounds for another study (Franklin et al., 2007).  
However, there was a risk that the observer may influence the individual’s behaviour during 
the study.  The largely unpredictable nature of the observer-effect on different individuals 
being observed is a problem that can be difficult to measure.  Dean and Barber (2001) 
investigated the validity and reliability of observational method for studying MAEs in two 
wards of an acute NHS hospital.  Overall, findings from Dean and Barber’s (2001) study suggest 
MAE rates were not significantly affected when a discreet, non-judgemental, and tactful 
observational approach used; this corroborated findings from an earlier study by Barker and 
McConnell (1962).  Consequently, this was the approach that was used in the current study by 
the observer to minimise the risk of data contamination from potential observer-effects.  In 
addition, the researcher was introduced to all the nursing staff prior to the start of the study 
and piloted data collection on the same ward to enable nurses to become familiar with the 
presence of an observer.  The researcher also made every effort to be as unobtrusive as 
possible and encouraged nurses to feed back about their experience of being observed.   
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2.4.2 MAE definition, denominator, and MAE subcategories 
An MAE was defined by Allan and Barker
 
(1990) as any dose of medication administered (or 
omitted) that deviates from the patient’s medication order.  This American hospital-based 
definition was used in the current study as it was specific to the medication administration 
process, was clear about the inclusion of dose omissions as an MAE, and has been widely used 
in MAE studies including in the UK, thus allowing relevant comparisons with previous research.  
The associated MAE subcategories by Allan and Barker (1990) are listed in table 2.1. 
Considerations for inclusion or exclusion of each MAE subcategory are summarised; these 
were largely based on a previous study that adapted Allan and Barker’s MAE subcategories and 
were considered more operational for use in UK hospital settings (Franklin et al., 2007).  The 
MAE subcategories were mutually exclusive; only one MAE subcategory could be associated 
with each dose. 
 
In the current study, ‘administration’ was taken to include leaving a dose at a patient’s bedside 
for self-administration and pharmacists’ written endorsements to clarify prescribers’ 
medication order were considered part of the medication order (Franklin et al., 2007).  In 
circumstances where the medication order in an inpatient drug chart cross-referenced 
medication orders on a separate sheet, for example, a multiple resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA) protocol, it was the separate sheet that was considered to be the medication 
order and not any cross-references in the drug chart.    
 
To determine the MAE rate, the denominator used in the current study was the total number 
of OEs, defined by Allan and Barker (1990) as the sum of all doses given plus all doses omitted 
(ordered, but not given).  The overall MAE rate was calculated as the number of MAEs divided 
by the total number of OEs, multiplied by 100 (Allan & Barker, 1990; Franklin et al., 2007). 
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Table 2.1 Medication administration error (MAE) subcategories used in the current study. 
MAE subcategory 
Description by Allan and Barker (1990) 
(developed for use in American hospital 
setting) 
Inclusion, exclusion, and/or elaboration of definitions used 
in the current study for an MAE (based on Franklin et al 
2007) 
Omission An omission error takes place when a 
patient has not received his or her 
medication by the time the next dose is due. 
Included.  A dose of medication that has not been 
administered by the time of the next scheduled dose (does 
not include doses omitted according to doctor’s instructions, 
nurse’s clinical judgement, or if patient not on ward).  
Omissions due to drug not being available were differentiated 
from other types of omissions. 
Wrong dose A wrong dose error typically occurs when 
the patient receives an amount of medicine 
that is greater than or less than the amount 
ordered. 
Included. The administration of the correct drug by the 
correct route but in a quantity that was not that prescribed 
(includes administration of incorrect number of dose units, 
selection of the wrong strength and the measurement of an 
incorrect volume of an oral liquid (+/- one graduation mark 
from the intended volume required, or more drops than that 
was required).   
Unordered drug An unordered drug error occurs when a 
patient receives a medication for which the 
physician did not write an order.  This 
includes those that result when a nurse 
switches medications for two patients; each 
patient is the victim of an unordered drug 
error (as well as an omission) 
Included. The administration of a drug that was not 
prescribed at all for the patient concerned (classified as a 
wrong drug error if drug X prescribed but drug Y given 
instead). 
Unauthorised 
drug 
This was considered to be the same as 
unordered drug error  
Excluded. Same as unordered drug error. 
Wrong drug Administration of the wrong drug was 
considered to an unordered drug error. 
Included. A dose of a drug administered that is not the drug 
prescribed (does not include generic substitution or 
therapeutic substitutions in accordance with trust policy). 
Wrong dosage 
form  
Wrong dosage form errors involve the 
administration of a drug in a dosage form 
different from the one that was ordered 
Included.  The administration of the correct dose of the drug 
by the correct route but in a formulation that was not 
prescribed (includes administration of modified release when 
non-modified prescribed, and vice versa).  Does not include 
administration of enteric coated drug instead of plain tablets 
if the patient states enteric coated is normally taken, or any 
appropriate purposeful alteration, such as substituting tablets 
with a soluble equivalent to help administration. 
Wrong time  A wrong time error occurs when the patient 
does not receive his or her medication 
within a predefined interval. 
Excluded.  Timing of drug administration in relation to the 
prescribed time was measured and reported but not included 
as an MAE. 
Wrong route Wrong route errors occur when the correct 
form of drug is administered, but in the 
correct site on the patient’s body. 
Included.  The administration of the correct drug by a route 
or site that was not that prescribed. 
Drug deteriorated A deteriorated drug error is reported when 
the physical or chemical integrity of a 
medication dosage form has been 
compromised, as with expired drugs or 
intravenous medications requiring 
refrigeration that are left out of the fridge. 
Included.  Administration of a drug that has exceeded its 
expiry date or a drug with its physical or chemical integrity 
compromised. 
Wrong rate of 
administration  
Wrong rate of administration errors can 
occur with infusions of intravenous fluids or 
liquid enteral products.   
Excluded.  The current study was focused on the 
administration of non-intravenous drugs. 
Wrong 
administration 
technique 
Wrong administration technique errors 
involve using an inappropriate procedure 
during administration of a drug.  Examples 
include wrong inhaler technique and not 
wiping an injection site with alcohol. 
Excluded.  Wrong administration technique errors such as 
wrong inhaler technique were considered a wrong dose, and 
not wiping an injection site with alcohol was considered a 
violation of procedure rather than an error. 
Wrong dose 
preparation  
Wrong dose preparation error occurs when 
a product is incorrectly manipulated before 
administration.  Examples include not 
shaking an oral suspension. 
Excluded.  If wrong dose preparation such as failure to shake 
a bottle of suspension resulted in a visible concentration 
gradient this is was considered a wrong dose error. 
Extra dose An extra dose error occurs when the patient 
receives additional dosage units to those 
that were authorised, such as a dose 
administered after the order was cancelled. 
Included.  The administration of an additional dose of a 
prescribed medication (includes administration of a drug 
more times in the day than prescribed and administration of 
a dose of drug after it has been crossed off the chart). 
Other error When the investigator believes that a 
medication error has occurred but does not 
fall into a predefined subcategory 
Included. 
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2.4.3 Identifying the core tasks and defence barriers associated with the 
medication administration process 
Pilot observations were conducted on the study ward to identify the core tasks and defence 
barriers associated with medication administration on non-IV drug rounds.  Potential measures 
relating to the system effects were initially identified by noting common interactions between 
nursing staff and the medication systems used on the ward.   The medication administration 
related measures specified in the Productive Ward toolkit were also considered for inclusion in 
the study: the number of MAEs and associated themes identified from medication incident 
reports, time taken to complete drug rounds, and number of interruptions per drug round.   
 
To ensure the study measures were relevant and useful to staff at the study site, a group 
comprising four nurses of varying seniority from the study ward, the lead nurse for Medicine, 
the lead nurse for process improvement projects, and MM, reviewed the measures suggested 
in the Productive Ward toolkit and identified other potential quality measures for inclusion in 
the study.  The quality and safety measures were based on those previously measured in other 
quantitative MAE studies, feedback from nursing staff on potential problematic medication 
administration-related areas, practicalities of data collection, and priorities for assessment 
locally.  Additionally, two other measures were identified during the pilot observations and 
subsequently included in the study following discussion with the project group: (1) nurses 
often accessed the patient’s bedside medication locker to retrieve medications but doses were 
not always available.  It was therefore decided to also document whether or not each dose 
was retrieved from the bedside medication locker. (2) There was variation in the prescribed 
times for doses in the morning i.e. 6am and 8am but both were administered at the same time 
by nursing staff, and therefore the prescribed time of each dose was also documented.  
Evaluation of medication incident reports was excluded from the study (but continued to be 
reviewed according to local hospital policy) as the current study was focused on quantitative 
investigation of medication safety; this was discussed and agreed by the group.  Both PhD 
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supervisors of MM provided further guidance on the measures chosen, and a final set of 10 
was agreed (table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2  List of outcome measures included in observational study on the quality and 
safety of medication administration 
Purpose  Outcome measure 
Primary outcome measure (i) Overall medication administration error rate 
Measures of the core tasks 
and defence barriers for 
evaluating the overall quality 
and safety of the medication 
administration process 
(ii) Timeliness of drug round relative to scheduled drug 
round time  
(iii) Percentage of doses given after the patient’s identity 
was confirmed (as a match to the drug chart) prior to 
medication administration  
(iv) Percentage of doses given and/or omitted for 
therapeutic reasons 
(v) Percentage of doses that were given correctly  
(vi) Percentage of doses taken by the patient that were 
observed by the nurse  
(vii) Percentage of doses that were documented as 
administered or reason for omission recorded in the 
drug chart  
Additional measures  (viii) Availability of medication in the patient’s bedside 
medication locker or bedside area  
(ix) Number of interruptions during drug rounds 
(x) Duration of drug rounds 
 
2.5  Methods 
2.5.1 Study setting 
The study was conducted on a 28-bed adult general medical ward of a 600-bed NHS teaching 
hospital.  Medications were generally administered at four scheduled drug round times each 
day: 08:00, 12:00, 18:00, and 22:00 hours.  Nurses administered medications for the patients 
they were looking after against medication orders prescribed on handwritten paper drug 
charts.  Non-IV patient-specific medications were stored in individual patient bedside 
medication lockers, and ward stock was stored in separate stock cupboards located in a 
treatment room at one end of the ward.  Local trust policy allowed some patient-specific 
medications to be kept at the bedside rather than in the bedside medication locker; these 
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were insulin, creams, and inhalers.  Controlled drugs were stored separately in an automated 
drug storage unit (Pyxis MedStation™) that was accessed either via fingerprint recognition or 
individual user log in by two trained and registered nurses; the system was implemented in 
2006 (Franklin et al., 2010).  
 
The ward operated a patients’ own drugs (PODs) and one-stop dispensing (OSD) scheme, as 
endorsed nationally (Audit Commission, 2001; Department of Health, 2000b). In the PODs 
scheme, patients were encouraged to bring their medicines into hospital to facilitate accurate 
medicines reconciliation, minimise the risk of missed doses due to medication not being 
available, and thus reduce waste, in addition to increasing safety.  The OSD scheme involved 
pharmacy staff dispensing 28-day inpatient-specific supplies labelled with instructions on how 
to take the medicine; these were intended for both inpatient administration and given to 
patients at discharge thus minimising repeat dispensing, and reducing waiting time for 
medication supplies.  Medicines that were unlikely to be continued post discharge were not 
dispensed as OSD; instead ward stock or non-OSD inpatient supplies (medications labelled 
without directions) were used.  During pharmacy opening hours, nurses ordered medications 
via the ward pharmacist and/or by going to the pharmacy dispensary.  Outside pharmacy 
opening hours, an emergency on-call resident pharmacist was available who could be 
contacted for obtaining medicines if necessary.   
 
2.5.2 Data collection 
Non-IV drug rounds were observed by MM and data recorded on pre-piloted data collection 
forms (appendix 1).  Nurses were informed of the study objectives during staff meetings and 
given opportunities to ask questions about the study.  MM arrived approximately 1-2 hours 
prior to the drug round time as pilot work revealed nurses sometimes started the drug round 
up to two hours early.   Verbal consent from each nurse was obtained prior to the start of any 
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observations.  In general, the ward was divided into four sections during the 08:00, 12:00 and 
18:00 hour drug rounds and two sections for the 22:00 drug round.  As the nurse looking after 
each section often started their respective drug rounds at similar times, only one section of the 
ward was observed at any one scheduled drug round time.  Observations were organised to 
ensure all four scheduled drug round times were observed on all seven days of the week over 
20 days; these were approximately equally distributed across all sections of the ward.   
 
All MAEs observed, defined as “any dose of medication administered (or omitted) that deviates 
from the patient’s medication order”
 
(Allan & Barker, 1990), were documented; each were 
categorised according to table 2.1.  Consistent with the approach used in previous 
observational MAE studies, MM intervened whenever there was a risk that the patient would 
be harmed as a result of the MAE.  Errors prevented by MM or the patient were included as 
MAEs, those prevented by other health care professionals were not.   The clinical 
appropriateness of the prescription was not assessed.  All regular, “when required” and “once 
only” non-IV medication orders that were due on the scheduled drug round observed were 
included.  Doses given in between the four daily scheduled drug rounds were excluded; 
controlled drugs were therefore also excluded as these were generally prepared between drug 
rounds when two nurses were available.  In addition, any dose that could not be observed, for 
example, rectal administrations were also excluded.  Medical gases, dietary supplements, and 
thromboembolic deterrent stockings were excluded from the study.  
 
Confirmation of a patient’s identity was recorded if the nurse visibly checked the patient’s 
identity band against the details on the drug chart and/or asked the patient to confirm their 
name and date or birth prior to drug administration.  Availability of the medication at the 
patient’s bedside was taken to include successful dose retrieval from the patient’s bedside 
medication locker, and/or any area around the bedside.  A dose taken by a patient was 
considered observed by the nurse if the nurse remained at the patient’s bedside while the 
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patient took the dose and/or if the dose was administered directly to the patient by the nurse.  
Five types of administration documentation were recorded: (1) dose was administered and 
signed for, (2) dose was administered but not signed for, (3) dose was not administered and a 
reason documented, (4) dose was not administered but signed to suggest it was administered, 
and (5) dose not administered and not signed. 
 
Timing of each drug round observed started when the nurse picked up the first drug chart for 
medication administration and stopped after the last dose was administered or drug 
administration was documented (whichever was the last task).  The prescribed time for each 
dose observed was also recorded. 
 
The number of interruptions during each drug round observed was recorded.  An interruption 
was defined as any action(s) from a person (other than the patient to whom medication is 
being administered) that prevents the nurse from continuing with the drug round.  For 
example, an interruption included the nurse being called away to answer a telephone call, 
being asked by a different patient to do something which takes the nurse’s attention away 
from the task of medication administration.  An interruption did not include any interaction 
between the nurse and the patient, to whom medication was being administered, for example, 
talking to the patient, answering questions from the patient.   
 
2.5.3 Sample size 
A sample size calculation was made on the assumption that an intervention would be made.  
Based on a normal approximation to the binomial distribution, a sample of 634 observed dose 
administrations  before and after an intervention was required to provide a power of 80% to 
detect a reduction in MAEs from 7% (Franklin et al., 2007) to 3.5% based on a two-sided test 
with an α of 0.05. The reported baseline MAE rate from Franklin et al (2007) was used for the 
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following reasons: (1) many of the methods used in the current study were adapted from 
Franklin et al (2007), (2) the study was conducted at the same hospital and thus the MAE rate 
identified might be expected to be comparable, and (3) this was the most recent UK study of 
MAEs identified at the time.  Data were collected until this sample was achieved. 
 
2.5.4 Data analysis 
All data were analysed using descriptive statistics.  In addition, a cumulative quality filter of six 
medication administration related measures was constructed which comprised: (1) timeliness, 
calculated as the percentage of doses administered on a drug round that started and finished 
within each of 1, 1.5, and 2 hours of scheduled round time, (2) percentage of doses where the 
patient’s identity was checked prior to administration, (3) percentage of doses that were given 
and/or omitted for a therapeutic reason, (4) percentage of doses given that were administered 
correctly, (5) percentage of doses where the nurse observed patient taking the medication, 
and (6) percentage of doses that were correctly documented.  The cumulative quality filter was 
produced by adapting the approach used by (Garfield et al., 2009).  This involved identifying 
the key medication process steps, superimposing the compliance rate at each process step and 
then calculating the cumulative compliance rate by aggregating the compliance rate at each 
step with the preceding compliance rates; all compliance rates for the quality filter were 
calculated using the same denominator.   In the present study, the reliability of each of the six 
tasks was determined and then combined in a stepwise manner to produce an overall 
percentage of ‘compliance with standard good practice’.  Additionally, an overall MAE rate was 
calculated using the total number of MAEs identified divided by the total number of 
opportunities for error, multiplied by 100.  The timing of actual drug round start times was also 
compared with prescribed times of observed doses.   
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2.5.5 Ethical considerations 
Research ethics approval was not required as the local ethics committee considered this study 
to be service evaluation.   
 
2.6  Results 
Overall, twenty-nine drug rounds were observed over 20 days between May and June 2009. A 
total of 650 OEs were observed, involving eighty-five different drugs.  Characteristics of the 
drug rounds observed are summarised in table 2.3.  Since no medication-related process 
improvements were subsequently implemented, no follow-up data were collected.  The results 
are therefore ‘pre-intervention’ data only.   
 
Table 2.3 Characteristics of drug rounds observed. 
 08:00 12:00 18:00 22:00 
Number of drug rounds 
observed 
9 6 6 8 
Mean number of patients 
per drug  round (range) 
6 
(3 to 8) 
4 
(2 to 6) 
6 
(4 to 6) 
10 
(6 to 11) 
Mean number of OEs per 
drug round (95% CI) 
35 
(28 to 41) 
8 
(5 to 10) 
14 
(10 to 19) 
26 
(21 to 31) 
CI, confidence interval; OE, opportunities for error 
 
 
2.6.1 Quality filter for the medication administration process  
Overall, 15.4% of OEs (approximately one in seven doses) was administered according to the 
quality measures of standard good practice (figure 2.1); the overall percentage was based on 
defining timeliness as dose administrations on drug rounds that started within 1 hour of the 
prescribed time, and increased when the timeframe was raised to 1.5 hours, and 2 hours.  The 
results for each of the six measures of quality were as follows:  
(1) Timeliness  in relation to prescribed time – see figure 2.1 
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(2) Patient identity check – 37.5% of doses where the patient’s identity was checked 
prior to administration 
(3) Doses given (not omitted) – 97.4% of doses were given (excludes dose omissions 
due to therapeutic reasons) 
(4) Doses given correctly – Of the doses that were given (and not omitted for 
therapeutic reasons), 98.3% were given correctly 
(5) Nurse observed patient taking medication – 81.6% of doses administered were 
taken by the patient and observed by the nurse 
(6) Correct dose administration documentation – 97.2% of doses were correctly 
documented to indicate whether or not the dose had been administered or 
omitted 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Quality filter of the medication administration process comprising six components 
of standard good practice 
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2.6.2 Quality and safety measures  
Of 591 doses administered, 524 (88.7%; 95% CI 86.1-91.2%) were available and retrieved from 
the patient’s bedside medication locker or bedside area.  Table 2.4 summarises medication 
availability during different drug round times and includes a comparison of interruptions and 
duration. In all, 25 (86%) drug rounds had at least one interruption with a median of three 
interruptions per drug round hour (range 0 to 9).   
  
Table 2.4 Comparison of drug round duration, interruptions, and availability of 
medications in the patient’s bedside medication locker or bedside area at different 
scheduled drug round times. 
 Scheduled drug round times 
08:00 12:00 18:00 22:00 
Mean duration (95% CI) 
minutes per drug round 
75 
(59 to 92) 
37 
(16 to 57) 
37 
(30 to 43) 
76 
(54 to 99) 
Median number of doses 
attempted per drug round 
hour (range) 
32 
(17-54) 
14 
(10-51) 
30 
(11-68) 
17 
(13-43) 
Interruptions 
Median number of 
interruptions per drug 
round (range) 
3 
(0 to 11) 
1 
(0 to 6) 
1.5 
(0 to 3) 
5 
(1 to 8) 
Median number of 
interruptions per drug 
round hour (range) 
4 
(0-7) 
3 
(0-5) 
3 
(0-4) 
3 
(1-9) 
Availability of doses in the patient’s bedside medication locker or bedside area 
Median number of doses 
available in the patient’s 
bedside medication locker 
or bedside area (range) 
33 
(17 to 40) 
6 
(3 to 11) 
9 
(5 to 20) 
23 
(14 to 35) 
Median % of OEs that 
were available in the 
patient’s bedside 
medication locker or 
bedside area (range) 
88 
(74-100) 
85 
(60-92) 
74 
(50-87) 
88 
(67-95) 
CI, confidence interval; OE, opportunity for error 
 
2.6.3 MAEs 
There were 28 MAEs in 650 OEs, giving an overall MAE rate of 4.3% (95% CI 2.7-5.9%). The 
majority (17; 60.7%) of MAEs identified were due to dose omissions, of which 5 (29.4%) were 
due to drug not being available.  Figure 2.2 shows a breakdown of MAEs by subcategory.  Five 
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interventions were made by the researcher; these are described in box 2.1.   Exploratory sub-
analysis of associations between MAEs and time of day suggested that there may have been 
more MAEs during the 18:00 drug round than at 08:00 (table 2.5). 
 
Figure 2.2 Frequency of MAE subcategories identified as a percentage of all 28 
medication administration errors (MAEs) detected. 
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Box 2.1. Summary of five medication administration errors that resulted in an intervention 
by the observer. 
 
 Gliclazide 40mg was prescribed, nurse was about to give a whole 80mg tablet instead of half a 
tablet 
 
 Clotrimazole cream was prescribed, nurse was about to administer chloramphenicol eye drops 
(the latter was no longer prescribed, patient had an old bottle in bedside medication locker and 
the nurse had intended to administer a dose against the clotrimazole cream) 
 
 Co-beneldopa 125mg was prescribed, available strengths in the patient’s bedside medication 
locker were 62.5 (12.5/50) and 125 (25/100), nurse was about to administer one tablet of the 
62.5 strength. 
 
 Sando K (potassium chloride) three tablets stat was prescribed, the dose was not administered 
and chart not signed, researcher waited until nurse confirmed drug round was complete and 
then intervened 
 
 Co-beneldopa 125mg was prescribed, drug not administered and not signed, researcher 
intervened when nurse moved on to the next patient 
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Table 2.5 Exploratory comparison of medication administration error (MAE) rates at 
scheduled drug round times 
Drug round OE MAE MAE rate (95% CI) 
08:00 311 5 1.6% (0.2 to 3.0) 
12:00 46 1 2.2% (0 to 6.5) 
18:00 85 8 10.4% (4.1 to 16.6) 
22:00 208 14 7.2% (3.8 to 10.6) 
CI, confidence interval; OE, opportunity for error 
 
2.6.4 Safety relating to timeliness 
In all, medications were prescribed at seven different scheduled times (rather than the four 
scheduled drug round times).  A total of 518 (82%) doses administered were prescribed for the 
same time as a scheduled drug round time; of these, 492 (95%) were administered on the 
scheduled drug round time prescribed, the remainder were administered at a separate drug 
round (figure 2.3).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Percentage of doses that were prescribed and administered during the same drug 
round time (total 631 doses administered). n represent number of doses prescribed for each of 
seven different times. 
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Separately, sub-analysis of time interval between the start times of 18 consecutive drug 
rounds showed variation in duration between drug rounds with some less than 4 hours apart 
and some over 11 hours apart (table 2.6).  The same section of the ward was not always 
observed on consecutive drug rounds; however nurses generally started and finished 
concurrent drug rounds at similar times.  A total of 137 (21%) of all OEs were for medications 
that were prescribed for administration four times a day.  
 
Table 2.6 Time interval between start times of 18 consecutive drug rounds observed.  The 
same section of the ward was not always observed on consecutive drug rounds; however 
nurses generally started and finished drug rounds at similar times. 
Consecutive drug 
rounds observed 
Number 
observed 
Time interval (hours) between the start times of 
consecutive drug rounds observed 
Mean Min Max 
08:00 then 12:00 5 3.9 3.4 4.9 
12:00 then 18:00 3 5.2 5.2 5.3 
18:00 then 22:00 5 3.4 3.0 3.7 
22:00 then 08:00 5 11.4 11.3 11.7 
 
2.6.5 Safety relating to documentation of administration 
Nurses administered the dose and signed the drug chart for 585 (90.0%) of 650 OEs; 47 (7.2%) 
doses were not administered and the reason was documented.  The remaining 18 (2.8%) cases 
of incorrect documentation are summarised in table 2.7.  Of these, 11 (61.1%) were not 
administered nor signed by the nurse, and 7 (38.9%) were signed by the nurse as “drug not 
available”. 
 
Table 2.7 Types of inappropriate documentation or omission of administration 
documentation. 
Type of inappropriate documentation or 
omission 
Scheduled drug round times Total (%) 
08:00 12:00 18:00 22:00 
Dose was administered but not signed 2 2 2 1 7 (38.9) 
Dose was not administered but signed 0 0 0 0 0 
Dose was not administered and not signed 0 0 4 7 11 (61.1) 
Total 2 2 6 8 18 (100) 
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2.7  Discussion 
2.7.1 Main findings 
An MAE rate of 4.3% for non-IV doses was identified.  Overall findings indicate the processes of 
administering apparently straightforward non-IV doses appear to have a number failings in 
addition to MAEs that potentially lower their quality and safety; some were related to 
individual procedural violations (such as not confirming the patient’s identity prior to 
administration and inaccurate administration documentation) while others indicate potentially 
more organisational-related problems (such as unavailability of medication and less than four 
hour intervals between consecutive drug rounds).   In the current study, six quality and safety 
measures were combined to reveal that only 11.8-25.5% of doses observed complied with the 
six nominal standards of good practice for medication administration at the study site.  
‘Failures’ were apparent for each of these six quality and safety measures; two variables 
associated with the lowest ‘quality’ were timeliness of drug rounds and confirming the 
patient’s identity prior to administration.  Findings relating to the following are next discussed 
in detail:  (1) MAEs and considerations for use as a quality and safety measure, (2) 
discrepancies between prescribed time, scheduled drug round time, and actual drug round 
times – an underlying latent failure? (3) patient identity check – an inadequately used defence 
barrier, and (4) medication retrieval and storage. 
 
2.7.2 MAEs and considerations for use as a quality and safety measure 
The primary measure of quality and safety in the current study was the MAE rate, which was 
4.3%; or approximately one MAE in every 25 doses.  This MAE rate is lower than the 7.0% for 
non-IV doses previously reported by Franklin et al (2007) that was used to derive the sample 
size, but consistent with MAE rates of 3.0-8.0% for non-IV doses reported in other similar 
observational studies (Dean et al., 1995; Ho et al., 1997; Cavell & Hughes, 1997; Taxis et al., 
1999).    Exploratory sub-analysis of MAE rates at different times of day suggested that more 
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MAEs occurred during the 18:00 and 22:00 drug rounds than at 08:00.  This is different from 
other studies which have found the 12:00 drug round to be associated with the most MAEs 
(Franklin et al., 2008; Ho et al., 1997), and may reflect differences in inherent common causes 
of variation (chapter one) associated with the specific ward setting.  For example, Ho et al 
(1997) found higher MAE rates during the first 48 hours of admission and in the first 48 hours 
of prescribing on an acute admissions ward; the patient turnover on that ward was much 
higher than on the current study ward of general medical patients and therefore the potential 
effect of patient admissions may not have been a factor in the current study.  Franklin et al 
(2008) attributed a higher MAE rate at midday to a potentially greater number of interruptions 
and activity on the ward.  While the study by Franklin et al (2008) was not designed to assess 
the effects of interruptions on MAEs, a separate study was identified that investigated the 
relationship between interruptions and MAEs.  Westbrook et al (2010) observed a total of 
4,271 drug administrations by nurses at two major teaching hospitals in Australia.  The 
researchers identified a correlation between the number of interruptions and errors; each 
interruption was associated with a 12.1% increase in procedural failures and a 12.7% increase 
in clinical MAEs (Westbrook et al., 2010).  However, findings from the present study suggest 
there were more interruptions at 08:00 and 22:00 than at other times (although not 
statistically significant), however, the MAE rate was lowest at 08:00 (1.6% of OEs; 95% CI 0.2-
3.0%) and highest at 18:00 (10.4%; 95% CI 4.1-16.6).  Overall, these findings suggest other 
factors, in addition to or other than interruptions, played a more prominent role in affecting 
MAE rates in the present study.  Based on analysis of medication administration 
documentation, more doses were inaccurately documented during 18:00 and 22:00 than at 
other times (although statistical significance was not explored due to small sample); these 
were mainly due to doses that were omitted and not signed, suggesting potential oversight to 
be more problematic later in the day.  Overall, findings from this study suggest that analysis 
and interpretation of MAE rates alone may not be sufficient to explain the potential causes.  
Concomitant data collection of other parameters associated with the medication 
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administration provides an enhanced understanding of the safety of medication administration 
process.    
 
2.7.3 Discrepancies between prescribed time, scheduled drug round time, and 
actual drug round times – an underlying latent failure? 
Observations revealed that 82% of doses administered were prescribed for the same time as a 
scheduled drug round time; this meant that 18% of doses administered were not planned to 
be given around the prescribed time.  This was because doses were also prescribed regularly 
for 06:00, 14:00, and 20:00.  The mismatch between the prescribed times and the scheduled 
drug round times present a potential technical problem in the measurement of quality and 
safety.  Timeliness is generally measured against the prescribed time, however in practice, 
timeliness is usually only relevant for a relatively small group of drugs: for example, time-
critical medicines such as anti-Parkinsonian drugs, and time-interval critical medicines such as 
those that require administration four or more times a day.  Thus, while some doses 
prescribed for 06:00 may be administered at the 08:00 drug round, these are not always a 
problem and do not infer ‘lower’ quality or safety.  However, for time-interval critical doses, 
timing of administration may be more problematic.  In particular, findings from the current 
study suggest that some consecutive drug rounds were started less than 4 hours apart, and 
others over 11 hours apart; these could potentially result in sub-optimal drug profile levels of 
time-interval critical drugs.  Consequently, it may be more useful to assess timeliness for time-
critical and time-interval critical medicines rather than for all.   
 
Unfortunately, it was rarely clear when timeliness was critical on the drug chart without 
knowledge of the medications prescribed; such information was generally not provided.  
Instead, much of the responsibility to ensure that time-critical doses are recognised and 
administered on time seems to be burdened on nursing staff; this is likely to require a 
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combination of medicines knowledge and memory to identify and keep track of such doses for 
all patients.  This highlights a potential underlying limitation of the medication prescribing and 
administration system; which may also be considered a latent failure.   
 
2.7.4 Patient identity check – an inadequately used defence barrier  
Of all the measures recorded in the current study, the largest deviation from standard good 
practice was the percentage of doses given after the patient’s identity was confirmed by the 
nurse (37.5% of OEs).  This figure is higher than 17.4% of doses previously reported in a similar 
observational study (Franklin et al., 2007).  One possible reason for higher compliance may be 
related to the presence of an observer.  In the current study, the observer noticed that some 
newly observed nurses (i.e. not observed during the piloting stage) tended to check the first 
few patients’ identity during the drug round but would then revert to addressing subsequent 
patients by their first name as the drug round progressed.  Although the absence of a check 
may not lead to patient harm, 66% non-compliance is high and evidence from other research 
suggests this preventable risk to patients has yet to be resolved (Franklin et al., 2007; Koppel 
et al., 2008).  Furthermore, it has been suggested that not checking a patient’s identity prior to 
administration may be indicative of non-compliance to other procedures that also increase the 
risk of error (Westbrook et al., 2011).  In the UK, in 2007, there were 2,781 incidents of 
mismatch between patient and medicine reported to the NHS NRLS; of these, two patients 
suffered severe harm and there was one patient death (Cousins et al., 2007).  These incidents 
may have been avoided if the patient’s identity was confirmed as a match to their medication 
order prior to drug administration. 
 
2.7.5 Medication retrieval and storage  
The findings from the current study suggests that despite the use of PODs and OSD stored in 
patient bedside medication lockers, 11.3% of doses administered were not available at the 
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patient’s bedside.  Having the right medications at the patient’s bedside should help to 
minimise time spent looking for medication and it was inferred that measuring the percentage 
of doses that were unavailable at the patient’s bedside provides an indication of the amount of 
“excess travel” nurses make during drug rounds.  However, from observations, a number of 
nurses would routinely store medications in their pockets in anticipation that a medication will 
not be available at the patient’s bedside, for example, syringes of enoxaparin and paracetamol 
tablets.  This suggests that potential problems or inefficiencies associated with medication 
storage exist and are perhaps common. While experienced nurses may take preventative 
actions to manage the potential inefficiency, others may take more time to retrieve 
medications during drug rounds unless the underlying potential medication storage 
inefficiency is addressed.   
 
2.7.6 Strengths and limitations 
A limitation of the current study was that the process improvement initiative was not 
implemented on the study ward and therefore the potential effects on the quality and safety 
of the medication process could not be examined.  However, a strength of the current study 
was the inclusion of a range of quality and safety measures to study the medication 
administration process.  Another strength was the use of observation; this allowed MAEs to be 
recorded more accurately and consistently, and also provided the context that facilitated data 
analysis.  In general, nurses did not seem to mind being observed and no obvious change in 
behaviour was identified other than those associated with confirming patient’s identity.  A 
limitation was that a number of other potential confounding factors that may affect the quality 
of the medication administration process were not collected: nurse experience, number of 
admissions and number of new medication orders.  It would be useful to know what the extent 
(if any) of these factors had on the MAE rate as there is the possibility that some of the MAEs 
may be restricted to a small number of patients, staff or medication order.  Furthermore, 
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severity assessments of the MAEs were not conducted.  It would have provided an additional 
dimension to the potential impact of the MAE rate and therefore a stronger safety indicator of 
the quality of the medication administration process.  Finally, the current study was based on 
one ward, by one observer which limits the generalisability of the study.   
 
2.7.7 Implications for practice 
In the current study, identifying time-critical and time-interval critical doses was found to be a 
potential problem; EPMA systems potentially offer an opportunity to resolve this by employing 
a design function that alert nurses to time-critical and time-interval critical doses; thus 
minimising the need for individuals to rely on their memory.  Additionally, use of bar-code 
technology has been associated with a greater compliance in confirming a patient’s identity 
prior to administration in a UK hospital  (Franklin et al., 2007). However, care should be taken 
when designing, choosing and/or implementing technologies in health care; as discovered 
from research of technological workarounds (Koppel et al., 2008), implementation of 
electronic systems may not resolve the problem entirely, and potentially create new problems. 
 
2.7.8 Future research 
Several definitions for MAEs and associated subcategories have been reported in past studies 
in the UK, the US, and other countries.  While it was outside the scope of the current study to 
review all the definitions used, it was soon realised that the implications of such diverse 
terminology posed a potential barrier for interpreting and comparing research in the area; a 
systematic literature review was therefore carried out separately to the current study and is 
described in chapter three of this thesis.   
 
In addition, the potential problem of inefficient medication storage also warrants further 
research.  Findings from the current study suggest nurses took preventative action to avoid 
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having to travel back and forth between the patient and the stock cupboard for some drugs.  
While some preventative practices may have been considered risky (unused medicines may be 
left in the pocket and expire, nurses may accidently take medicines home), these practices 
may have potentially increased drug round efficiency and also reduced the number of 
interruptions to nurses during drug rounds. Research has found 22% of interruptions occurred 
when nurses were in the medication storage room (Potter et al., 2005).  As highlighted earlier, 
Westbrook et al (2010) identified an association between the number of interruptions and 
errors.  Furthermore, the researchers also found the risk of a major error doubled (4.7% of 
errors) when there were four interruptions than when there were no interruptions (2.3% of 
errors).  Thus, by taking preventative action to minimise excess travel and interruptions, it is 
possible that the risk of MAEs may also be reduced; however, this inference is outside the 
scope of the present study.   
 
While the problem of medication not being available may be partly because the ward no 
longer used conventional drug trolleys during drug rounds, previous research have found that 
doses are not always available from drug trolleys even when they are used (Dean et al., 1995; 
Taxis et al., 1999).  Thus potentially more efficient methods of storing medications for timely 
retrieval and administration may be required.  However, the problem (and thus the solution) 
of medication storage is likely to affect many parts of the NHS.  Consequently, a more systems-
based approach to understanding this is required.  First however, we need to identify what 
current types of hospital medication systems exist, including ward-based medication storage 
facilities.  A national survey of hospital medication systems in English hospitals is presented in 
chapter four. 
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2.8  Conclusion 
Medication administration is a complex process, and there were failures at each step of the 
process measured in this study, including two which were also defence barriers against MAEs.  
Combining the findings from six core tasks into a quality filter indicated that only one in seven 
doses were administered in accordance with standard good practice.  Concomitant analysis of 
the MAE rate with other measures of the medication administration process allowed potential 
error-producing factors to be explored.  However, further work is required to identify the 
extent of variations in hospital medication systems used to support medication administration.   
 
The next chapter describes a systematic review of UK MAE studies and the effects of 
methodological variations between studies on reported MAE rates.  This is then followed by a 
national survey of hospital medication systems in English NHS hospitals in chapter four. 
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Chapter 3.  Methodological variations 
and their effects on reported medication 
administration error rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter one, the problem of MAEs was described; MAEs account for the majority of severe 
patient harm and death reported to the NRLS in the NHS.  However, variations between 
studies of MAEs exist (chapters one and two) and present a potential barrier for increasing 
medication safety due to limited evaluation of transferability of interventions, risk factors, 
and MAE rates for benchmarking and monitoring of trends.  A preliminary search in April 
2010 in the following databases found no systematic literature review of the incidence of 
MAEs, either completed or in progress: PubMed, Cochrane Library Database of Systemic 
Reviews, The Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects (DARE), Health Technology 
Assessment Database (HTA), NHS Economic Evaluation Database (NHS EED), and UK 
Database of Uncertainties about the Effects of Treatments (DUETs).  This chapter describes a 
systematic literature review of UK MAE studies conducted to summarise methodological 
variations that exist and evaluate their effects on reported MAE rates.  This systematic 
literature review has been published (M
c
Leod et al., 2013). 
 
Chapter 3 – Effects of methodological variations on MAE rates 
 
 
 
89 of 321 
3.2 Background 
Since the first medication error studies were published in the 1960s (Hill & Wigmore, 1967; 
Barker & McConnell, 1962), improving medication safety has become a major priority for 
health care worldwide (World Health Organization, 2008; Department of Health, 2004; 
Institute of Medicine, 2007; Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 
2009).  Studies of MAEs can be challenging and resource intensive as direct observation is 
generally required (Allan & Barker, 1990).  In addition, methodological variations between 
studies are well known, (Allan & Barker, 1990; Barker & McConnell, 1962; Ferner, 2009) 
which can limit interpretation of findings.  Inconsistent MAE definitions, MAE subcategories, 
denominator definitions and MAE rate calculations exist; these present a potential barrier to 
interpreting and evaluating the transferability of interventions to reduce MAEs.  
 
Furthermore, the types of doses studied are also likely to affect the MAE rate.  Doses that are 
to be administered via the IV route are widely perceived to be higher risk for MAEs compared 
to non-IV doses; a recent UK report identified MAE rates of 3-8% for non-IV doses and 49-
94% for IV doses (Vincent et al., 2009).  However, the true extent of the difference in error 
rates between IV and non-IV doses is unknown as studies used different methods and 
definitions.  It is also widely believed that MAEs are more likely in children than in adults, but 
no direct comparison exists (Ghaleb et al., 2006).  Consequently, the effects of such 
commonly accepted risk factors on reported MAE rates have yet to be quantified.   
 
At a macro level, there are important differences between countries in how medication is 
prescribed, dispensed, and administered, which can also hinder the interpretation of study 
findings.  For example, in the UK, nursing staff are responsible for preparing the majority of 
doses, including IV doses, on the ward (Brock & Franklin, 2007).  By contrast, in the US, 
pharmacy staff typically prepare the majority of doses and supply these as patient-specific 
unit-doses.  Thus MAEs in the UK would include errors made by the nurse at the preparation 
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stage while such preparation-related errors in the US are more likely to have been inherited 
from the earlier dispensing stage.   
 
Considering that MAE studies are important but time-consuming and costly to conduct, it is 
important to maximise the value of these studies.  Thus this chapter describes a systematic 
literature review of UK MAE studies to identify methodological variations that exist and 
examine their effects on reported MAE rates.  The review used one country as a case study 
because differences between countries in how medications are prescribed, dispensed and 
administered, are also likely to affect the prevalence and types of MAEs identified, and thus 
the exploration of heterogeneity among MAE rates (Dean et al., 1995; Wirtz et al., 2003). 
 
3.3 Aim and objectives 
The aim of this systematic literature review was to summarise methodological variations in 
UK MAE studies and their effects on reported MAE rates.  There were four objectives: 
(1) To summarise the variation in MAE definitions, MAE subcategories and 
denominator definitions; 
(2) To quantify their effect on reported MAE rates; 
(3) To use comparable MAE and denominator definitions to determine overall non-IV 
and IV MAE rates for adult and paediatric doses; 
(4) To quantify the effect of including IV and paediatric doses on reported MAE rates.   
 
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Setting 
In the UK, medications for hospital inpatients are typically prescribed  and administered from 
paper drug charts (Brock & Franklin, 2007).  Electronic prescribing is currently rare for 
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hospital inpatients (although common for discharge and primary care prescribing); few 
hospitals use barcode verification at the point of administration and unit-dose drug 
distribution is not used.  Instead, nurses administer medications from ward-based stocks, 
patient-specific supplies from the hospital pharmacy, and/or PODs brought in from home 
that have been verified by hospital staff.   
 
3.4.2 Search strategy  
Nine electronic databases were initially searched for published studies up to and including 
May 2010: British Nursing Index (from 1985), Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health 
Literature (from 1981), Embase (from 1980), Health Management Information Consortium 
(from 1983), International Pharmaceutical Abstracts (from 1970), Medline (from 1950), 
Pharmline (from 1978), Science Citation Index Expanded (from 1970), Social Science Citation 
Index (from 1970). The search terms were (medication* OR medicine* OR drug* OR ‘near 
miss’ OR ‘near misses’) AND (error* OR discrepan*) AND adminis* AND (prevalence OR 
incidence OR harm OR severity OR mortality OR morbidity OR ‘adverse event’ OR ‘adverse 
events’ OR ‘adverse drug event’ OR ‘adverse drug events’ OR caus*). ‘Medication error’ was 
also included as a mapped thesaurus term in Medline and Embase. Studies were limited to 
those conducted in humans and published in English. The search was repeated in October 
2012 to identify papers published since May 2010; however Pharmline was excluded as it 
was archived shortly after May 2010. 
 
3.4.3 Study selection process 
One reviewer (MM) initially screened all titles and available abstracts identified.   A random 
10% sample was screened by a second reviewer (BDF) to assess reliability.  Only studies 
reporting empirical MAE rates detected by observation methods were included as 
observation is generally considered to be the gold standard (Allan & Barker, 1990; Dean & 
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Barber, 2001).  Conference abstracts, case-reports, and studies focusing only on anaesthesia, 
nutrition or a specific type of MAE were excluded.   Full papers of selected studies were 
retrieved and further examined, including their reference lists.  A shortlist of studies was 
produced.  Both reviewers screened these studies and the final set of studies confirmed 
through discussion.   
 
3.4.4 Data extraction and quality assessment 
The two reviewers independently extracted data using standardised forms (appendix 2). 
Where necessary, authors were contacted for missing information.  Discrepancies between 
reviewers were resolved through discussion and a third reviewer was available if agreement 
could not be reached.  The quality of each study was independently assessed by the two 
reviewers using the criteria of Allan and Barker which are specific to studies measuring MAE 
rates (Allan & Barker, 1990).   Two criteria for reporting were added: (1) whether or not IV 
administrations were included as MAE rates for IV doses are known to be higher than for 
non-IV doses (Vincent et al., 2009), and (2) whether or not paediatric doses were included, as 
pilot work indicated that not all studies reported this information.  
 
3.4.5 Data analysis 
MAE definitions, subcategories and denominator definitions were compared and 
summarised descriptively. The effect of specific MAE definitions, MAE categorisation and 
denominator definitions on reported MAE rates was calculated where data were available. A 
meta-analysis (Neyeloff et al., 2012) of reported MAE rates from studies that used the same 
MAE and denominator definition was conducted using a random-effects model. An overall 
MAE rate was calculated separately for non-IV and IV data; for studies that included both 
types of doses, separate MAE rates were extracted where possible. For studies conducted in 
multiple countries, only UK data were extracted. Heterogeneity was assessed by calculating 
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the I2 index (Neyeloff et al., 2012). Odds ratios were calculated to assess the effect of IV 
versus non-IV doses and paediatric versus adult doses on MAE rates, where the same error 
and denominator definitions were used. 
 
3.5 Results  
Overall the searches identified 2025 studies; 109 full articles were retrieved and 24 
potentially relevant studies subsequently shortlisted.  There was 100% agreement between 
the two reviewers on initial inclusion versus exclusion of a 10% sample (n=203 studies). Of 
the 24 shortlisted studies, four were excluded because an MAE rate could not be extracted 
from two studies (Hill & Wigmore, 1967; Valentin et al., 2009), one was conducted in a non-
NHS hospital (Haw et al., 2007), and the method of MAE detection could not be ascertained 
in another (Almond et al., 2002).  Twenty studies (Dean et al., 1995; Wirtz et al., 2003; Dean 
& Barber, 2001; Ridge et al., 1995; Gethins, 1996; Ho et al., 1997; Cavell & Hughes, 1997; 
Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Taxis et al., 1999; Dean & Barber, 2000; Bruce & Wong, 2001; Taxis 
& Barber, 2003b; Franklin et al., 2006; Franklin et al., 2007; Conroy et al., 2007; Ghaleb et al., 
2010; Taxis & Barber, 2003a; Franklin et al., 2008; Kelly et al., 2011; Kelly & Wright, 2012) 
therefore met the inclusion criteria. Of these, four (Dean & Barber, 2001; Taxis & Barber, 
2003a; Franklin et al., 2008; Kelly & Wright, 2012) analysed data from previous studies (Dean 
& Barber, 2000; Taxis & Barber, 2003b; Franklin et al., 2007; Kelly et al., 2011); a final 16 
unique studies were included.  A third reviewer was not required. 
 
3.5.1 Characteristics and quality of studies 
The characteristics of the 16 included studies are outlined in figure 3.1 and table 3.1.  The 
majority were descriptive and conducted in adult settings.  Generalisability was limited in 
eight studies as these were conducted in: (1) only one or two wards (Ho et al., 1997; Cavell & 
Hughes, 1997; Taxis et al., 1999; Dean & Barber, 2000; Bruce & Wong, 2001; Franklin et al., 
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2006; Franklin et al., 2007), (2) wards that received a hospital-specific intervention (Franklin 
et al., 2007; Franklin et al., 2006), or (3) an unknown number and type of wards (Wirtz et al., 
2003).    
 
Figure 3.1 Characteristics of 16 observational studies of medication administration errors.  
Weighted font sizes have been used to illustrate approximate proportion of studies between 
groups that contain more than two studies. 
a
One study of parenteral administrations was 
included as all doses observed for intravenous (IV) doses except for one intramuscular and 
one subcutaneous dose.  
b
Three of 12 studies were comparison studies with other countries. 
 
 
 
In relation to the quality criteria, ten studies reported clear definitions and methods for 
determining the MAE rate; six did not.  Specifically, the following were unclear: (1) the 
number of MAEs possible per dose (Ridge et al., 1995; Gethins, 1996; Conroy et al., 2007), (2) 
whether or not dose omissions were included in the denominator (Wirtz et al., 2003; Ridge et 
al., 1995; Gethins, 1996; Taxis & Barber, 2003b; Conroy et al., 2007), and (3) whether or not 
‘extra doses’(as defined by Allan and Barker, 1990), were included in the denominator (Wirtz 
et al., 2003; Ridge et al., 1995; Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Taxis & Barber, 2003b; Conroy et al., 
2007).   Participants were told the study objectives in three studies, were not informed in 
three and partially informed in ten.   
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Observers were pharmacists in 14 studies, a pharmacist and pharmacy technician in one 
(Conroy et al., 2007) and a nurse in another (Kelly et al., 2011).  Data were collected by one 
observer in nine studies, two observers in six (Dean et al., 1995; Ridge et al., 1995; Taxis et 
al., 1999; Dean & Barber, 2000; Franklin et al, 2006; Conroy et al., 2007), and four 
pharmacists in another (Franklin et al., 2007).  Of the seven studies with more than one 
observer, one (Dean & Barber, 2000) assessed inter-observer reliability (reported in a 
separate paper)(Dean & Barber, 2001), one reported that “detection of medication errors 
was comparable between the two observers” (Dean et al., 1995), and five did not report 
whether or not inter-observer reliability was assessed (Ridge et al., 1995; Taxis et al., 1999; 
Franklin et al., 2006; Franklin et al., 2007; Conroy et al., 2007).  Potential sources of variation 
were explored in some studies: observations at specific times of day (Ho et al, 1997; Hartley 
& Dhillon, 1998; Dean & Barber, 2000), days of the week (Ho et al., 1997; Dean & Barber, 
2000), time-point of inpatient stay (Ho et al., 1997), timing of administration in relation to 
when the medication was prescribed (Ho et al., 1997), and nurse-specific variation (Dean & 
Barber, 2000).  All papers reported whether or not IV doses were studied; three studied both 
dose types but did not report error rates for these separately (Ridge et al., 1995; Conroy et 
al., 2007; Ghaleb et al., 2010).  Ten papers did not specify whether adults, paediatrics, or 
both, were studied, however all were confirmed as being conducted in adult settings by the 
relevant authors.   
 
Clinical severity of MAEs was assessed in eight studies: five (Taxis et al., 1999; Dean & Barber, 
2000; Taxis & Barber, 2003b; Franklin et al., 2007; Kelly et al., 2011) used the validated 
method of Dean and Barber (Dean & Barber, 1999), one (Wirtz et al., 2003) used an earlier 
method developed by Dean (Dean, 1999), one involved an unreported number of clinical 
pharmacists and the researcher reaching consensus on whether each MAE was minor, 
moderate or major (Hartley & Dhillon, 1998), and one used the judgement of an experienced 
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pharmacist researcher to classify each MAE as either minor or potentially serious (Franklin et 
al., 2006).
 
 All severity assessments were based on potential (rather than actual) harm. 
 
No obvious trend in MAE rates over time was identified, table 3.1.  A forest plot of non-IV 
studies which used the same MAE definition and denominator also showed no apparent 
trend in MAE rates over time (figure 3.2).  A scatterplot of the same studies revealed no 
discernible correlation between MAE rates and sample size (figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.2 Forest plot of 12 reported medication administration error (MAE) rates from 
eight UK observational studies of non-IV doses that used the same error definition, 
denominator definition and error rate calculation.  
Study
Sample 
(OEs)
               % MAE rate of OEs
Dean et al (1995) 2765
Cavell and Hughes (1997) (handwritten) 1206
Cavell and Hughes (1997) (computer) 1295
Ho et al (1997) 2170
Taxis and Barber (1999) 842
Dean and Barber (2000) (drug trolley) 3576
Dean and Barber (2000) (bedside locker) 2491
Franklin et al (2006) (pre web-based education) 1165
Franklin et al (2006) (post web-based education) 1282
Franklin et al (2007) (pre EPMA) 1473
Franklin et al (2007) (post EPMA) 1139
Kelly (2011) 2129
Pooled MAE rate (meta-analysis, random-effects model) 21,533        
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
 
Figure 3.3 Scatterplot of 12 reported medication administration error (MAE) rates from 
eight comparable UK studies of non-IV doses.  
 
Chapter 3 – Effects of methodological variations on MAE rates 
 
 
 
97 of 321 
Table 3.1 Characteristics of 16 UK observational studies and reported medication 
administration error (MAE) rates.  *Wrong time errors were excluded from reported MAE rates 
where applicable. 
Study Study setting Data collection Were participants told 
the purpose of the 
study? 
IV or 
non-IV 
doses 
Sample size Reported 
MAE rate* 
(95% CI) 
Dean et al 
1995 
1 hospital, 6 
wards: 2 medical, 
2 surgical, 2 MfE. 
Consecutive weekday drug 
rounds (May and June 1993). 
Partially (a study of 
medication 
administration and 
work sampling 
conducted 
concurrently). 
Non-IV 2756 OE 3.0% 
(2.4 to 3.7) 
Ridge et al 
1995 
1 hospital, 6 
wards: 2 medical, 
2 surgical, 2 MfE. 
One week on each ward (at 
least 10 drug rounds), 
between January and April 
1993. 
No (work sampling 
study). 
Both 3312 drug 
administrations 
3.5% 
(2.9 to 4.1) 
 
Gethins 1996 1 hospital, 5 
wards: 4 medical, 
1 renal. 
6 week period. No (a time and motion 
survey). 
Non-IV 2000 drug 
administrations 
2.8% 
Ho et al 1997 1 female MfE 
ward. 
Two 8-day periods with one 
week break in between. 
Partially (a study of 
the problems 
associated with the 
medication 
distribution system). 
Non-IV 2170 OE 5.5% 
(4.5 to 6.4) 
Cavell and 
Hughes 1997 
2 hospitals, 2 
medical wards. 
42 drug rounds on ward with 
handwritten charts (H). 35 
drug rounds on ward with 
computer-printed 
administration form (C). 
Partially (a study of 
computerised 
prescribing on the 
drug use process). 
Non-IV 1206 OE (H) 
1295 OE (C) 
 
5.5% (H) 
5.7% (C) 
 
Hartley and 
Dhillon 1998 
1 hospital. 3 
wards: 2 surgical, 
1 medical. 
39 consecutive days in June 
and July 1996. 
Partially (a study to 
understand the 
constraints the nurses 
operated under and to 
improve the provision 
of information for 
their needs). 
IV 320 prescribed 
doses 
26.9% 
(20.3 to 30.7) 
Taxis and 
Barber 1999 
1 hospital, 2 
general medical. 
5 weekdays on each ward in 
May and July 1997.  All 
scheduled drug rounds 
except where two nurses 
administered using separate 
trolleys. 
Partially (a study of 
advantages and 
disadvantages of each 
system). 
Non-IV 842 OE 8.0% 
(6.2 to 9.8) 
Dean and 
Barber 2000 
1 hospital: 1 
vascular surgery 
and 1 renal 
medical ward. 
Total 27 days before bedside 
medication lockers were 
implemented, and 17 days 
post. All four scheduled drug 
rounds seven days a week 
(January to June 1998). 
Partially (a study to 
find out how often 
medication was 
unavailable, could not 
be found, or whether 
any other problems 
occurred). 
Non-IV 3576 OE (pre) 
2491 OE (post) 
4.3% (pre) 
4.2% (post) 
 
Bruce and 
Wong 2001 
1 acute 
admissions ward. 
4 weeks, each weekday in 
December 1998. 
No (a study of time 
spent on drug 
administrations). 
IV (except 
1 SC, 1 
IM) 
107 OE 10.3% 
(3.8 to 14.9) 
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Table 3.1 continued.  Characteristics of 16 UK observational studies and reported 
medication administration error (MAE) rates.  *Wrong time errors were excluded from 
reported MAE rates where applicable. 
Taxis and 
Barber 2003 
2 hospitals, 10 
wards: 1 renal, 2 
medical, 1 CTS, 1 
surgical, 1 ICU, 1 
oncology, 1 
neonatal, 1 CICU, 
and 1 paediatric. 
6-10 consecutive days on 
each ward between June and 
December 1999.  Included 
weekends and all times of 
drug rounds on each ward. 
Partially (a study of 
common preparation 
and administration 
problems of IV drugs). 
IV 430 observed 
doses 
49% 
(45 to 54) 
Wirtz et al 
2003 
1 hospital. 
Number and types 
of ward not 
stated. 
6 consecutive days in each 
ward, May - June 2000. 
Partially (a study of 
problems associated 
with preparing and 
administering IV 
drugs). 
IV 77 preparations, 
63 administrations 
22% (prep) 
(13 to 31) 
27% (admin) 
(16 to 38) 
Franklin et al 
2006 
1 mixed medical 
ward. 
4 weeks pre internet-
education for nursing staff 
(June 2004), 4 weeks post 
(Oct/Nov 2004). 
Partially (a study of 
drug administration 
problems). 
Both 1188 OE (pre) 
1308 OE (post) 
6.9% (pre) 
5.0% (post) 
Franklin et al 
2007 
1 general surgical 
ward. 
2 weeks pre-EPMA (spring 
2007) and 2 weeks post-
EPMA (spring 2008). 
Partially (a study of 
any problems 
associated with the 
medication system). 
Both 1644 OE (pre) 
1178 OE (post) 
8.6% (pre) 
4.4% (post) 
 
Conroy et al 
2007 
1 children's 
hospital.  Included 
PICU, NICU, 
medical, surgical, 
ED. 
6 weeks, usually two drug 
rounds each weekday. 
Yes Both 752 
administrations 
 
1.2% 
Ghaleb et al 
2010 
 
5 hospitals, 10 
wards: 4 medical, 1 
adolescent, 2PICU, 
2NICU, 1surgical 
2 week period on each ward 
(2004/2005) each day, 
including weekends. 
Yes Both 1554 doses; 2249 
OE 
27.6% of doses 
19.9% of OE 
(17.5 to 20.7) 
Kelly et al 
2011 
4 hospitals, 8 
wards: 1 MfE and 
1 stroke ward per 
hospital. 
March to June 2008. Morning 
and lunchtime drug rounds 
on some weekdays and 
weekends. 
Yes Non-IV 2129 OE 10.7% 
a
comparison study of UK and USA hospital (only UK data is presented) 
 
b
 comparison study of UK and German hospital (only UK data is presented).   
CICU, cardiac intensive care unit; CTS, cardio-thoracic surgery; ED, emergency department; EPMA, electronic prescribing and 
medication administration system; ICU, intensive care unit; IM, intramuscular; IV, intravenous; MfE, medicine for the elderly; NICU, 
neonatal intensive care unit; OE, opportunities for error; PICU, paediatric intensive care unit; SC, subcutaneous. 
 
 
3.5.2 MAE definitions 
Three different overall MAE definitions were identified.  Fourteen studies (Dean et al., 1995; 
Wirtz et al., 2003; Ridge et al., 1995; Gethins, 1996; Ho et al., 1997; Cavell & Hughes, 1997; 
Taxis et al., 1999; Dean & Barber, 2000; Bruce & Wong, 2001; Taxis & Barber, 2003b; Franklin 
et al., 2006; Franklin et al., 2007; Ghaleb et al., 2010; Kelly et al., 2011) used Allan and 
Barker’s (1990; p558) definition: “a deviation from the physician’s medication order as 
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written on the patient’s chart”.  Of these, three (Wirtz et al., 2003; Taxis & Barber, 2003b; 
Ghaleb et al., 2010) expanded this American-based definition to include ‘any deviation from 
standard hospital policy or the manufacturer’s instructions’, and one (Kelly et al., 2011) 
included three additional drug administration related guidance documents to evaluate the 
‘appropriateness of administration’.  The additional specifications relating to hospital policy, 
manufacturer’s instructions, and other drug administration guidance documents made the 
definition more specific for studying IV doses, paediatric doses and doses administered to 
patients with dysphagia in the UK.  One study (Hartley & Dhillon, 1998) used a circular 
definition: “error in an administered dose or an omitted dose”, and one (Conroy et al., 2007) 
used an outcome-based but general definition: “preventable events that may cause or lead 
to inappropriate medication use or patient harm”.  Observers intervened to prevent all 
identified MAEs in three studies (Cavell & Hughes, 1997; Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Conroy et 
al., 2007) and only for potentially serious errors in the remaining 13; all interventions were  
included as MAEs.   
 
Inconsistencies in what was included as an MAE were identified, even when the same 
definition was used.  Four specific variations were identified, table 3.2.  The most significant 
and divisive amongst researchers was ‘wrong time’ errors.  Based on data reported in one 
single-centre study, including wrong time errors of over 30 minutes from the time for which 
the dose was due increased the MAE rate from 27% to 69% of 320 IV doses (Hartley & 
Dhillon, 1998).  The effect of including wrong time errors in non-IV doses was not assessed as 
relevant studies did not report the number of doses with wrong time errors only.  
Nonetheless, including wrong time errors is likely to substantially increase the reported MAE 
rate as doses administered over 60 minutes from the time for which the dose was due 
occurred in 13-50% of a total of 9054 non-IV doses (Dean et al., 1995; Ho et al., 1997; Cavell 
& Hughes, 1997; Kelly et al., 2011).  
 
Chapter 3 – Effects of methodological variations on MAE rates 
 
 
 
100 of 321 
 
Table 3.2 Summary of variations associated with medication administration error 
(MAE) inclusion/exclusion criteria in 16 UK observational studies and their effect on 
the reported MAE rate. 
Type of variation 
in MAE 
inclusion/exclusi
on criteria 
Number of 
studies 
that 
included 
the 
following 
as an MAE 
Number of 
studies 
that 
excluded 
the 
following 
as an MAE 
Number of 
studies 
that did 
not report 
whether 
or not the 
following 
were  
included 
as an MAE 
Effect of variation on reported MAE 
rate 
Wrong time 6 5 5 
Including wrong time errors of over 30 
minutes from the time for which the dose 
was due increased the reported MAE rate 
from 27 to 69% of 320 intravenous doses 
(Hartley & Dhillon, 1998).  Other studies 
did not report these data separately. 
 
Omission due to 
patient not on 
ward 
3 1 12 
Unknown, as studies did not report these 
data separately. 
 
Doses left at the 
patient’s bedside 
without nurse 
witnessing 
consumption 
1 4* 11 
These accounted for 2.8% of 1554 
paediatric doses in one multi-centre 
study (Ghaleb et al., 2010).  If the 
frequency of doses left at the bedside are 
similar in adult hospital settings, then 
inclusion of these as MAEs would 
potentially increase the MAE rate by up 
to 2.8% of doses observed. 
 
Omission for 
clinical reasons 
1 6 9 
These occurred in 0.2% of 2000 non-
intravenous doses in one study (Gethins, 
1996) and thus their exclusion in other 
MAE studies is unlikely to have a 
significant impact on the reported MAE 
rate. 
 
*One study excluded leaving a dose at the bedside as a MAE initially but included these as MAEs if the dose was 
still at the bedside by the time the researcher leaves the ward (Kelly et al., 2011). 
 
3.5.3 MAE subcategories 
Forty-four different MAE subcategories were identified, with a median of 11 per study (range 
3 to 16), table 3.3.  In some cases, differences in subcategories reflect different ways of 
classifying the same errors.  For example, MAE subcategories such as ‘wrong diluent’ and 
‘wrong solvent’ can be considered more detailed subcategories of a broader subcategory: 
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‘wrong preparation technique’. Furthermore, in studies where only one MAE was allowed for 
each dose, none specified the hierarchy used to decide how the subcategory was allocated if 
more than one error was observed for the same dose.  Although the classification should not 
affect the overall MAE rate, care should be taken when comparing specific MAE 
subcategories across studies. 
 
Different researchers also used the same term to mean different things and different terms 
to mean the same thing.  This mainly concerned ‘unordered drug’ errors (also known as 
‘unauthorised drug’ and ‘unprescribed drug’).  One study used ‘unauthorised drug’ to include 
‘wrong drug’, ‘wrong patient’ and ‘administration of a drug without a valid prescription’ 
(Hartley & Dhillon, 1998).  However, other studies differentiated ‘unauthorised drug’ from 
‘wrong drug’ by stating that the former involves the administration of a drug where no 
medication order exists, while the latter involves administration of a different drug against an 
existing medication order (Wirtz et al., 2003; Taxis et al., 1999; Dean & Barber, 2000; Franklin 
et al., 2006; Ghaleb et al., 2010; Kelly et al., 2011). An ‘unauthorised drug’ error is also 
generally differentiated from an ‘extra dose’ error which is administering an extra dose of a 
prescribed drug, for example, giving a medication twice a day instead of once a day (Allan & 
Barker, 1990). 
 
In some cases, differences in MAE subcategories used may reflect disparities in the types of 
error included.  One study considered dose omissions, a common MAE subcategory, as a 
“violation of procedure” and differentiated these from MAEs (Conroy et al., 2007).  Including 
dose omissions in this study would increase the MAE rate from 1.2% to 5.6% of 742 drug 
administrations.  There were also studies that included some procedural violations within 
established MAE subcategories, for example, not wearing gloves was included in a ‘wrong 
preparation technique’ subcategory (Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Bruce & Wong, 2001), but was 
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not included as an MAE in other studies.  However, data were not reported separately in the 
relevant studies and therefore their effect on the reported MAE rate was not determined. 
 
Several studies additionally reported a breakdown of specific MAE subcategories based on 
the reason for error.  Although the causes of MAE are outside the scope of this literature 
review, these additional subcategories were frequently reported and provide an important 
role for understanding MAE rates.  For example, omission due to unavailability was 
commonly included as a subset of omissions and accounted for 52-67% of a total of 12,993 
non-IV dose omissions (Dean et al., 1995; Gethins, 1996; Ho et al., 1997; Dean & Barber, 
2000). 
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Table 3.3 Medication administration error (MAE) subcategories included in 16 UK observational studies.   
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1 *Omission                 15 
2 *Wrong dose / improper dose                 14 
3 
*Wrong dosage form / wrong form / wrong 
preparation selected / wrong 
pharmaceutical form / wrong formulation 
               
 
 13 
4 *Deteriorated drug / expired drug ()                12 
5 *Extra dose / unordered dose                 10 
6 Wrong drug                 10 
7 
*Unordered drug /unauthorized 
drug/unprescribed drug 
                10 
8 *Wrong route                 9 
9 
*Wrong dose preparation/ wrong 
preparation technique / wrong technique / 
wrong preparation 
               
 
8 
10 *Other  / miscellaneous                 7 
11 Wrong patient ()                4 
12 *Wrong rate of administration                 4 
13 Drug incompatibility                 4 
14 *Wrong time +/- 30 minutes    (**)         (**)    3 
15 *Wrong administration technique                 3 
16 Wrong time +/- 1 hour (**) (**)  (**)       (**)  (**)    3 
17 Fast IV bolus                 2 
18 Wrong diluent                 2 
19 Wrong time - not specified                 2 
20 Unauthorised                 1 
21 Wrong preparation                 1 
22 Administration without a valid prescription                 1 
23 Incomplete labelling                 1 
24 Wrong base solution content                 1 
25 Errors in solvent/diluent                 1 
26 Fast administration (via a central line)                 1 
27 Fast administration (via a peripheral line)                 1 
28 Other administration errors                 1 
29 Other preparation errors                 1 
30 Preparation of an unauthorised drug                 1 
31 Preparation of wrong dose                 1 
32 Preparation of wrong drug                 1 
33 Wrong dose preparation                 1 
34 Wrong solvent                 1 
35 Wrong volume of diluent                 1 
36 Wrong volume of solvent                 1 
37 Errors with inhalers/nebuliser                  1 
38 
Errors with oral/gastrostomy drug 
administration 
               
 
1 
39 Errors with IV drug administration                 1 
40 Incorrect rate of IV administrations                 1 
41 
Left drug by patient's bedside without 
checking drug administration 
               
 
1 
42 Omission of nurses' signature                  1 
43 
Wrong dose preparation and 
administration 
               
 
1 
44 Wrong time +/- 2 hours  (**)  (**)         (**)    0 
TOTAL 7 8 9 8 12 11 7 8 12 11 12 16 11 3 12 11  
* indicate subcategories that were listed by Allan and Barker
11
    reported by the study, () reported in a sub-analysis of causes of 
MAEs and not as an MAE subcategory, (**) measured but not considered an error.    IV, intravenous. 
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3.5.4 Denominators used to determine MAE rates 
We identified four denominators and three main differences between them which may affect 
interpretation of reported MAE rates.  The four denominators were the total number of: 
(1)‘opportunities for error’ (OE) defined as the “sum of all doses ordered plus all the 
unordered doses given” (Allan & Barker, 1990), (2) ‘drug administrations’, (3) ‘prepared 
and/or administered doses’, and (4) ‘prescribed doses’.  The first difference between the 
denominators is whether or not dose omissions were included.  All ten studies (Dean et al., 
1995; Ho et al., 1997; Cavell & Hughes, 1997; Taxis et al., 1999; Dean & Barber, 2000; Bruce & 
Wong, 2001; Franklin et al., 2006; Franklin et al., 2007; Ghaleb et al., 2010; Kelly et al., 2011) 
that used OE and one (Hartley & Dhillon, 1998) that used ‘prescribed doses’ as the 
denominator included dose omissions, while it was unclear in the remaining five (Wirtz et al., 
2003; Ridge et al., 1995; Gethins, 1996; Taxis & Barber, 2003b; Conroy et al., 2007) whether 
or not dose omissions were included.  Dose omissions accounted for 0-13 % of a total of 934 
IV doses (Wirtz et al., 2003; Hartley & Dhillon, 1998; Bruce & Wong, 2001; Taxis & Barber, 
2003b) and 1.8-5.1% of a total of 16,465 non-IV doses (Dean et al., 1995; Cavell & Hughes, 
1997; Taxis et al., 1999; Dean & Barber, 2000; Kelly et al., 2011), therefore excluding dose 
omissions from the denominator will inflate the reported MAE rate.  The second difference 
was whether or not extra doses were included: ten studies that used OE included extra doses 
in the denominator, but it was unclear in the remaining six.  Despite this variation, extra 
doses are relatively rare and therefore unlikely to substantially affect the reported MAE rate.  
The third difference is whether or not each dose was split into preparation and 
administration.  This was generally a feature of studies that included IV and/or paediatric 
doses.  Seven of the 10 studies that used an OE as the denominator counted one OE per dose 
(Dean et al., 1995; Ho et al., 1997; Cavell & Hughes, 1997; Taxis et al., 1999; Dean & Barber, 
2000; Franklin et al., 2006; Kelly et al., 2011) (all were studies of non-IV doses) and three 
allowed up to two OEs per dose (Bruce & Wong, 2001; Franklin et al., 2007; Ghaleb et al., 
2010) (all included IV doses, two in adults and one in paediatrics).  In the paediatric study 
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where up to two OEs were possible per dose, researchers reported that MAEs occurred in 
19.1% of OE and 27.6% of doses (Ghaleb et al., 2010).  The effect of allowing up to two OEs 
per dose in this study therefore resulted in a lower calculated MAE rate. 
 
3.5.5 MAE rates  
Non-IV versus IV doses 
A meta-analysis of 21,533 adult non-IV OEs from eight studies revealed MAEs occurred in 
5.6% for non-IV OEs (95% CI, 4.6-6.7%) (table 3.4).   Heterogeneity between studies was 
relatively low (random effects model I2=19%).  Nine MAE rates for IV doses were extracted; 
however a meta-analysis of three MAE rates was conducted from two studies only as it was 
inappropriate to include studies that used different error and denominator definitions.  MAEs 
occurred in 35% of a total of 156 adult OEs (95% CI 2-68%) (Bruce & Wong, 2001; Franklin et 
al., 2007).  Heterogeneity between studies was low (random effects model I
2
=0), however 
this was based on a small sample of IV OEs which resulted in a wide 95% CI.  Based on these 
limited data, IV doses were estimated to be five times more likely to be associated with an 
MAE than non-IV doses (pooled OR 5.1; 95% CI 3.5-7.5).    
 
Adult versus paediatric doses 
Of the three studies that included paediatric doses, two reported IV and non-IV data together 
(Conroy et al., 2007; Ghaleb et al., 2010) and one study combined adult and paediatric IV 
doses (Taxis & Barber, 2003b).  It was thus inappropriate to perform a meta-analysis of 
paediatric MAE rates for comparison with adult MAE rates. 
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Table 3.4 Summary of 29 medication administration error (MAE) rates from 16 direct 
observation studies.   
Type of 
doses 
Numerator Denominator term 
(definition) 
Meta-analysis of MAE 
rate (95% CI) 
Studies 
Non-IV 
doses  
 
MAE definition based 
on Allan and Barker 
1990. 
Opportunity for error 
(Total number of doses 
given plus any doses 
ordered but omitted) 
5.6% 
(4.6 to 6.7) 
Cavell and Hughes 1997 
Dean and Barber 2000 
Dean et al 1995 
Franklin et al 2007
 
Franklin et al 2006 
Ho et al 1997 
Taxis and Barber 1999 
Kelly et al 2011 
Drug administration 
(“Drugs administered 
from the drug trolley”) 
3.2% Gethins 1996 
IV doses 
only 
 
MAE definition based 
on Allan and Barker 
1990. 
Opportunity for error 
(Total number of doses 
given plus any doses 
ordered but omitted) 
35% 
(2 to 68) 
Franklin et al 2006  
Bruce and Wong 2001*  
(all IV doses except one SC 
and one IM) 
MAE (Allan and Barker 
1990) 
plus “any deviation 
from the hospital’s 
intravenous policy or 
the manufacturer’s 
instructions”. 
Drug prepared and/or 
administered 
(Total number of doses 
prepared and/or 
administered) 
22% of preparations 
Wirtz et al 2003 
27% of administrations 
49% 
Taxis and Barber 2003a 
(adults and paediatrics)
 
“Error in an 
administered dose or 
an omitted dose” 
Prescribed doses 
(“Total number of 
prescribed doses”) 
16.7% Hartley and Dhillon 1998* 
IV and non-
IV doses  
 
(proportion 
of IV and 
non-IV 
doses were 
different 
between 
studies) 
 
MAE (Allan and Barker 
1990) 
Opportunity for error 
(Total number of 
opportunities for error 
for doses given “plus 
any doses ordered but 
omitted.”) 
6.0% 
(up to 2 OEs per dose) 
Franklin et al 2007 
Franklin et al 2006  
MAE (Allan and Barker 
1990) plus “any 
deviation from 
standard hospital policy 
& procedure”. 
19.1% 
(>1 MAE per OE 
possible and up to 2 
OEs per dose) 
Ghaleb et al 2009 
(paediatrics) 
“Preventable events 
that may cause or lead 
to inappropriate 
medication use or 
patient harm” 
Drug administration 
(Total number of drug 
administrations) 
1.2% 
(excluded 141 (18.8%)  
violations in 752 drug 
administrations) 
Conroy et al 2007 
(paediatrics) 
 
MAE (Allan and Barker 
1990). 
3.5% 
(excluded wrong 
administration rate 
errors) 
Ridge et al 1995 
All reported error rates were calculated using: number of opportunities for error (OE) with at least one MAE divided 
by the total number of OEs unless where stated in the table. *indicates studies where the MAE rate was manually 
adjusted from the reported MAE rate presented in the study which was based on >1 MAE for each OE.  All MAE rates 
exclude timing errors.  All studies were conducted in adult patient populations unless otherwise stated in the table.   
IM, intramuscular; IV, intravenous; SC, subcutaneous. 
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3.6 Discussion 
3.6.1 Methodological variations 
While methodological variations between studies are widely known, no literature review has 
systematically summarised and quantified their effects on reported MAE rates.  Using the UK 
as a case-study, a number of methodological variations between studies were identified, 
even within one country.  Some differences reflect the objectives of specific studies; the 
rationale for other differences was less clear.  The effects of some methodological variations 
on the reported MAE rate were quantified.  Notably, IV doses were five times more likely to 
be associated with a MAE than non-IV doses.  While the 95% CI for the pooled MAE rates for 
non-IV and IV doses overlap, the 95% CI for the OR does not cross zero, suggesting that the 
odds of error was significantly different for non-IV and IV doses.   
 
The findings highlight the importance of considering a number of methodological details 
when interpreting studies of MAE rates.  More research is required to quantify other 
methodological effects on reported MAE rates, for example: (1) whether or not nurse 
participants were fully, partially or not informed of the study objectives, (2) type of observer, 
for example, a pharmacist and/or a nurse, and (3) the type of medication order included in 
studies, for example, regular and/or ‘when required’ medication orders.   
   
3.6.2 MAE rates and practical implications 
The meta-analysis revealed an overall MAE rate of 5.6% for non-IV OEs and 35% of IV OEs in 
UK hospitals.  The pooled estimate of the MAE rate for non-IV doses was based on a 
relatively homogenous, large sample of OEs in adult patients from a wide range of settings 
and therefore may be useful for benchmarking and monitoring UK hospital MAE rates.  In 
contrast, there was a limited sample and wide confidence interval for IV doses.     
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Sub-analysis of MAE rates for non-IV doses showed no apparent trends over the past 15 
years.  However, interpretation is limited as studies cannot be compared directly due to their 
methodological variations.  Studies measuring MAE rates at frequent regular intervals using 
consistent methods are required to monitor long-term trends; this may require coordination 
at a local and national level in order to maximise the utility of the data collected beyond that 
of a ‘standalone descriptive study’.   
 
Limited numbers of UK studies and insufficient reporting in all three paediatric studies 
prevented calculation of overall MAE rates for paediatric non-IV and IV doses separately.  
Future studies measuring and reporting separate MAE rates for non-IV and IV doses in 
paediatrics are required to assess the effect of including paediatric doses on reported MAE 
rates.  
 
3.6.3 Suggestions for future studies of MAEs  
A suggestion, based on the current study findings, is for future studies to use definitions and 
methods for measuring MAEs that are based on those used previously.  This not only allows 
comparison with past findings but also facilitates the capture of new errors that arise.  For 
studies that include IVs, paediatrics and other doses that require multiple manipulations, for 
example, for patients with dysphagia, it might be useful to build on the work by Taxis et al 
(2003) by separating MAE subcategories according to preparation and administration stage.  
This will develop our understanding of where MAEs occur and allow comparisons to be made 
across different medication doses and systems. 
 
Based on Allan and Barker’s (1990) MAE definition, subcategories should probably be 
assigned from the perspective of the medication order where practical (rather than the 
patient’s perspective).  Although the patient’s perspective plays a vital role in assessing the 
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quality of health care in many cases, the medication order viewpoint is advocated to provide 
a practical approach to categorising MAEs which also allows for better comparison with 
previous studies.  The perspective is important to distinguish between errors such as 
administering a ‘wrong drug’ to the right patient (patient perspective) and administering the 
right drug (according to the medication order used at the time of administration) to the 
‘wrong patient’; the former is an error at the preparation stage and the latter is an error at 
the administration stage.   
 
To improve the clarity of ‘unordered/unauthorised drug’ errors, one suggestion would be to 
split this subcategory into three: ‘wrong drug’, ‘wrong patient’ and ‘administration without a 
medication order’.  A ‘wrong drug’ error occurs when an incorrect drug is selected against an 
existing medication order, a ‘wrong patient’ error occurs when the correct drug is selected 
but administered to a different patient and ‘administration without a medication order’ is 
giving a drug to a patient against no existing medication order (for example, giving a dose 
before it has been prescribed on the drug chart).   
 
The use of OE as the denominator has been advocated for determining medication error 
rates in general (Brown et al., 2008) and for MAE rates specifically (Allan & Barker, 1990).  For 
calculating MAE rates, the proportion of OE with at least one MAE was found to be the most 
practical and easily interpretable.  Consequently another suggestion would be to use this 
calculation either alone or in addition to other MAE rate calculations. In studies where each 
dose may be associated with more than one OE, the proportion of doses given (or omitted) 
with at least one MAE should also be reported where possible.    
 
Finally, based on the findings in this review and experience in conducting observation 
studies, a set of reporting guidance to support future researchers is proposed, table 3.5.  This 
is intended for use in conjunction with standard good practice for reporting, and is designed 
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to be non-prescriptive as a considerable part of a study’s design and subsequent reporting 
will depend on the objectives.  Further work is needed to evaluate this.  
Table 3.5 Suggested reporting criteria for future studies that involve measuring 
medication administration error (MAE) rates adapted from Allan and Barker (1990).  
Parameter Suggestions for reporting in future MAE studies: 
Method of data 
collection 
1. Whether direct observation, incident reports and/or chart review was used 
2. Number, profession and experience of data collectors 
3. Whether or not inter-observer reliability was assessed if more than one data 
collector, and how this was assessed 
Type of doses 4. Whether or not intravenous (IV) doses were included  
5. Proportion of IV doses, if both IV and non-IV were included 
6. Whether or not regular, when required and/or ‘once-only’ medication orders 
were included 
Patients 7. Whether adults and/or paediatric patients were studied 
8. Proportion of adult and paediatric doses if both were included  
Medication 
administration 
errors 
9. Operational definition accompanied by a set of guidance with examples 
10. Explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria.  Examples include stating whether or not 
the following were considered to be an MAE: 
i.  Time of administration in relation to that prescribed (for regular and 
‘once-only’ medication orders) 
ii. Omissions for clinical reasons such as those determined by the nurse, 
lack of IV access and patient refusal 
iii. Omission due to patient not on the ward 
iv. Procedural-related violations such as not checking a patient’s identity, 
leaving a dose at the patient’s bedside without observing 
administration, not labelling a syringe, administering without a valid 
prescription and not documenting administration 
v. Errors prevented by the observer, patient, nurse and other health care 
professionals  
11. Number of errors possible per dose 
12. Number of doses with at least one error if more than one error is possible per 
dose 
13. Types of medication orders involved: regular, ‘when required’, ‘once-only’ 
medication, medications ordered separate to the drug chart 
MAE 
subcategories 
14. Operational definitions for error subcategories used 
15. For studies where each dose can only be associated with one error, state the 
hierarchy for deciding how the MAE category should be allocated if more than 
one error occurs in the same dose 
16. The number of MAE detected in each category 
Denominator 17. Operational denominator definition accompanied by a set of guidance with 
examples 
18. Explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria for including doses in the denominator.  
Examples include stating whether or not the following were included in the 
denominator: 
i. Omission of a prescribed dose 
ii. Administration of an extra dose of a prescribed drug 
iii. Leaving a dose at the patient’s bedside without observing 
administration 
iv. Non-medication items, for example, support stockings and dietetic 
products 
v. Oxygen and other medical gases 
19. Types of medication orders included: regular, ‘when required’, ‘once-only’ 
medication, medications ordered separate to the drug chart 
20. Relationship between denominator used and a dose, if dose is not used as the 
denominator 
21. Number of doses excluded from the study 
MAE rate  22. How the MAE rate was calculated 
Other 23. Whether or not the clinical severity of MAEs was assessed, and how  
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3.6.4 Limitations  
Few studies of IV doses and substantial heterogeneity meant findings from only two studies 
were used to calculate the overall MAE rate for IV doses and there were insufficient data to 
explore the differences between adult and paediatric MAE rates.  Only UK-based studies 
were included and therefore the overall MAE rates cannot be extrapolated to other 
countries.  Finally, 11 of the 16 included studies were co-authored by PhD supervisors BDF 
and/or NB.  This was identified as a potential limitation as this may be perceived as a source 
of bias.  However, this was also one of the strengths of the current review, as their 
experience has facilitated review of the studies by MM to a high level of detail.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The UK literature was used to summarise methodological variations between studies within 
one country and their effect on reported MAE rates were evaluated.  A number of 
methodological and reporting recommendations can be applied to other countries.  Overall, 
the findings may be useful for making future MAE studies more transparent and comparable.   
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Chapter 4.  A national survey of 
medication systems and processes in 
English NHS hospitals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction  
Systems and processes by which medications are prescribed, ordered, distributed and 
administered have a great impact on patient safety and MAEs (Ammenworth et al., 2008; 
Franklin et al., 2007; McRobbie et al., 2003; Dean & Barber, 2000; Cavell & Hughes, 1997; 
Dean et al., 1995).  Surprisingly few studies have measured system and/or process changes 
on UK MAE rates (chapter three).   Those studies that exist, suggests different systems 
contribute to MAEs in different ways (Franklin et al., 2007; Cavell & Hughes, 1997; Taxis et 
al., 1999; Dean et al., 1995).  However, the extent of use of many medication systems and 
processes within the NHS is currently unknown; this presents a barrier for assessing the 
generalisability of interventions to reduce MAEs across the NHS, and also for exploring the 
advantages and disadvantages of systems variation for further research to reduce MAEs.  
This chapter describes a national survey that was conducted to identify the extent of 
variation in medication systems used in English NHS hospitals. 
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4.2  Background 
Against a backdrop of increasing financial pressures on the NHS and greater awareness of the 
need to increase patient safety, there is an urgent need to maximise benefits from 
interventions that reduce risk and can be applied across a range of settings.  In the past, 
national initiatives such as the use of PODs, OSD, and the introduction of patient bedside 
medication lockers have been implemented in hospitals with some success (Audit 
Commission, 2001; Department of Health, 2000b; Lummis et al., 2006).  These interventions 
evolved from the recognition of common problems across the NHS.  However, the extents to 
which local problems are generalisable to the wider NHS are not always clear because 
systems-based similarities and differences between hospitals have not been described 
(chapter one).  Furthermore, different types of hospital medication systems have been 
associated with different effects on MAEs. 
 
Different hospital drug distribution systems have previously been associated with different 
MAE rates and also in the types of MAEs that occur (Means et al., 1975; Dean et al., 1995; 
Taxis et al., 1999).  More recently advances in technology, in the form of automation, EPMA, 
and BCMA systems, and their subsequent adoption has also contributed to potential 
systems-based variation between hospitals.  In turn, these have been associated with 
different effects on reported MAE rates (Schwarz & Brodowy, 1995; Paoletti et al., 2007; 
DeYoung et al., 2009; Poon et al., 2010; Franklin et al., 2007).  Thus, knowing the extent of 
such systems-based variation would facilitate the prioritisation and development of systems-
based interventions to reduce MAEs.   
 
Unlike in the US (Pedersen et al., 2012; 2011), there has been no national survey of hospital 
medication systems used to support medication administration in UK hospitals.  A recent 
survey (Frontini et al., 2012) of hospital medication procurement and distribution in Europe 
suggested that 37.5% of UK hospital pharmacists provided a unit-dose service.  However, the 
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response rate from the UK was very low; 34.5% of questionnaires sent were returned and 
only 8.8% were usable after adjusting for the number of unanswered questions.  
Furthermore, it was unclear what was meant by a ‘unit-dose service’ and how the question 
was framed in the survey.  A unit-dose service in the MAE-related literature and in hospital 
practice generally refers to the unit-dose preparation of all medication doses in a hospital; 
however some hospitals provide a unit-dose preparation service for specific drugs only, such 
as in the production of sterile unit-doses of chemotherapy and in the provision of a 
centralised intravenous additive service.  Separately, a survey of clinical pharmacy services in 
UK NHS hospitals (Cotter et al., 1994) reported the extent to which a wide range of activities 
were carried out by pharmacy staff.  Among the findings, the survey identified that 9% of 
hospitals had a resident on-call pharmacist and 88% had a non-resident on-call pharmacy 
service that provided advice and medication supply support outside of pharmacy opening 
hours.  However, the data is now over 20 years old and no other national survey of 
medication administration related services and systems have been conducted since then.   
 
The gap in the knowledge of the extent to which different systems are used in hospitals 
present a potential barrier for prioritising and developing systems-based interventions to 
reduce error.  Thus, a national survey of hospital medication systems in English NHS hospitals 
was conducted and is described in this chapter. 
 
4.3  Aim and objectives 
The aim of the present survey was to describe the medication administration related systems 
and processes currently used in English NHS hospitals.  There were three objectives: 
(1) To summarise the systems and processes used for prescribing, obtaining, storing, and 
administering medications on general medical and surgical inpatient wards;  
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(2) To identify intra- and inter-hospital similarities and variations in systems and 
processes used for obtaining, storing, and administering medications on inpatient 
wards; 
(3) To summarise local strategies currently used with the aim of reducing MAEs in 
English NHS hospitals. 
 
4.3 Methodology  
A descriptive survey was conducted as these are routinely used in health service research to 
identify (i) what the characteristics of a target population may be (ii) what proportion of a 
population have a certain characteristic or opinion and (iii) how often certain characteristics 
or events occur together (Oppenheim, 1992).  As such, survey findings often contribute to 
the generation of inferences regarding potential causal relationships for further investigation.  
This section describes three main methodological considerations that contributed to the 
study: (1) analytic framework, (2) approach to the survey, and (3) questionnaire 
development. 
 
4.3.1  Analytic framework  
An analytic framework was developed to define the scope of this study, guide development 
of survey questions and subsequent data analysis.  Initially, this involved identifying key 
processes required for medication administration on inpatient wards with both PhD 
supervisors (BDF and NB), and then separately with two senior hospital pharmacists; each 
had 10-20 years of hospital pharmacy experience, and a working knowledge of medication 
processes and resources used on a variety of wards in multiple hospitals.  Main systems and 
resources used to support the processes identified were then listed.  These were based 
around four key questions:   
1. What proportion of hospitals use paper drug charts and/or an EPMA system? 
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2. What pharmacy services are provided to supply medication for inpatient use in 
hospitals? 
3. How are medications distributed and retrieved for inpatient medication 
administration in hospitals? 
4. How do hospitals differ in the policies and guidance available to support medication 
administration? 
 
A fifth ‘catch-all’ question was included: 
5. What local initiatives have been implemented to improve any of the following: 
pharmacy service to inpatients, medication supply and storage on inpatient wards 
and/or medication administration? 
 
The fifth question was included to identify other systems and processes that potentially have 
an impact (directly or indirectly) on MAEs.  The main systems and resources listed were then 
refined following further discussion with the two PhD supervisors and the two senior hospital 
pharmacists before the analytic framework was finalised (table 4.1).   This analytic framework 
formed the basis for the survey questions. 
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4.3.2  Approach to the survey 
Respondents 
Doctors, nurses, pharmacists, pharmacy technicians and pharmacy assistants are routinely 
involved in one or more of the processes outlined in table 4.1.  Ideally, representatives from 
each group would have been included to provide information on the specific part or part(s) 
of the system they were involved with.  However, this was deemed impractical, and so 
pharmacists were chosen because they are routinely involved with and generally have an 
understanding of all the components in the analytic framework.   Specifically, chief 
pharmacists and senior pharmacists were selected as target respondents for their knowledge 
of the hospital as a whole, and to ensure the study was conducted with their implicit consent 
and support.  A census of acute and foundation NHS trusts in England was conducted by 
inviting their chief pharmacists to participate in the study.   
Table 4.1   Overview of analytic framework used to define the scope of the current study 
and guide development of survey questions. 
Processes Resources 
Prescribing and documenting 
medication administration  
Paper or electronic prescribing system  
Medication ordering  
 
Pharmacy opening hours 
Ward pharmacist visits 
Pharmacist and/or pharmacy technician for ordering 
medications 
Out-of hours access to medication supplies 
 On-call and/or resident pharmacist(s) 
 Reserve/emergency drug cupboard(s) 
 Other methods 
Medication distribution Types of medication supplies used 
 Types of hospital supply (ward stock, one-stop 
dispensing, inpatient labelled supplies) 
 Patients’ own drugs 
Ward-based medication storage facilities available 
Medication administration  Medication storage facilities used during drug rounds 
Local policies and guidance 
Other processes that support 
medication administration 
Other resources to support medication administration 
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Data collection method 
Two main approaches to data collection were considered for this study: researcher-
administered questionnaire and participant self-administered questionnaire.   Each method 
has its advantages and disadvantages; the choice depends on a number of factors such as 
complexity and sensitivity of the information required, location of the participants, time and 
cost limitations.   The self-administered approach was chosen for five main reasons: (1) it 
allowed coverage of a wide geographical area within a relatively short period of time, (2) it 
gave respondents time to research their answers (if necessary) prior to documenting them, 
(3) it gave respondents the flexibility to respond when it is convenient for them, (4) potential 
researcher bias was minimised, and (5) it was relatively low cost compared with researcher-
administered questionnaires.  Additionally, the self-administered questionnaire approach 
enabled questions to be presented in the same way to the respondents, which ensured 
standardisation.  The disadvantages of a self-administered questionnaire were that there was 
little opportunity for participants to obtain clarification from the researchers and that this 
method was generally associated with a lower response rate than researcher-administered 
questionnaires.  To reduce the risk of respondents misunderstanding the questions, the final 
questionnaire was developed following extensive fieldwork and pilot studies with 15 hospital 
pharmacists from four different NHS hospital trusts.   In addition, the researcher’s contact 
details were provided to respondents and a number of methods to potentially increase the 
response rate were used (Edwards et al., 2009); these are described in later sections and in 
appendix 3. 
 
Number of contacts with respondents 
The number of times and methods used to contact respondents depends on the level of 
responsiveness received.  In general, follow-up ‘contacts’ are standard practice and evidence 
suggests this increases the odds of response by more than a third (OR 1.35; 95% CI 1.18 - 
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1.55) (Edwards et al., 2009).  Pre-notification has been associated with a higher increase in 
the odds of response (OR 1.45; 95% CI 1.29 - 1.63)(Edwards et al., 2009), and therefore both 
methods were used.   
 
4.3.3 Questionnaire development 
Developing a questionnaire is an iterative process and almost every aspect of the 
questionnaire can and should be carefully reviewed (Oppenheim 2000). The aim is to 
facilitate and encourage the respondents to complete the questionnaire and to do so as 
accurately as possible.  Non-response reduces the effective sample size and can introduce 
bias.  This section explains how the questionnaire was developed and is divided into the 
following: (1) postal versus on-line questionnaires, (2) type of question and question 
wording, and (3) methods to increase response rates. 
 
Postal versus on-line questionnaires  
The advantages and disadvantages of postal and internet-based questionnaires, including 
estimates of cost, time, questionnaire design, ease of access to the questionnaire by 
participants, ease of questionnaire completion by participants, security of information, and 
data management considerations, were identified and compared (appendix 4).  Overall, the 
postal approach was chosen as it does not require computer or internet access, and 
questionnaires can be sent to the ‘Chief Pharmacist’ with relatively low risk of it getting lost 
compared to email which requires identifying an up to date and correct email address for all 
165 chief pharmacists.  Furthermore, internet access to the questionnaire may be blocked at 
some hospitals. 
 
Methods to increase response rate 
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A Cochrane systematic literature review evaluated 110 different methods to increase 
response rate from postal questionnaires (Edwards et al., 2009). In total, 481 relevant studies 
concerning postal questionnaires were included.  Methods were meta-analysed in pairs, for 
example, monetary incentive versus non-monetary incentive, hand-written address versus 
computer-printed address.  Table 4.2 summarises the methods identified for use in this study 
(represented by group one) and associated odds ratio of their effect on the response rate 
(over the alternative method in group two).   
 
 
 
Type of question and question wording  
Due to the fact-finding nature of the study, the questionnaire was designed to consist mainly 
of closed questions.  Closed questions are relatively easy to answer compared to open 
questions, and require less time from the respondents; thus potentially facilitate 
Table 4.2 Methods used in the current study to potentially increase response rate.  
Associated odds ratio presented are for the effect of group one over group two.  Data 
from Edwards et al (2009). 
Group 1 Group 2 
Sample size 
(number of 
studies 
Odds ratio (95% 
CI) 
More interesting/salient 
questions 
Less interesting/salient 
questions 
2711 (3) 
 
2.00 (1.32-3.04) 
Easier questions first Harder questions first 3182 (2) 1.61 (1.14-2.26) 
Postal follow-up including 
questionnaire 
Postal follow-up 
excluding questionnaire 
8619 (11) 1.46 (1.13-1.90) 
User friendly Standard 3540 (1) 1.46 (1.21-1.75) 
Pre-contact No pre-contact 79,651 (47) 1.45 (1.29-1.63) 
Follow-up No follow-up 32,778 (19) 1.35 (1.18-1.55) 
Assurance of confidentiality No assurance 25,000 (1) 1.33 (1.24-1.42) 
University sponsor/source Other 21,628 (14) 1.32 (1.13-1.54) 
Hand-written address Computer printed 5091 (7) 1.25 (1.08-1.45) 
Hand-written signature on 
cover letter 
Typed/electronic 15,006 (14) 1.24 (1.08-1.41) 
More relevant questions first More relevant questions 
last 
5817 (1) 1.23 (1.10-1.37) 
CI, confidence interval 
Chapter 4 – National survey 
 
 
 
121 of 321 
questionnaire completion and therefore increase the response rate.   A recent meta-analysis 
of three studies evaluating the effect of using open versus closed questions found the odds 
of response were reduced by more than a half when open questions were used (OR 0.31; 
95% CI 0.09-1.04), although the results should be interpreted with care as there was 
significant heterogeneity among the included studies (Edwards et al., 2009).   
 
Other advantages of closed questions are that data can be processed more easily and that 
quantitative comparisons can be made.  Although closed questions may be associated with 
less risk of non-response (or non-return of questionnaires) compared with open questions, 
there is still the risk of non-response to specific questions.  Ambiguous wording of questions 
and/or inappropriate answer options may deter the respondent from completing the 
questionnaire, or elicit incorrect answers; therefore question wording was reviewed in a 
series of pilot studies with hospital pharmacists.   Leading questions and double-barrelled 
questions were avoided.   A category of ‘not sure’ and/or ‘not available’ were included in the 
answer options where appropriate to minimise non-response (Bennett & Ritchie, 1975; 
Armstrong et al., 1995).  The frequency of use of these categories was reviewed during the 
pilot studies to identify problematic questions which required further revision. In all, the 
questionnaire was piloted with 15 hospital pharmacists from four NHS trusts. One of the 
researchers (MM or the other PhD student) sat with each hospital pharmacist as they 
completed the questionnaire to obtain real-time feedback.  This also enabled internal 
consistency, construct validity, and content validity to be assessed, as MM was familiar with 
the hospital medication systems used by some of the pharmacists. A number of questions 
were subsequently rephrased and the following key changes were made: (1) a brief 
explanation to emphasise the importance of the survey was inserted on the front page of the 
questionnaire, (2) an option for respondents to select ‘one ward’ was included in questions 
where ‘all wards’, ‘most wards’, ‘some wards’, ‘no ward’ and ‘not sure’ were standard 
options, and (3)  two open questions were combined: one asked respondents to describe up 
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to six medication safety related initiatives in their hospital and the other asked about any 
processes that may affect medication administration errors.  The final questionnaire 
comprised mainly multiple choice questions with tick boxes, a small number of ranking 
questions and spaces for additional comments (appendix 5).  
  
4.4 Methods 
A national cross-sectional postal census of English NHS hospital inpatient medication systems 
was carried out in July 2011.  The survey was conducted in collaboration with another PhD 
student who explored the use of different electronic prescribing systems in English NHS 
hospitals.  Only data relating to the medication administration-related systems (including 
inpatient EPMA systems, but not electronic discharge prescribing or other electronic 
prescribing systems) were presented in this thesis. 
 
4.4.1 The setting, survey population and unit of sample 
At the time of the survey, NHS services in England were geographically separated and 
managed by 10 strategic health authorities (SHAs); each SHA was responsible for the 
development, provision, and prioritisation of health services for their local area (NHS, 2010).  
There were multiple acute and/or foundation NHS trusts within each SHA that managed the 
hospitals within the area. The main difference between acute and foundation NHS trusts was 
that foundation trusts were recognised independent legal entities (that remain part of the 
NHS), with more financial and operational freedom than acute trusts.   
 
As each trust (acute or foundation) may comprise more than one hospital, respondents were 
asked to answer the questionnaire for their main acute hospital only. Hospitals in Mental 
Health NHS trusts were excluded from this study as processes of drug administration are 
generally different to that on general medical and surgical inpatient wards (Haw et al., 2007).  
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Additionally, respondents were asked to exclude intensive care units, maternity wards and 
mental health wards in their responses as these areas also generally have distinctly different 
systems to general medical and surgical inpatient wards.   
 
At the time of this study, there were 165 Acute NHS trusts in England (NHS, 2010) across the 
10 strategic health authorities: East Midlands, East of England, London, North East, North 
West, South Central, South East Coast, South West, West Midlands, and Yorkshire and The 
Humber.  All acute and foundation NHS trusts were included (NHS, 2010).   
 
4.4.2 Questionnaire 
A pre-piloted questionnaire was developed that included 19 questions relating to medication 
administration-related systems and processes in hospital inpatient wards.  The questions 
were divided into four sections: (1) hospital demographics, (2) pharmacy service, (3) 
medication supply and storage on inpatient wards (including the prescribing and medication 
administration documentation system used), and (4) medication administration, policies, and 
guidance.  Eighteen were closed questions and one was an open question asking the 
respondent about initiatives that had been implemented in their hospital to improve 
medication safety.    
 
Of the 18 closed questions, eight had multiple parts that involved the respondent selecting 
one option from six (“all wards”, “most wards”, “some wards”, “one ward”, “no ward”, or 
“not sure”).  Where relevant, respondents were also asked to identify and rank the three 
most common system or practice used in their hospital.  Three other closed questions had 
multiple parts; these involved the respondent selecting one option from three (“yes”, “no”, 
“not sure”) in response to whether a specific administration-related policy guidance was 
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available.  The remaining seven questions asked the respondent to provide hospital and 
pharmacy demographic information.   
 
4.4.3 Data collection 
A pre-notification letter (first contact) was sent to all 165 chief pharmacists in June 2011 
(appendix 6).  The letter outlined the purpose of the survey, invited them to participate, and 
explained that a questionnaire will be sent to them within the next two weeks.  In July 2011, 
the questionnaire (appendix 5) was mailed to the chief pharmacists (second contact).  A 
cover letter (appendix 7) and a business-franked addressed envelope for returning the 
questionnaire was also enclosed to potentially increase the response rate (Edwards et al., 
2009).  Chief pharmacists were encouraged to delegate questionnaire completion to a senior 
pharmacist if they preferred, and to return the completed questionnaire by 22 July 2011 
(approximately three weeks later).  In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to provide 
their name, job title and contact details if they were willing to be contacted for clarifying 
responses.  Separately, respondents were also asked to indicate if they would be willing to be 
contacted for the next stage of the research. Respondents were informed on the 
questionnaire that all data would remain confidential.  The researcher’s name, telephone and 
email address was provided in case further information on the study was required by the 
respondents.  A third contact letter was sent in August 2011 to all non-responders thanking 
them if they had responded recently and reminding them to participate in the survey if they 
had not already responded (appendix 8).  A second copy of the questionnaire and a stamped 
addressed envelope was also provided.  In October 2011, a fourth and final contact was 
made via email of non-respondents who were known to the research team.  An electronic 
copy of the questionnaire was attached to the email and further responses were invited via 
email, fax and post.   
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4.4.4 Data entry and verification 
Questionnaire responses were entered verbatim and managed using Microsoft Excel.  A 
random 20% of returned questionnaires entered into the database were verified by another 
PhD student.  Any discrepancies that were identified were reviewed jointly by MM and the 
other PhD student to confirm, agree, and correct any transcribing errors.  Both PhD 
supervisors were available to discuss any potential problems identified.  All completed 
questionnaires returned by 1 November 2011 were included in the data analysis.  One 
additional completed questionnaire received in December was excluded, and specific 
questions which were omitted by individual respondents were also excluded from the data 
analysis for the relevant questions only.   
 
4.4.5 Data analysis 
Data were analysed using Microsoft Excel; responses were summarised using descriptive 
statistics.  Percentage response for each question part was calculated; the effective 
denominator was the total number of usable responses received for the relevant question 
part.  Intra-hospital variations were identified by reviewing responses for questions when 
‘some’ wards were selected; therefore only those questions that asked the respondent to 
identify the proportion of wards that used a specific system or process within their hospital 
were included in this part of the analysis.  Inter-hospital variations were identified by 
summarising the responses received for all questions.  For questions relating to the 
proportion of wards that used a specific system or process, the responses for ‘all wards’ and 
‘most wards’ were combined into the ‘majority of wards’ in the inter-hospital variation 
analysis.  Responses for ‘one ward’ and ‘no ward’ were summarised and reported separately.  
Further inter-hospital variation was explored by identifying the relevant SHA in which the 
respondent hospital was located and the use of paper drug charts or EPMA on inpatient 
wards. 
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4.4.6 Ethical considerations  
The current study was approved by the then University of London School of Pharmacy 
Research Ethics Committee in June 2011.  The local NHS Research Ethics Committee 
confirmed that research ethics approval was not required as this study met the criteria for 
service development.   
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Overview 
Overall, 100 of 165 (61%) questionnaires were returned: 57 (35%) initially and 43 (26%) after 
follow-up.  Respondents were from 59 of 93 (63%) foundation NHS trusts and 41 of 72 (57%) 
acute NHS trusts.  Overall a median of 83% (range 33-93%) of trusts within each of the then 
10 SHAs responded (appendix 9); the highest response rate was from Yorkshire and The 
Humber, and the lowest response rate was from South Central.  Median response rate per 
question part was 97% (range 64-100%) (appendix 10).  Characteristics of respondent and 
non-respondent trusts are summarised in table 4.3; no statistically significant differences 
were identified.   
 
Table 4.3 Comparison of characteristics between respondents’ and non-respondents’ 
trusts. 
Trust characteristics Respondents  
(n=100 trusts) 
Non-respondents* 
(n = 65 trusts) 
Statistical 
analysis 
Median number of 
acute hospitals in 
trust (range) 
1 (1-5) 1 (1-5) p=0.08;  
Mann-Whitney test 
Median number  of 
wards at main acute 
hospital  (range) 
25 (3 – 60) 23 (1–44) p=0.12;  
Mann-Whitney test 
Services provided by 
main acute hospital 
Adults (13) or paediatrics 
(1) only: 14 (14%) 
 
Mixed: 86 (86%) 
Adults (2) or paediatrics 
(3) only: 5 (8%) 
 
Mixed: 60 (92%) 
p = 0.21; 
Chi-square 1.538 
 
*Data were obtained from the trust websites 
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Overall, the majority of hospitals used paper-based prescribing (87% of usable responses), 
patient bedside medication lockers (92%), ward stock (94%), PODs (89%), and OSD (85%) 
supplies throughout the hospital (table 4.4).  Hospitals varied in the methods used to order 
medications during pharmacy opening hours, use of drug trolleys to store and transport 
medicines, use of other methods to transport medicines during drug rounds, and the use of 
non-OSD supplies.  More detailed results are presented separately in the following sections: 
section 4.5.3 prescribing systems; section 4.5.4 pharmacy services; section 4.5.4 medication 
storage and supply; section 4.5.5 medication administration related policies and guidance; 
and section 4.5.6 local initiatives aimed to increase medication safety and/or efficiency. 
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Table 4.4 An overview of inpatient medication systems in English National health 
service hospitals.   
System* Number of respondent hospitals (% of usable responses)  
Prescribing and 
medication 
administration 
documentation  
 Paper or electronic prescribing system  (more detail in section 4.5.2) 
- 87 (87%) used paper drug charts 
- 13 (13%) used an EPMA system 
Medication 
ordering  
 Pharmacy opening hours and ward visits (section 4.5.3) 
 Ward staff ordered medications† (more detail in section 4.5.3): 
- 59 (62%) via the ward pharmacy technician (during ward visit) 
- 55 (58%) via the ward pharmacist (during ward visit) 
- 26 (29%) via the ward pharmacist (outside of ward visit) 
- 24 (26%) by taking drug charts to the pharmacy  
- 12 (13%) by computer/electronically 
- 5 (5%) selected ‘other’: 2 used ‘pneumatic tubes’, 1 “pharmacy teams are 
ward based”, 1 “bleeping [paging] the sweep pharmacist in the 
afternoon”, and 1 “nurse ordering”.  
 Availability of pharmacist outside pharmacy opening hours (section 4.5.3) 
 Out of hours access to medication supplies†:  
- 97 (97%) borrowed medicines from another ward 
- 96 (96%) contacted the on-call pharmacist 
- 89 (89%) used a non-electronic reserve drug cupboard 
- 39 (39%) borrowed from another patient’s hospital supply (same ward) 
- 11 (11%) used an electronic reserve drug cupboard 
- 9 (9%) selected ‘other’: 5 asked the family to bring in PODs, 2 accessed 
the remote dispensing robot via the on-call pharmacist, 1 stated that 
medicines were not generally ordered outside of hours, and 1 had a 24-
hour hospital pharmacy. 
Ward-based 
medication storage 
and type of 
medication supply  
 Ward-based medication storage† (more detail in section 4.5.4): 
- 91 (92%) used patient bedside medication lockers 
- 55 (59%) used drug trolleys 
 Types of medication supply for inpatient administration†: 
- 89 (94%) used ward stock  
- 85 (89%) used PODs 
- 82 (85%) used OSD supplies 
- 46 (50%) used non-OSD supplies 
- 3 (3%) selected ‘other’: all 3 used pre-labelled packs 
Medication 
administration 
processes  
 Medication transport during drug rounds† (more detail in section 4.5.5): 
- 64 (65%) used drug trolleys  
- 31 (43%) used medicines cup/oral syringe 
- 10 (14%) used a tray/basket 
- 6 (8%) used a temporary trolley (for example, dressing trolley) 
- 2 (2%) selected ‘other’: 1 used “prn lockers per bay”, 1 “drugs cupboard 
in 6-bedded bay” 
 Policies and guidance (section 4.5.5) 
Other   Local initiatives aimed to increase medication safety and/or efficiency 
(section 4.5.6) 
*System that was used on the majority of inpatient medical and surgical wards 
† Percentage total was over 100 as more than one option could be selected by the respondent.   
EPMA, electronic prescribing and medication administration; PODs, patients’ own drugs; OSD, one-
stop dispensing; prn, pro re nata or ‘when required’. 
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4.5.2 Prescribing systems  
The 13 hospitals with an EPMA system that were used on the majority of inpatient medical 
and surgical wards were mainly located in the northern SHAs (figure 1).  Exploratory analysis 
suggests that such EPMA systems were more likely in foundation trusts than acute trusts (13 
foundation trusts versus 0 acute trusts, p=0.001, chi-square test). 
 
Figure 4.1 Prevalence of inpatient electronic prescribing and medication administration 
(EPMA) systems in English NHS trusts.  Number of hospitals that had an EPMA system on the 
majority of inpatient medical and surgical wards (percentage of trusts within each of the 10 
strategic health authorities). 
 
 
                                                  
  
 
Of all 100 respondent hospitals, 7 (7%) used an EPMA system on one or some wards, while 
other wards in the same hospital used a paper-based prescribing system.   
 
4.5.3 Medication ordering systems  
Pharmacy services 
One respondent hospital had a pharmacy that was open 24-hours a day. Of the remaining 99 
hospitals, the pharmacy was open for a median of 9 hours on weekdays (95% CI 9-10), 5 
hours on Saturdays (95% CI 4-5), and 3 hours on Sundays (95% CI 2-4).  A total of 96 
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respondents answered the question about frequency of ward pharmacist visits; the majority 
of hospitals (86;90%) had at least one daily pharmacist visit on most wards every weekday 
within the hospital (figure 4.2).  Two (2.1%) respondent hospitals selected ‘other’ as the 
frequency of ward pharmacist visits on some wards, but no other information was reported. 
 
Figure 4.2 Frequency of ward pharmacist visits in English NHS hospitals.  Totals do not sum 
to 100% as a number of respondents selected answers that indicated ‘majority of wards’ for a 
particular option and therefore the remaining options were not applicable.   
 
 
 
In all, 90 (90%) respondent hospitals had a non-resident on-call pharmacist, 9 (9%) had a 
resident on-call pharmacist, and 1 (1%) had neither because there was a 24-hour pharmacy 
service available.  There was no significant difference in hospital size between those with an 
on-call pharmacist (mean 25 wards per hospital, 95% CI 23-28) and those with a resident 
pharmacist (mean 33 wards per hospital, 95% CI 23-43).  There was also no significant 
difference in the type of NHS trust (acute or foundation) between those with an on-call 
pharmacist (42% acute, 58% foundation) and those with a resident pharmacist (22% acute, 
78% foundation) (p = 0.42, chi-square with Yates’ correction). 
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Methods used to order non-stock medications for inpatient use 
Overall, a median of three methods (range 1 to 6) were used in respondent hospitals to 
obtain medicines outside of pharmacy opening hours.  An overview of medication ordering 
methods used by respondent hospitals is presented in table 4.4. As more than one method 
could be used in each hospital, respondents were also asked to rank the three methods that 
were most common (figure 4.3).  Overall, ordering medications via the ward pharmacy 
technician was the most common method (48; 49% of respondent hospitals).  
 
A sub-analysis of 14 (15%) hospitals that had both a ward pharmacist and pharmacy 
technician on the majority of wards revealed that the most common method was ordering 
medicines via the ‘ward pharmacist during their ward visit’ (6; 43%), followed by the ‘ward 
technician during their ward visit’ (5; 36%), and 1 (8%) each of the following:  ‘taking the drug 
chart to pharmacy’ as the most common method, via the ‘computer/electronically’, and 
“other – pharmacy teams are ward-based”. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Methods used to order non-stock medicines by ward staff in English NHS 
hospitals.  Totals do not sum to 100% as respondents were asked to rank the three most 
common methods rather than rank all methods. 
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4.5.4 Ward-based medication storage and types of medication supplies  
Ward-based medication storage 
Overall, four of 11 types of medication storage facility were available on the majority of 
wards in respondents’ hospitals: a non-electronic CD cupboard, patient bedside medication 
lockers, medicines stock cupboards, and a fridge (figure 4.4).   
 
Figure 4.4 Availability of different ward-based medication storage facilities on wards in 
English NHS hospitals. n represents total number of respondent hospitals for each medication 
storage facility (effective denominator). CD: controlled drugs. 
n
CD cupboard (non-electronic) 95
Patient's bedside medication locker 99
Medicines stock cupboard 92
Fridge 95
Drug trolley (non-electronic) 93
Patient's bedside (not in locker) 89
Patient container (not at bedside) 89
Shelves or units without doors 88
Electronic storage cabinet (stationary) 91
CD cupboard (electronic) 91
Electronic drug trolley 91
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Use of drug trolleys was associated with the most intra-hospital variation; 31% of respondent 
hospitals used these on some wards only.  Exploratory analysis according to SHA suggests 
drug trolleys remain widely used in the South Central (100% of 3 hospitals) and London SHAs 
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(86% of 7 hospitals), and least used in the North West (27% of 11 hospitals) and East 
Midlands SHAs (29% of 7 hospitals) (appendix 11).  When asked about the most common 
medication storage used to retrieve medications from at the time of administration, 71 (72%) 
respondents reported patient bedside medication locker, 15 (16%) reported a drug trolley, 10 
(11%) reported medicines cupboard, and 2 (2%) reported patient’s bedside table or 
belongings.  
 
Types of medication supplies 
In general, the majority of respondent hospitals used ward-stock, OSD supplies, and PODs on 
the majority of wards (figure 4.5).   
 
Figure 4.5 Types of medication supply used for inpatient medication administration in 
English NHS hospitals.  n represents the number of complete responses for each type of 
medication supply. 
 
 
Relatively greater inter- and intra-hospital variation was reported for non-OSD supplies; 50% 
used these on the majority of wards, 29% on some wards, and 21% did not use them on any 
ward.  Exploratory analysis of non-OSD use between SHAs suggests non-OSD were widely 
used in South Central SHA (100% of 2 hospitals), and least used in West Midlands SHA (22% 
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of 9 hospitals) (appendix 12).  Three respondents additionally selected ‘other’ and specified 
the use of pre-labelled packs (medicines that have been labelled with standard dosage 
instructions but not with the patient’s name) for inpatient use on wards in their hospital.  
These pre-labelled packs were referred to as ‘PLPs’ (pre-labelled packs), ‘TTO packs’ (‘to take 
out’), or more generically as ‘prepacks’.  When asked about the most common type of 
medication supply used on inpatient wards, 31 (34%) respondents reported PODs, 31 (34%) 
reported OSDs, 27 (30%) reported ward-stock, and 1 (1%) reported non-OSD supplies. 
 
4.5.5 Medication administration process  
Of 99 usable responses, all respondents reported the use of regularly scheduled drug rounds 
on the majority of wards in their hospital.   
 
Methods used to transport oral medicines to patients  
There were inter- and intra-hospital variations in the methods used to transport medicines to 
patients during drug rounds, including the use of a drug trolley (figure 4.6). In addition, three 
respondents selected ‘other’ methods to transport oral medicines: “prn [when required] 
lockers per bay” on the majority of wards in one hospital, “drugs cupboard in 6-bedded bay” 
on some wards in one hospital, and “individual items carried by nurse (in hands)” on some 
wards in one hospital.   
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Figure 4.6 Methods used to transport oral medicines during drug rounds in English NHS 
hospitals.  n represents the number of complete responses for each method used to transport 
oral medications to patients. 
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Where oral doses were most commonly retrieved from  
When asked which storage location the respondent thought was most commonly used to 
retrieve medications from during drug rounds, 72%  (from 98 usable responses) of 
respondents stated patient bedside medication lockers, 16% stated drug trolleys and 11% 
stated medicines stock cupboard.   
 
Double-checking medications 
Respondents were asked if double-checking prior to administration was required for five 
specific groups of drugs: 82 (85% of 97 usable responses) stated ‘yes’ for IV medications, 63 
(65%) for IV fluids, 94 (97%) for parenteral chemotherapy, 73 (75%) for oral chemotherapy, 
and 81 (83%) for paediatric doses.  Double-checking of CDs was excluded from this question 
as this is a legal requirement in the UK.  When asked which other specific drugs required 
double-checking prior to administration, 37 (58% of 64 usable responses) respondents 
reported 15 types of drugs (table 4.5).  The route of administration of named drugs was not 
specified by the respondents.  Overall, insulin was the most commonly named drug that 
required a double-check prior to administration in respondents’ hospitals (16; 25%). 
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Table 4.5 Named drugs and groups of drugs that were double-
checked prior to administration 
Drug name/group 
Number of respondent 
hospitals 
Double checking of specific drugs required 
but names of drugs not provided 
Insulin 
Heparin 
Complex preparations 
Potassium 
Epidurals 
Infusion devices 
Intrathecal administration 
Oral methotrexate 
Saline flushes 
Therapeutic low molecular weight heparins 
Trial drugs 
High risk intravenous drugs 
Intravenous immunoglobulin 
Midazolam 
Paediatric doses requiring calculations 
 
27 (42) 
16 (25) 
7 (11) 
6 (9) 
5 (8) 
3 (5) 
2 (3) 
2 (3) 
2 (3) 
2 (3) 
2 (3) 
2 (3) 
1 (2) 
1 (2) 
1 (2) 
1 (2) 
Total percentage is over 100% as some respondent hospitals had more than one drug-
specific double-checking policy in place. 
 
 
Other medication-related policies, guidance, and practices 
Six specific medication-related policies and guidance were listed in the questionnaire and 
respondents were asked if each were available in their hospital (figure 4.7).  The majority of 
respondent hospitals had all the policies and guidance listed.  Guidance for administering IV 
medications was more commonly available electronically than on paper.  One respondent 
additionally reported that their hospital had an ‘opt out patient self-administration scheme’. 
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Figure 4.7 Availability of different medication administration-related policies and guidance 
in English NHS hospitals. n value represents the number of complete responses. 
 
 
 
 
A total of 56 (59% of 95 usable responses) respondents reported the use of a ‘do not disturb 
overall/sash’ by nursing staff routinely during medication administration on at least one ward 
in their hospital.  Administration of medications by a patient’s carer (for example, parent, 
spouse) was routinely practised on at least one ward in 24 (27% of 89 usable responses) of 
respondents’ hospital; of these, 23 were in mixed adult and paediatric hospitals and 1 was in 
an adult only hospital.   
 
4.5.6 Local initiatives which aimed to improve medication supply, storage, and/or 
administration  
Finally, respondents were invited to provide additional information on any initiatives that 
had been implemented in their hospital to improve either the pharmacy service to inpatients, 
medication supply and storage on inpatient wards, and/or medication administration.  In all, 
seven main strategies were described by 32 respondents (table 4.6). Additionally, two other 
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respondents reported on lack of investment, high workload with few staff and multiple 
vacancies as barriers for developing pharmacy services further in their hospital. 
 
Table 4.6 Reported local initiatives used in English National Health Service hospitals to 
improve medication supply, storage, and/or administration. 
Local initiative 
Number of 
hospitals Examples 
Extensive ward pharmacy 
technician and/or 
pharmacy assistant 
service 
10 Technician discharge transcribing service, and trial of 
technician medication administration 
Near-patient dispensing 9 Use of mobile dispensing units, satellite dispensary, and 
prepacks 
Extended pharmacy 
services to wards 
7 Increased frequency of ward pharmacy visits, increased 
pharmacy opening hours, and provision of  pharmacy 
service to wards on weekends 
Use of OSD and PODs 6 (see section 4.5.4 for percentage of hospitals that use OSD 
supplies and PODs) 
Self-administration 
schemes 
4 Specific self-administration scheme for patients with 
Parkinson’s disease and separately for maternity units, and 
an ‘opt-out’ patient self-administration scheme 
Technology 3 EPMA, automated medication storage cabinets (for 
example, Omnicell®),  an electronic discharge prescribing 
system, and an electronic prescription tracking system 
Quarterly medication 
storage review on wards 
2  
Other 8 Director/matron walkabouts with medicines checks on 
wards to identify potential medication problems and 
provide immediate feedback to ward staff, fast-track 
medication request system, pneumatic tube system, 
double-checking policy for IV medicines, non-OSD supplies 
being additionally labelled with “inpatient supply only” to 
remind staff not to issue these to patients on discharge, 
standard operating procedures for nurses on specific 
administration processes, target turnaround times for 
inpatient supply, and changed order of tasks during drug 
administrations with IVs administered first followed by 
medicines on the critical list then other non-IV medications. 
EPMA, electronic prescribing and medication administration; IV, intravenous; OSD, one-stop 
dispensing; POD, patients’ own drugs. 
 
 
The most frequently reported local initiatives were based on expanding ward pharmacy 
services and near-patient dispensing. 
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4.6  Discussion 
4.6.1 Main findings  
Overall, the extent of use of a number of core medication systems in English NHS hospitals 
was identified.  The majority of hospitals used paper-based prescribing (87%), patient 
bedside medication lockers (92%), ward stock (94%), PODs (89%), and OSD supplies (85%) in 
the majority of inpatient wards.  However, hospitals varied in the methods that were 
primarily used to order medications during pharmacy opening hours; variations were mainly 
attributed to ordering medicines via the ward pharmacist and/or pharmacy technician.  
There were also inter- and intra-hospital variations in practices that were once standard prior 
to the national introduction of PODs, OSD, and patient bedside medication lockers; these 
include use of drug trolleys to store and transport medicines, use of other methods to 
transport medicines during drug rounds, and the use of non-OSD supplies for inpatient use.  
Such variations suggest hospitals have implemented the national initiatives in different ways.   
Exploratory analysis by SHA suggests that there are some geographical differences between 
hospitals that use drug trolleys and non-OSD supplies, but statistical significance was not 
tested due to the risk of a type 1 error that are associated multiple comparisons. 
 
In addition, the prevalence of a number of medication administration related policies, 
guidance and double-checking practices was also identified.  In particular, 85% of hospitals 
had a double-checking policy for IV administrations and 58% for specific drugs or groups of 
drugs.  The widely advocated “do not disturb” tabard/overall for reducing interruptions 
during drug rounds was used routinely on at least one ward in 59% of hospitals, and 
administration of medications by a patient’s carer (for example, parent and/or spouse) in 
27% of hospitals.  Across English NHS hospitals, current efforts to improve safety and 
efficiency of medication supply, storage and administration appear to concentrate on 
extending ward and clinical pharmacy services.   
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4.6.2 Comparisons with previous research 
This is the first national survey of medication systems used in English NHS hospitals.  Previous 
surveys that involved studying medication systems were primarily pharmacy-specific, did not 
include ward-based medication systems in use or were not specific to the UK (Cotter et al., 
1994; Doloresco & Vermeulen, 2009; Pedersen et al., 2012; Frontini et al., 2012) and 
therefore not all aspects of our survey findings can be compared with the literature.  
Comparison of our pharmacy-specific findings with those from the UK clinical pharmacy 
survey conducted in 1992 (Cotter et al., 1994), suggest that more hospital pharmacies are 
now providing a weekend service: 74% of UK hospitals were open on Saturdays in 1992 
versus 90% of English hospitals in 2011, 10% of UK hospitals were open on Sundays in 1992 
versus 74% of English hospitals in 2011.  However, the percentage of hospitals that provide a 
resident on-call pharmacy service (9% of UK hospitals in 1992 versus 9% of English hospitals 
in 2011) and non-resident on-call pharmacy service (88% of UK hospitals in 1992 versus 90% 
of English hospitals in 2011) remain the same. 
 
Another aspect of our survey for which previous data was available was the prevalence of 
technological systems used in the US.  Research suggests electronic systems for prescribing, 
documenting administration, and storing medications are more widespread in US hospitals 
than in England (Pedersen et al., 2011; 2012).  For example, 67% of US hospitals have an 
electronic medication administration record (MAR) compared to 13% in England with an 
EPMA system, and 89% of US hospitals have electronic medication storage facilities 
compared to 7% in England.  However, unlike the combined inpatient prescribing and 
medication administration systems used in the UK (paper-based or EPMA), inpatient 
prescribing systems are generally separate from the medication administration record 
system in the US.  This may partly explain the apparent difference in uptake of technological 
systems; the current ‘multi-purpose’ EPMA systems used in the UK may be more challenging 
for technological developers than the ‘single purpose’ systems used elsewhere.   
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4.6.3 Implications for practice 
Identifying system similarities across the NHS provides an important context for those 
seeking to develop and prioritise systems based interventions to increase medication safety.  
However, identifying and exploring system differences between hospitals enable advantages 
and disadvantages of the medication systems to be better understood, and therefore inform 
future developments in their design, application, and/or implementation.  Two of the 
variations that we identified in medication systems were unexpected: (1) medication storage 
and transport (specifically relating to the use or not of drug trolleys), and (2) types of 
medication supply (specifically relating to the use or not of non-OSD supplies).  
 
Medication storage  
Hospitals varied in whether or not drug trolleys were used, and in the proportion of wards in 
which drug trolleys were used. Inter- and intra-hospital variations in drug trolley use are 
difficult to interpret as drug trolleys serve the two functions of storage and transport.  The 
introduction of patient bedside medication lockers around 2001 was not specifically intended 
to eliminate the use of drug trolleys as bedside medication lockers could not replace the 
‘transport’ functionality.  However the survey results revealed drug trolley use was much 
lower than expected; drug trolleys were previously reported as a standard component of 
medication administration during drug rounds in UK hospital inpatient wards (Dean et al., 
1995; Brock & Franklin, 2007).  Data from this survey also suggest some hospitals are using 
other devices to transport medications on the majority of wards, for example, a tray or a 
basket, with or without a dressing trolley to transport medications to patient’s bedside 
during oral drug rounds.  These alternative solutions may have arisen from the need to 
transfer medications from stock cabinets to the patient’s bedside due to insufficient 
medication supply in the patient’s bedside medication locker.  Storing all the medications 
that are prescribed for the patient may not be practical for a number of reasons: (1) there 
may be insufficient space to physically store all the medications that the patient is on, (2) it 
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may be inefficient to store commonly used medicines in each patient’s bedside medication 
locker (costs for small pack sizes are often higher than for larger pack sizes).  The implication 
is that there may still be a role for re-introducing lockable drug trolleys or some sort of 
lockable and/or wheelable device for transporting medications on some wards. 
 
Types of medication supplies  
Findings from the survey suggest only 50% of hospitals now use non-OSD inpatient supplies 
compared with what would have been standard prior to the introduction of OSD.  “[By April 
2002] all hospitals will have a ‘one stop dispensing/dispensing for discharge’ schemes”.  This 
was one of the milestones set by the Department of Health in the Medicines and Older 
People report (Department of Health, 2001; p27), which was then taken further by the Audit 
Commission (2001) to promote original pack dispensing and patient self-administration 
schemes, alongside implementation of patient bedside medication lockers.  However, it was 
unclear from these documents whether or not traditional ‘non-OSD’ inpatient labelled 
supplies still had a role in hospitals.  Ten years on and results from the present survey 
revealed OSD supplies were used in all hospitals, and on the majority of inpatient wards in 
85% of hospitals.   This high up-take may indicate that the potential benefits of OSD have 
translated into real benefits in practice; this may also explain why only 50% hospitals 
continue to use non-OSD inpatient labelled supplies on the majority of wards and 21% 
hospitals do not use these at all.  However, further research is required to substantiate these 
speculations.  Both locally and nationally, we now have more experience with the use of OSD.  
Thus, it would be useful to explore the rationale behind the respondent hospitals that have 
stopped using non-OSD inpatient labelled.  Simplifying the types of hospital medication 
supplies used may offer additional benefits for medication safety, reduce the number of re-
supplies, reduce time spent re-labelling non-OSD inpatient supplies, and therefore potentially 
reduce costs.  However, the disadvantages would also need to be considered such as how to 
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manage patients that use a medicines compliance aid, when supplying OSD may increase the 
risk of the patient going home without their compliance aid. 
 
4.6.4 Strengths and limitations of the current study 
A strength of the present study was the census approach, which enabled an overview of 
systems and processes to support medication administration across English NHS hospitals to 
be identified.  The response rate in this study (61% of hospitals) was higher than that which 
was previously reported for other similar surveys in the US (40% and 29% of hospitals; 
Pedersen 2012;2011, respectively), and also than the UK-specific response rate (35%) in the 
European survey by Frontini et al (2012).  Responses in the present study also represented a 
range of hospital sizes from both acute and foundation NHS trusts.  Thus, the findings may 
facilitate prioritisation and development of potential systems-based interventions to reduce 
MAEs.  Furthermore, the inclusion of medication administration-related policies in the survey 
provided additional insight into the prevalence of specific organisational support for 
medication administration in hospitals.  However, there were also a number of study 
limitations.  First, the present survey was focused on English NHS hospitals; therefore, the 
findings cannot be extrapolated to the NHS in Wales, Scotland, or Northern Ireland.  Second, 
specific parts of the questions were not completed by all respondents; however, these were 
relatively infrequent and therefore unlikely to have affected interpretation of the results.  
Third, a small number of questions asked the respondents to describe use of the system ‘in 
their experience’; responses for these subjective questions should therefore be interpreted 
with care. Lastly, a number other technologies to support medication administration were 
not included in the survey, for example, use of BCMA and ‘smart’ infusion pumps.  
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4.6.5 Future research 
Having identified and described a number of variations in the hospital medication systems 
used in English NHS hospitals, further research is needed to explore the effects of different 
medication systems and processes on MAEs and to develop potential NHS-wide interventions 
to reduce MAEs.  Based on the survey findings, the medication storage and distribution 
system was identified as a particular area of interest for this thesis and a study was therefore 
conducted to take this research further.  Chapter five describes an observational study that 
focused on medication storage and dose retrieval during non-IV drug rounds to better 
understand how different medication storage facilities are used in practice, and which, if any 
specific medication storage facilities offer safety and efficiency benefits over others.   
 
In addition, findings from the survey may provide a useful starting point for future surveys to 
monitor the use of hospital medication systems and processes.  The potential expansion of 
EPMA implementation in the future will most probably lead to substantial changes.  Thus, 
monitoring the use of different hospital medication systems would not only facilitate 
prioritisation of potential NHS-wide interventions to increase medication safety, but also 
provide an indicator of the pace of change in the NHS which may be useful to policy makers.   
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Prior to the present survey, the extent of use of many specific systems and processes to 
support medication administration in NHS hospitals was unknown.  Findings from the current 
survey have revealed the prevalence of many such systems and processes, including the 
extent of inter- and intra-hospital systems variations that exist.  Such variations suggest that 
hospitals have implemented core medication systems in different ways, particularly in 
relation to the use of ward-based medication storage and transport systems and the use of 
double-checking policies for specific drugs or groups of drugs. Further research is needed to 
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explore the implications of such variations, investigate their contribution to MAEs, and to 
develop potential interventions to reduce MAEs that are applicable across the NHS.  Thus, 
the next chapter describes a study to investigate variation in ward-based medication storage 
in more detail and their potential effects on medication retrieval across three acute hospitals 
of one NHS trust. 
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Chapter 5.  Exploration of variations in 
ward-based medication storage and 
their potential effects on dose retrieval 
in one acute NHS trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
In the systematic literature review in chapter three (McLeod et al., 2013), non-therapeutic 
dose omissions were consistently found in observational studies to be the most common 
subcategory of MAEs in UK NHS hospitals; omission due to drug unavailability accounted for 
over half of omissions in non-IV doses.   In chapter four, the national survey identified 
variation in the types of ward-based medication storage systems used both within and 
between hospitals.  This chapter now describes variations in current practices of ward-based 
medication storage and retrieval in one large acute NHS trust, and explores how medication 
storage may affect the success and timeliness of dose retrieval during non-IV drug rounds.    
 
5.2  Background 
Since the introduction of patients’ bedside medication lockers around the year 2000 
(Department of Health, 2000b; Audit Commission, 2001), there has been a shift in the 
number and types of medication storage facilities used in English hospital wards (chapter 
four), with little research investigating their impact on medication administration.    
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One partially-controlled before and after study investigated the effects of implementing 
patient bedside medication lockers and PODs on MAEs (Dean & Barber, 2000).  The study 
involved observation of 6,067 OEs on one general medical and one general surgical ward of 
an English NHS hospital.  Using robust observation methods and clear definitions, the 
researchers found no significant difference in overall MAE rates between wards with bedside 
medication lockers and wards without.   However, sub-analysis of the data suggested that 
there may be differences in the MAE subcategories that occur.  In general, there were fewer 
omissions due to nurses not being able to find the medication when bedside medication 
lockers were available than when they were not.  However, more ‘wrong dose’ errors were 
observed with bedside medication lockers than without.  Despite insufficient sample in the 
sub-analysis for statistical significance to be assessed, this study highlighted the potential 
effects of different medication storage on specific subcategories of MAES.   
 
More recently, a study in an Northern Irish hospital also investigated the potential effects of 
implementing patient bedside medication lockers on MAEs (Hogg et al., 2012).  The study 
involved observation of 4,211 doses across two general medical and two general surgical 
wards of two hospitals.  The researchers found a reduction in overall MAE rate (including 
wrong time errors) post-implementation of patient bedside medication lockers.  Dose 
omissions were the most common MAE subtype observed which were also reduced post-
intervention.  However, several key information were not reported which limited 
interpretability of the findings: the number of MAEs that could be associated with each OE, 
the number of observers collecting data, how data collection was standardised between 
observers, whether inter-observer reliability was assessed, what statistical tests were used 
for data analysis, and whether or not drug trolleys were continued to be used post-
intervention.  In addition, it was unclear how the pharmacy technician replenished the drug 
trolley and bedside medication lockers during the study period, and if changes in how 
medications were supplied might have also affected the reported error rates. 
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While previous research in this area has generally focused on the effects of introducing 
patients’ bedside medication lockers on MAEs, none have examined how the combination of 
different types of medication storage facilities may also affect MAE rates, particularly dose 
omissions.  Survey data suggest the use of patient bedside medication lockers are now 
widespread in English NHS hospitals, but the additional use of a conventional drug trolley 
and/or other types of medication storage was variable (chapter four).  Furthermore, 
availability of a particular type of storage facility on the same wards does not necessarily 
mean it will be used in the same way.  A study by Dean et al., (1998) of 1,002 observed doses, 
on two general medical wards, identified differences in where nurses stored individually 
dispensed preparations; some nurses stored these in the drug trolley while others kept these 
at the patient’s bedside.  According to the researchers, “this sometimes resulted in the 
omission of medication if the nurse could not find the drugs where he or she expected to find 
them”.  In addition, difficulties locating the drugs would conceivably increase the nurse’s 
time on the drug round and result in a delay in administering any subsequent doses. 
 
Nationally, the problem of omitted and delayed doses has become one of the medication 
safety priorities for the NHS (National Patient Safety Agency, 2010a).  A recent review of 
medication incidents submitted to the NHS NRLS  found ‘omitted and delayed medicine’ to 
be the most common error category reported by health care professions; accounting for 16% 
of over half a million incidents in England and Wales (Cousins et al., 2012).  While the 
majority of these did not cause patient harm, earlier figures from a subset of the same data 
found omissions and delays of some time-critical medicines were associated with 27 deaths 
and 68 cases of severe harm (National Patient Safety Agency, 2010b). 
 
Locally, in one large acute NHS trust, informal feedback from staff suggested there were a 
number of problems associated with the use of patient bedside medication lockers.  
Reported problems include the following: there was often insufficient space in the bedside 
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medication locker to store medicines, not all doses were always found, and the nurse may 
end up walking back and forth to the stock cupboard or drug trolley to retrieve a dose.  In 
addition, keys were not always available or did not work very well, and there was generally 
little space around the bedside medication locker to place the drug chart.  Consequently, it 
was suspected that the current system was no longer fit for purpose.  Concerns were raised 
about dose omissions due to difficulties finding medicines on the ward, and drug rounds 
were perceived as becoming excessively time consuming.  However, it was unclear what the 
current medication storage practice was within the trust.  Inpatient wards were located 
across three large hospital sites.  These hospitals were previously from two different acute 
NHS trusts prior to their merger in 2007 and therefore practices may have evolved 
differently.  Thus, the present study to investigate variations in ward-based medication 
storage and dose retrieval was conducted. 
 
5.2 Aims and objectives 
The aims of this study were to describe current practices of medication storage and retrieval 
during non-IV drug rounds on inpatient wards of one NHS trust, and to explore potential 
effects of different medication storage systems on successful and timely dose 
administrations.  Specifically, the objectives were to: 
(1) Describe the number and types of ward-based medication storage facilities available 
on general medical and surgical wards within one trust; 
(2) Identify the successful dose retrieval rate and the types of medication storage 
locations searched in during non-IV drug rounds; 
(3) Document the timeliness of medication administration on non-IV drug rounds; 
(4) Document the number of physical steps taken by nursing staff to complete drug 
rounds; 
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(5) Explore the relationship between different ward-based medication storage systems 
used and the outcome measures (2) to (4) above. 
 
5.3  Methods 
5.3.1 Setting 
The study was conducted in three acute hospitals comprising 450, 344, and 441 beds 
respectively, and one 83-bed specialist women’s and children’s hospital.  The four hospitals 
were located on three separate sites (A to C) of one large acute NHS trust; site B additionally 
included the specialist hospital.  Clinical pharmacy services and medication supplies for both 
hospitals at site B were provided by the same pharmacy department.    All NHS medical and 
surgical wards were included.  Intensive care, high dependency, accident and emergency, 
paediatrics and neonatal wards were excluded as medications were generally not 
administered at pre-specified drug round times in these areas.  To minimise the risk of 
infection to immune-compromised patients, all haematology, oncology and HIV wards were 
also excluded.   The inpatient specialties included at site A were therefore acute medicine, 
medicine for the elderly, gastroenterology, respiratory, rheumatology, neurology, stroke, 
gastrointestinal surgery, neurosurgery, plastic surgery, and orthopaedic surgery.  At site B, 
included wards were acute medicine, cardiology, cardiothoracic surgery, rheumatology, 
endocrinology, hepatobiliary surgery, gynaecology, obstetrics, and renal medicine.  At site C, 
included wards were acute medicine, medicine for the elderly, vascular, stroke, gynaecology, 
and obstetrics. 
 
Across the trust, nursing staff generally administered medications from paper drug charts 
during four scheduled drug rounds each day.  The pre-printed drug administration times on 
drug charts were 0800, 1200, 1800 and 2200 hours.  Each ward held a selection of stock 
medications that were commonly prescribed for the relevant patient population.  Non-ward-
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stock medications for specific patients were ordered from the hospital pharmacy as OSD or 
non-OSD inpatient supplies.   The trust had a typical OSD policy where four-week supplies of 
long-term medications were issued from pharmacy, labelled with administration information 
for the patient.  These could be used for inpatient administration by nursing staff, self-
administration by the patient, and/or to expedite medication supply at discharge.  For 
medications that were unlikely to be continued on discharge, pharmacy supplied sufficient 
non-OSD medication for the anticipated inpatient stay, labelled specifically for the patient 
but without instructions for use.  Additionally, the use of PODs was encouraged.  Most 
patient-specific medications were stored in dedicated bedside medication lockers; trust 
policy permitted insulin, inhalers, creams and ointments to be kept at the bedside outside 
the bedside medication locker. 
 
5.3.2 Data collection 
Observation training and standardisation 
Data were collected with the assistance of three pharmacy undergraduate students over four 
weeks in March 2012 using standardised observational methods and data collection forms 
(appendix 13). MM coordinated and supervised data collection.  Each student observer was 
given training on conducting observations which comprised: (1) group briefing sessions on 
the study, practicalities of observing drug rounds, trust policies and guidance relating to drug 
administration, (2) several ward visits with a trust pharmacist to become familiar with 
general hospital practice on the ward and ward layout, (3) shadowing a number of different 
nurses on their drug rounds, and (4) conducting pilot observations on a number of wards.  In 
addition, MM held weekly meetings with all student observers to consolidate observation 
training, resolve any queries prior to starting data collection and to establish a routine of 
regular feedback and discussion following observations.  The weekly meetings continued 
throughout the remainder of the study period to maximise standardisation in data collection 
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between all three observers.  The study was not specifically designed to identify all MAEs, 
however in case an MAE was identified that may cause patient harm; observers were taught 
in advance how to intervene in a discreet and non-judgemental manner. 
 
Drug rounds and nurse participants observed 
Each observer collected data at one hospital site.  One morning drug round (8am) and one 
lunchtime drug round (12pm) was observed on each included ward.  As each nurse generally 
administered drugs to the patients he or she was looking after, more than one drug round 
sometimes occurred at each scheduled drug round time; only one nurse could therefore be 
observed on each occasion.  Observers sketched the ward layout and location of patients on 
the drug round observed.  No patient or nurse identifiable information was collected.  
However, data on the ‘band’ and level of experience of each nurse were documented to 
assess comparability of nursing staff observed between sites.   In general, the NHS ‘Agenda 
for Change’ bands were used within the trust to differentiate levels of seniority between 
nursing staff rather than job titles.  Newly qualified nurses usually started at band 5, senior 
nurses were generally band 6, and band 7s were advanced nurse leaders and/or ward sisters. 
 
Ward-based medication storage locations 
The types of medication storage facilities available, and the locations searched for each dose 
were documented.  Based on pilot observations, medication storage locations were 
categorised into one of nine mutually exclusive categories: (1) patient’s bedside medication 
locker, (2) patient’s bedside area (for example, bedside table or cabinet but not in bedside 
medication locker), (3) a conventional drug trolley, (4) a container with or without a 
temporary trolley, (5) stock cupboard, (6) fridge, (7) controlled drugs cabinet, (8) ‘other’, and 
(9) dose ‘not found’.  Observers documented a brief description of any ‘other’ medication 
storage locations. Doses were categorised as not found if the nurse could not find the dose 
during the drug round observed.  Photographs of different medication storage facilities were 
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taken to illustrate relevant practice after obtaining verbal permission from the nurse in 
charge. 
 
Duration of drug rounds  
The time taken to complete each drug round was documented.  Timing started when the 
nurse picked up the first drug chart or indicated to the observer that they were starting the 
drug round (whichever happened first) and finished when the nurse had completed 
administration and/or documentation of the last dose for the drug round and indicated to 
the observer that they had completed the drug round.   
 
Physical steps during drug rounds 
Nurses were asked to wear a pedometer (Yamax Digi-Walker SW-200) during the observed 
drug round.  This spring-levered pedometer was chosen as it is not influenced by the variety 
of walking paces that are likely to occur during drug rounds, unlike more advanced 
accelerometer-based pedometers which calculate the number of steps based on acceleration 
due to movement over time (Corder et al., 2007).  This latter type are designed for sports use 
and filter the first few steps detected to avoid measuring ‘incidental movements’; they were 
therefore considered unsuitable for the present study. 
 
Other types of data collected 
In addition, observers documented whether or not the drug chart was misplaced or missing 
at the time it was needed.  This was not initially included but was added to the data 
collection form following pilot observations.  A drug chart was considered to be ‘misplaced’ if 
it was not found in its usual location for the ward, for example, in the bedside folder at the 
end of the bed or in a centralised folder at the drug trolley (but was subsequently located).  A 
drug chart was documented as ‘missing’ if it was not found at all by the end of the drug 
round period observed.   
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Finally, nurses were given the opportunity to provide feedback at the end of the drug round.  
The observer asked the nurse: (1) would you consider that to be a typical drug round? (2) 
How did you find being observed?   
  
5.3.3 Inter-observer reliability 
MM observed two drug rounds with each student observer and collected data independently 
to assess inter-observer reliability: one round prior to starting data collection to standardise 
the method of data collection, and one round two weeks into the data collection period to 
help ensure that data collection remained consistent.  The kappa-statistic was calculated for 
the number and types of locations searched for each dose during the drug rounds observed 
by MM (<0.4 poor agreement, 0.4 to 0.75 fair to good agreement, and >0.75 excellent 
agreement) (Fleiss, 1981). 
 
5.3.4 Data analysis  
All data were summarised using descriptive statistics and compared between sites.  The 
successful dose retrieval rate and the proportion of attempted doses retrieved from different 
locations were compared between hospital sites using a chi-square test.  Significant 
differences were additionally analysed post-hoc using the Marasquilo procedure (Levine, 
1946) to determine which specific sites were different.  All data for the three sites were then 
pooled and grouped according to the type of medication storage system used during the 
drug rounds.  These groups were used to explore potential effects of different types of 
medication storage systems on successful dose retrieval rates, time taken per attempted 
dose administration, and number of steps taken per attempted dose administration.  
Descriptive statistics including 95% CI were calculated to explore potential differences 
between systems. 
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5.3.5 Calculation of successful dose retrieval rate 
The number of doses that were successfully retrieved and given to patients (including leaving 
a dose at the bedside for subsequent administration) was documented.   The success rate of 
medication retrieval was calculated as follows: 
 
Successful dose retrieval rate =               sum of all doses retrieved      x 100% 
                  Sum of all attempted dose administrations  
 
The denominator was the sum of all attempted dose administrations, defined as a dose 
which was searched for in at least one location, irrespective of whether or not it was 
subsequently retrieved and administered.  All attempted dose administrations observed 
during the non-IV drug round were documented, including nutritional supplements, ‘when-
required’, ‘once-only’ doses, and any doses for which the observer intervened.  Any IV doses 
that were administered during the non-IV drug round were also included as these would 
affect the parameters being measured; those administered outside the non-IV drug round 
were excluded.  Doses that were omitted without any attempt to administer them were also 
excluded. 
 
5.3.6 Study approval and participant consent 
This study met the criteria for service evaluation and therefore did not require NHS ethics 
approval or UCL School of Pharmacy ethics approval.  The study was approved and supported 
by the relevant trust’s Medication Safety Review Group which was responsible for providing 
strategic direction to the trust on medication safety.  A summary of the proposal was sent to 
all the Heads of Nursing approximately three weeks prior to the start of the study and the 
relevant ward managers contacted prior to the start of data collection to obtain their 
consent.  Nursing staff were informed of the objectives of the study, and that participation 
was voluntary, prior to starting data collection.  A participant information leaflet was also 
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available if further information was requested.  All nurses were encouraged to complete the 
drug round as per their usual routine and were informed that the observer would not talk or 
interrupt them during the drug round.  Verbal consent was obtained from each nurse by the 
observer prior to shadowing them on the drug round. 
 
5.4  Results 
5.4.1  Characteristics of wards, participants and drug rounds observed 
Forty-eight wards across all three sites met the inclusion criteria.  Of these, the night staff on 
11 wards (23%) administered doses for the morning round at approximately 6am rather than 
at 8am.  This made observations more challenging logistically due to the limited public 
transport available for observers at that time of day.  However, the observers were able to 
get to the relevant wards for four 6am drug rounds; seven wards were excluded, and a total 
of 41 wards therefore included in this study. Characteristics of included wards, drug rounds 
and participants are summarised in table 5.1.  Inter-observer reliability per drug round was 
fair to excellent: median kappa per drug round was 0.76 (range 0.43 to 1.00).  No 
interventions were made by the observers. 
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Table 5.1 Characteristics of wards, drug rounds and participants observed 
 Site A Site B Site C All sites 
Wards 
Number of wards at each site 26 24 29 79 
Number of eligible wards 15 14 19 48 
Number of wards observed 13 14 14 41 
Median number of beds per ward (range) 23 
(15 to 26) 
22  
(13 to 44) 
18 
(8 to 37) 
21 
(8 to 44) 
Number of drug rounds 
Morning (approx. 6am) 1 0 3
 
 4 
Morning (approx. 8am) 12 16
 a
 11
 b
 39 
Lunchtime (approx. 12pm) 13 16
 a
 15
 c
 44 
Number of patients observed (regardless of whether or not a dose was administered)
d
 
Total observed per site 133 200 155 488 
Median per drug round (range) 5 (2 to 8) 6 (2 to 17) 5 (3 to 14) 5 (2 to 17) 
Missing and misplaced drug charts (of  all patients on the drug round) 
Number of misplaced drug charts 10 (7.5%) 17 (8.5%) 7 (4.5%) 34 (7.0%) 
Number of missing drug charts 0 0 0 0 
Number of attempted dose administrations 
Total observed per site 396 586 382 1,364 
Median per morning round (95% CI) 15 
(10-35) 
24 
(11-43) 
18 
(11-27) 
22 
(15-27) 
Median per lunchtime round (95% CI) 7 
(3-10) 
9 
(4 -10) 
6 
(4-7) 
7 
(4-9) 
Nurse participant on each observed drug round
d
 
Band 5 (staff nurse) 21 (81%) 21 (66%) 22 (76%) 64 (74%) 
Band 6 (senior nurse) 4 (15%) 10 (31%) 6 (21%) 20 (23%) 
Band 7 (sister) 1 (4%) 1 (3%) 1 (3%) 3 (3%) 
Total 26 (100%) 32 (100%) 29 (100%) 87 (100%) 
Nurse experience on each observed drug round
d
 
Median number of years 
(95% CI) 
Range 
1.2 
(0.5-2.0) 
0.5-14  
3.0 
(1.0-5.0) 
0.5-11  
3.0 
(1.5-5.0) 
0.5-10  
2.0 
(1.5-3.0) 
0.5-14  
Nurse experience post qualification on each observed drug round
d
 
Median number of years 
(95% CI) 
Range 
4 
(1-11) 
1-28 
5 
(4-12) 
0.5-30 
9 
(3-10) 
0.5-32 
6 
(4-9) 
0.5-32 
a
Two wards were formally divided into two separate patient areas, each with their own team of 
nursing staff, and therefore two additional drug rounds were observed; one on each ward.   
 
b
 One additional morning round was observed because the number of pedometer steps were not 
recorded and the observer had the opportunity to observe another nurse during the same shift, and 
one morning round was not observed because the time of morning rounds kept changing.
  
c 
One additional lunchtime round was observed because the observer had the opportunity to observe 
another nurse during the same shift. 
d 
It was possible to observe the same nurse participants and same patients on separate drug rounds 
but this was rare; actual number of nurses and patients that were observed more than once unknown 
as nurse and patient identifiable data were not recorded.  
 CI, confidence interval. 
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All nurses observed at site A and B, and 22 (76%) nurses at site C reported no problems with 
being observed on the drug rounds.  The remaining seven nurses reported feeling stressed, 
uncomfortable, awkward, a bit tense, intimidating, and generally did not like being observed. 
Drug rounds were reported as ‘typical’ by 77% of nurses observed at site A, 100% at site B, 
and 52% at site C.  Seven reasons were reported for the 21 ‘atypical’ drug rounds:  (1) 10 
drug rounds were considered easy or quiet because there were fewer doses, less patient 
problems and/or less interruptions than expected during the drug round, (2) nurses on three 
drug rounds administered medications to additional patients to the ones he/she was looking 
after, (3) two morning rounds were carried out by the night staff who reported that they see 
drug administration as the day staff’s role, (4) two rounds were observed on one newly 
opened ward, (5) two nurses reported the drug round as ‘atypical’ due to the presence of a 
student nurse on the round, (6) one nurse reported higher than expected number of drugs 
were not in the bedside medication locker, (7) one drug round was completed by a bank 
nurse who was not sure what was ‘typical’ for the specified ward. 
 
5.4.2  Medication storage locations available 
The main differences in medication storage systems available between wards were: (1) 
whether wards had their own stock cupboards or shared with an adjacent ward, (2) whether 
or not an automated storage cabinet was used for storing CDs, (3) whether or not bedside 
medication lockers were available, (4) the number of conventional drug trolleys available (if 
any), and (5) whether or not other storage facilities were used to store a selection of ward-
stock medications. 
 
As might be expected, all wards had a fridge and CD cupboard.  Thirty-nine wards (95%) had 
medication stock cupboards; the remaining two wards shared stock cupboards with an 
adjacent ward.  Five wards (all at site A) also had an automated storage cabinet for storing 
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CDs (Pyxis® MedStation®, figure 5.1a) and two wards (one at site B, one at site C) additional 
housed an automated storage cabinet for out-of-hours use (site B: ServeRx®, figure 5.1b and 
site C: Omnicell®, figure 5.1c).    
 
 
 
Figure 5.1a to f in order: Pyxis® MedStation®, ServeRx® medicines cabinet, Omnicell® 
medicines cabinet, key-less radio-frequency identification controlled bedside medication 
locker, transportable metal locker, temporary trolley, plastic tray. 
 
             
       
 
 
The vast majority of wards also had bedside medication lockers for storing patient specific 
medications (39; 95%), of these one ward was trialling a set of key-less radio-frequency 
identification controlled bedside medication lockers (figure 5.1d). There was variation among 
sites in the percentage of wards that had conventional drug trolleys: five (38%) wards at site 
A, four (27%) at site B and ten (71%) at site C had at least one conventional drug trolley 
(median one drug trolley per relevant ward, range one to four).  Separately, five wards at site 
C also stored a selection of ward-stock medications in transportable containers: three used 
metal lockers (figure 5.1e) and two used large plastic boxes.  All wards additionally had other 
a 
c 
e f g 
b 
d 
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types of trolleys, for example, dressing trolley (figure 5.1f), which some nurses used as a 
temporary drug trolley by placing medication from ward-stock directly onto it or one of the 
transportable containers.  This was observed on two (15%) wards in site A, two (14%) in site 
B and four (29%) in site C.  Additionally, one nurse at site A placed a selection of ward-stock 
medications into a plastic tray (figure 5.1g) for use on the drug round. 
 
5.4.3  Success rate of medication retrieval 
A total of 1,348 (98.8%) of 1,364 attempted doses were successfully retrieved and 
administered across all three sites.  Of these, 19 were administered intravenously. The 
remaining 16 (1.2%) doses were omitted as they could not be found on the ward.  Overall, 
1,203 doses (88.2%) were retrieved from the first location searched: this meant 
approximately one in nine attempted doses was searched for in more than one location.  
Table 5.2 shows a breakdown of the number of locations searched per dose at each site 
(overall chi-square for all sites 11.4, p-value 0.003).  Post-hoc analysis revealed significantly 
more doses were retrieved from the first location at site A than B.   
 
Table 5.2 Number of attempted dose administration that were searched in one or more 
locations (% of attempted doses at each site).   
 Site A Site B Site C Total 
One location 366 (92.4%) 500 (85.3%) 337 (88.2%) 1203 (88.2%) 
Two locations 28 (7.1%) 85 (14.5%) 30 (7.9%) 143 (10.5%) 
Three or more locations 2 (0.5%) 1 (0.2%) 15 (3.9%) 18 (1.3%) 
Total 396 (100%) 586 (100%) 382 (100%) 1,364 (100%) 
 
 
All 16 dose omissions due to drug being unavailable (1.2% of attempted dose 
administrations) occurred during the morning round: three on site A (three patients on two 
different drug rounds), five on site B (one patient) and eight on site C (seven patients on four 
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drug rounds).  Three omitted doses (19%) were on the relevant ward’s stock list and the 
remainder were not.  The omitted drugs prescribed were:  aciclovir, Adcal D3® (calcium 
carbonate and colecalciferol), Adcal D3® soluble, alfacalcidol, chloramphenicol eye drops, 
clopidogrel, ferrous fumarate, Femoston® (estradiol and dydrogesterone), isosorbide 
mononitrate, losartan, paroxetine, penicillin V, sevelamer, spironolactone, and two doses of 
bisoprolol.  Five other doses were also omitted during the observations but the nurse did not 
attempt to administer these as he/she knew in advance that the dose was not available.  The 
overall dose omission rate due to the drug being unavailable was therefore 1.5% of OEs.    
 
5.4.4  Types of medication storage locations where doses were retrieved from 
Of 1,364 attempted dose administrations across all three sites, doses were most commonly 
retrieved from the patient’s bedside medication locker (37%), followed by the conventional 
drug trolley (27%), and stock cupboard (16%).  Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of attempted 
dose administrations which were retrieved from different storage locations on each site.   
 
Figure 5.2 Comparison of locations where attempted doses were retrieved from between 
sites.   
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‘Other’ locations where medications were retrieved from were as follows:  
• the patient’s bag (six doses for the same patient, site A),  
• another ward (five doses for four patients, site C),  
• another patient’s bedside medication locker (four doses for four patients, two at 
site A and two at site C),  
• pocket of the nurse doing the drug round observed (two doses for two patients, 
site A),  
• pocket of another nurse i.e. not the one doing the drug round observed  (one 
dose, site B) 
 
Of the 19 wards that had at least one conventional drug trolley, 17 also had bedside 
medication lockers and two did not.  A sub-analysis of storage locations accessed on wards 
with both a drug trolley and bedside medication lockers revealed that nurses were more 
likely to look in the drug trolley first than in the patient’s bedside medication locker for a 
dose (75.4% and 11.9%, respectively, of 488 attempted dose administrations from 33 drug 
rounds).  Three hundred and eighty two (78%) of the 488 attempted dose administrations 
were for drugs that were on the relevant ward’s stock list.  Of the 106 doses that were not on 
the ward’s stock list, 26 (25%) were first searched for and retrieved from the drug trolley.   
 
5.4.5  Duration and timeliness of medication administration 
Across the three sites, median morning round duration was 43 minutes and median 
lunchtime round duration was 21 minutes (95% CI for the difference 8-37 minutes).  Figure 
5.3 shows the timeliness of drug round start times observed between the three hospital sites.  
Overall, 12-17% (equivalent to approximately one in every six to eight) of drug rounds were 
started more than 60 minutes from the scheduled drug round start time.   
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Figure 5.3 Comparison of timeliness of drug rounds between hospital sites.  
 
 
5.4.6  Pedometer steps 
Across the three hospital sites, the median number of pedometer steps taken during morning 
rounds was 564 (95% CI 327-759) and lunchtime rounds was 293 (95% CI 169-341).  Overall, 
nurses took fewer steps for each attempted dose administration during morning rounds than 
lunchtime rounds: the median number of steps for each attempted dose administration was 
23 (95% CI 16-30) and 44 (95% CI 34-53), respectively. 
 
5.4.7  Exploratory analysis of the effects of different medication storage systems 
Based on analysis of medication storage locations used across all three sites, three subtypes 
of the medication distribution system on drug rounds were identified: 
• System 1: a system that involved using at least one conventional drug trolley on the 
drug round regardless of whether or not patients’ bedside medication lockers were 
used (used on 19 wards (46%); 41 drug rounds) 
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• System 2: a system that involved using an ‘alternative’ drug trolley solution i.e. a 
container with or without a temporary trolley regardless of whether or not patients’ 
bedside medication lockers were used (used on nine wards (22%); 21 drug rounds) 
• System 3:  a system without a conventional drug trolley or ‘alternative’ drug trolley 
solution i.e.  a system that relied on the use of bedside medication lockers (used on 
13 wards (32%); 25 drug rounds) 
Characteristics of wards, drug rounds, and participants observed according to the type of 
medication storage system used are summarised in table 5.3.  There were no significant 
differences between sites in the reported characteristics, however the relatively wide 95% CI 
suggests there was insufficient sample to detect differences in median values between 
systems. 
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Table 5.3 Comparison of characteristics of wards, drug rounds and participants observed 
between three different medication distribution systems: system 1, wards with at least one 
conventional drug trolley; system 2, wards with an ‘alternative’ drug trolley solution; system 
3, wards with no trolleys. 
 System 1 System 2 System 3 Difference 
between systems 
Number of wards observed 19 9 13  
Number of drug rounds observed 
Morning rounds 20 11 12  p =  0.101 
(chi-square test 
for all systems) 
Lunchtime rounds 21 10 13 
Total 41 21 25 
Number of patients
 a
 
Total observed  246 121 121  
Median per drug round 5 5 5 p = 1.000 
(Kruskal-Wallis) (range) (2 to 17) (3 to 9) (2 to 8) 
Missing and misplaced drug charts 
Number of misplaced drug 
charts (% of patients) 
17 (6.9%) 4 (3.3%) 13 (10.7%) p = 0.076 
(chi-square test 
for all systems) Number of missing drug 
charts (% of patients) 
0 0 0 
Number of attempted dose administrations 
Total observed  533 357 474  
Median per morning round 
(95%CI) 
17 (11 to 23) 26 (11 to 40) 29 (10 to 53) No significant 
difference  
(overlapping 95% 
CI) 
Median per lunchtime 
round (95% CI) 
5 (3 to 10) 7 (4 to 10) 9 (4 to 10) 
Nurse participants
 a
 
Junior: Band 5 (staff nurse) 
Senior: Band 6 and Band 7  
32 (78%) 
8 (20%), 1 
(2%) 
15 (71%) 
5 (25%), 1 
(5%) 
17 (68%) 
7 (28%), 1 
(4%) 
p = 0.467 
(chi-square test 
for all systems) 
Total 41 (100%) 21 (100%) 25 (100%) 
Nurse experience on the ward observed
 a
 
Median number of years  
(95% CI) 
2 (1 to 3) 4 (2 to 8) 2 (1 to 4) No significant 
difference 
(overlapping 95% 
CI) 
Nurse experience post qualification
 a
 
Median number of years 
(95% CI) 
7 (3 to 12) 10 (4 to 17) 4 (2 to 6) No significant 
difference 
a 
It was possible to observe the same nurse participants and same patients on separate drug rounds but 
this was rare; actual number of nurses and patients that were observed more than once unknown as 
nurse and patient identifiable data were not collected.  
 CI, confidence interval. 
 
The success rate of medication retrieval was similar across the three systems, table 5.4.  
However, the number of doses that were searched for in multiple locations was significantly 
different between sites (chi-square test for all systems 12.63, p 0.002), post-hoc analysis 
revealed that significantly more doses were searched for in multiple locations in system 3 
(75; 15.8%) than systems 1 (57; 10.7%) or 2(29; 8.1%).  
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Table 5.4.  Comparison of outcome measures between three different medication 
distribution systems: system 1, wards with at least one conventional drug trolley; system 
2, wards with an ‘alternative’ drug trolley solution; system 3, wards with no trolleys. 
 System 1 System 2 System 3 
Number of attempted dose 
administrations  
533 357 474 
Median per drug round 
(range) 
18 (2 to 46) 26 (2 to 44) 18 (1 to 61) 
Successful dose retrieval 
(%, rate) 
527 (98.9%) 353 (98.9%) 468 (98.7%) 
Number (%) of doses 
searched for in more than 
one location  
57 (10.7%) 29 (8.1%) 75 (15.8%) 
Median duration per dose attempted per drug round, minutes (95% CI)  
Morning round 2.2 (1.4 to 3.0) 1.9 (1.3 to 2.5) 1.6 (1.0 to 2.2) 
Lunchtime round 4.0 (3.0 to 5.0) 3.0 (1.6 to 4.3) 3.1 (1.6 to 4.6) 
Median number of steps per dose per drug round (95% CI)* 
Morning round 27 (15 to 39) 22 (11 to 34) 17 (6 to 29) 
Lunchtime round 53 (25 to 81) 32 (18 to 45) 37 (18 to 56) 
Shaded boxes indicate order of magnitude of results: largest result,  2
nd
 largest result, and  
smallest result. 
* four drug rounds were excluded as the pedometer did not record the number of steps. CI, confidence 
interval.   
 
 
Overall, system 1 was associated with the longest time taken per attempted dose 
administration and greatest number of steps per attempted dose administrations during 
both morning and lunchtime rounds; however, overlapping 95% CI indicate that there these 
were not statistically significant, table 5.4.  
 
 
5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1 Main findings 
Overall, this study identified a number of differences in the types of medication storage 
facilities available and the frequency with which they were used among 41 general medical 
and surgical wards of one NHS trust.   Three main subtypes of the medication distribution 
system used on non-IV drug rounds were identified which differed in terms of whether or not 
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a conventional drug trolley or an ‘alternative’ drug trolley solution was used in addition to 
patients’ bedside medication lockers.  Exploratory comparisons between these three systems 
revealed no significant difference in the rate of successful dose retrieval, timeliness of 
medication administration, or physical steps taken by nursing staff during non-IV drug 
rounds.   
 
Overall omissions due to drug being unavailable occurred in 1.2% of attempted dose 
administrations or 1.5% of OEs, which is comparable to previous observation studies in UK 
hospitals (1.2-1.7% of OEs for non-IV doses)(chapter three; M
c
Leod et al., 2013).  However, 
this was despite the nurse searching in multiple locations for approximately one in every nine 
doses.  In general, doses were most commonly retrieved from the patient’s bedside 
medication locker, except on wards which had at least one conventional drug trolley.  On 
these wards, the drug trolley was the most common location used to retrieve medications.  
Across all wards, 15% of drug rounds (approximately one in six) were started 60-120 minutes 
from the relevant scheduled round time.  Nurses took longer, and more steps per attempted 
dose administration, during lunchtime rounds than morning rounds, with an overall median 
of 2.5 minutes per attempted dose administration and a median 31 steps per attempted 
dose administration (95% CI 26-37). 
 
5.5.2 Use of medication storage systems during non-IV drug rounds 
As might be expected, patient bedside medication lockers were widely used across the study 
wards.  However, intra-hospital variation was identified in: whether or not conventional drug 
trolleys were used, the number of conventional drug trolleys used, and the use of 
‘alternative’ drug trolley solutions.  These types of variation have not previously been 
described in published studies but the commercial availability of some of the ‘alternative’ 
drug solutions suggests their use may be well-established.   
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While the successful dose retrieval rate was comparable between the three systems, 
exploration of successful first location retrieval revealed a difference in use between the 
three systems.  The use of a conventional drug trolley or an ‘alternative’ drug trolley solution 
was associated with more successful first location retrieval than when neither type of drug 
trolleys were used.  This may seem counter-intuitive initially as the use of any type of drug 
trolley introduces an additional storage location for the nurse to search for medication.  
Three factors may explain this; first, the underlying assumption that an additional storage 
location affects the success of first location retrieval is that the nurse will always search for a 
dose in the bedside medication locker before any type of drug trolley.  In practice, 
observations revealed nurses searched in the bedside medication locker first for 43% of all 
attempted dose administrations.  Second, is the related assumption that the nurse has no 
prior knowledge or expectation of where the required dose is stored; therefore different 
storage locations would be searched in the same order for each dose.  However, findings 
from the current study suggest otherwise; 18 doses were first searched for in ‘other’ storage 
locations including a patient’s bag, another ward, another patient’s bedside medication 
locker, and nurse’s pocket.  Furthermore, five doses were omitted and the nurse did not 
attempt to administer these during the drug rounds observed as he/she knew in advance 
that the dose was not available.  Third is the assumption that nurses use the medication 
storage systems in the same way.  In practice, a number of ‘informal’ differences between 
nurses on different wards and even on the same ward was observed.  For example, nurses 
were observed decanting a selection of medicines from a conventional drug trolley to a 
temporary trolley for use on one ward.  On another ward, one nurse used a plastic tray to 
transport a selection of commonly used ward-stock medications on the drug round while 
another nurse did not.   
 
Other studies have also identified variations in nurse practice even on the same ward.   One 
study investigating the accuracy of documentation of administration on drug charts observed 
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1,002 dose administrations noted that “some nurses kept all medicines in the drug trolley, 
whereas others preferred to put individually dispensed preparations, such as mouthwashes, 
glyceryl trinitrate tablets, topical preparations and inhalers by the patient’s bedside (Dean et 
al., 1998).  This sometimes resulted in the omission of medication if the nurse could not find 
the drugs where he/she expected to find them”.  In another study, researchers found nurses 
frequently deviated from trust policy in what was termed “correct violation” when they used 
PODs on wards without patient bedside medication lockers, in order to administer a dose 
(Dean & Barber, 2000). 
 
More importantly, these observations highlight the adaptability of nursing staff to their work 
environment and the potential unintended consequences of some ward-based medication 
systems on drug round workflow.  A few studies have begun to explore these unintended 
sociotechnical interactions in relation to medication administration.  However these have 
mainly focused on workarounds (informal practices in response to a temporary problem), 
rather than informal practices to ‘pre-empt’ potential recurrent problems or have been 
specific to technology that are less common in UK hospitals such as barcode administration 
(Patterson et al., 2002; Carayon et al., 2007; Koppel et al., 2008). 
 
Based on observations during the study, some nurses were seen to pre-emptively minimise 
the problem of searching in multiple locations by going through the whole drug chart before 
retrieving the doses required.   Another nurse took two drug charts to the stock cupboard 
and prepared most of the doses there before going to retrieve the remaining doses from the 
patients’ bedside medication lockers.  Using a human factors approach (Reason, 1990; 
Norman, 1988) together with the exploratory analysis findings, these observations suggest 
the success rate of retrieving a dose from the first location is more likely to be associated 
with nurses’ prior knowledge of the locations in which they expect medications to be stored 
rather than just the availability of the drug trolleys.  The use of a drug trolley probably 
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facilitates the development of this knowledge by providing a visual reminder of which 
medications are ward-stock.  
 
5.5.3 Duration and pedometer steps taken for each dose 
Overall, the duration and timeliness of drug rounds were comparable to previous studies in 
the UK; observational studies found 13-50% for non-IV doses were administered more than 
60 minutes from the time for which the dose was due (chapter three).   While the sample in 
this exploratory analysis was too small to detect timing differences in seconds or pedometer 
steps between systems, the data for comparing timing and steps between morning and 
lunchtime rounds suggest lunchtime rounds were consistently less ‘efficient’ than morning 
rounds.  Possible reasons for the lunchtime round being less efficient include the following:  
fewer doses were required at lunchtime but nurses still have to visit each patient, more 
interruptions and/or distractions due to the presence of more ward staff, and a higher 
general level of activity on the ward.   
 
5.5.4 Implications for practice 
Findings from this study suggest that different nurses varied in how they used the same types 
of medication systems; these may have had an influence on successful retrieval rates, 
duration, and number of steps per dose. Given the variation in nurse practices observed, it 
might be useful to consider identifying a set of standard ‘best practice’ locally on the ward to 
align the knowledge and expectations of nursing staff as to where medications should be 
stored.  A multi-disciplinary health care professional approach would potentially be useful as 
there are a number of different stakeholders that access patients’ medications in the 
hospital.  The types of medication storage to use on a ward can then be considered based on 
whether or not it is suitable for supporting local best practice.  As the ‘standard’ practice 
becomes routine on the ward, this approach may also allow nursing staff to quickly identify 
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problems associated with the medication storage system because informal practices are 
more likely to stand out.   
 
Short-term, other suggestions for practice include: (1) review ward-stock levels of drugs as 
inappropriate over or under stocking may impede timely dose retrieval, and (2) for drugs that 
are used in large quantities for multiple patients, consider storing the drugs in a central 
location and take what is required on the drug round via an alternative drug trolley solution if 
a drug trolley is not used.  Incorporating the findings from the national survey data (chapter 
four), a medium-term suggestion is to review the need for OSD on long-stay wards (more 
than two weeks).  This is because OSD was primarily introduced to reduce re-dispensing for 
discharge, and therefore mainly useful for wards with less than two-week inpatient stays 
and/or where patients tend to self-administer.  Long-term, the potential implications of 
implementing EPMA systems on drug rounds should also be considered.  These systems may 
allow opportunities such as other technological devices to be developed and/or implemented 
to facilitate medication ordering and identifying medication availability in different locations. 
 
5.5.5 Strengths and limitations of this study 
Strengths of the current study include: (1) use of direct observation, (2) observations on a 
large number of wards with different medication systems and ward layouts, (3) dose 
administrations to patients for a range of general medical and surgical specialties were 
observed, and (4) inter-observer reliability was assessed and data collection found to be 
comparable between observers and MM.  The main study limitation was the small number of 
drug rounds observed on each ward for the exploratory medication system comparison 
analysis.   A number of potential confounding factors were identified: differences between 
individual nurses, the level of nurse experience on the ward, layout of the ward with respect 
to distance between stock cupboards and patients, number of patients on the drug round, 
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number of doses due and attempted on the drug round, number of IV doses given during the 
drug round, time of day, proportion of medications which were ward stock, the number of 
misplaced drug charts, the number and duration of interruptions, and the number of 
distractions.  Although these confounding factors could not all be taken into account during 
the analysis, the majority were documented and reported.  A larger study with multiple 
logistic regression analysis would be required to explore the impact of a wider range of 
factors.  Separately, 11 wards (23% of eligible wards) administered medications at 
approximately 6am rather than 8am.  This was unexpected, as it was the research team’s 
understanding, from the Nurse Directorate, no drug rounds were scheduled for 6am on any 
inpatient wards.  This suggests a change in work practice that may have been made at the 
ward level but not communicated outside the ward.  The early morning drug rounds was a 
limitation in the present study as this led to the exclusion of seven wards.  Finally seven 
nurses reported a negative experience with being observed which may have influenced their 
behaviour on the associated drug rounds. There was no indication during joint observations 
(MM and student) that any of the students’ behaviour might be received negatively.  
However, on further investigation, it was identified that one of the student observers would 
actively encourage nurses to express their opinion on being observed more so than the other 
two students at the end of the drug rounds.  This may have contributed to nurses being more 
open about their experience.   
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Intra-hospital variation in the number and types of ward-based medication storage facilities 
available exists.  Current practices of medication storage and retrieval in one NHS trust 
differed between different wards and even between nurses on the same ward.  A number of 
wards had developed different ‘alternative’ drug trolley solutions that have not previously 
been described in the literature. Exploratory analysis comparing the effects of three different 
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medication distribution systems used on non-IV drug rounds revealed no significant 
difference in the rate of successful dose retrieval, timeliness of medication administration, or 
physical steps taken by nursing staff, however a study with a larger sample is required to 
confirm this.    Further research is required to better understand the sociotechnical 
interactions between nursing staff and the medication systems used for drug administration.  
Thus, an ethnographic study of medication administration processes and systems used by 
nursing staff was conducted and is described in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6.  An ethnographic study of 
medication administration processes 
and systems (MAPS study): effects on 
medication safety, workflow, 
interruptions, and distractions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Following the national survey of medication systems in English NHS hospitals (chapter four), 
and the medication storage system study in one NHS trust (chapter five), a number of 
potential system variations that may contribute to safer medication administration were 
identified.  This chapter describes a study to explore in more depth the interactions between 
systems factors, nurses working within different medication systems, and safe medication 
administration. 
 
6.2 Background  
Errors at the medication administration stage are common; occurring in 3.0-8.0% for non-IV 
doses and 9.3-53.8% for IV doses administered to NHS hospital inpatients (chapter three; 
M
c
Leod et al., 2013).  Although a number of studies have measured the incidence of MAEs 
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and identified their potential causes, few have examined this area from the other 
perspective: how do staff work within the NHS hospital system to administer drugs safely and 
successfully?   
 
Poorly designed systems and overly complicated processes can increase the risk of an error 
occurring, while carefully designed systems and more streamlined or simpler processes may 
reduce this risk (Reason, 1990; Perrow, 1984).  As Leape (1995) highlighted, “the objectives 
of system design for safety are twofold: (1) to make it difficult for individuals to err, and (2) 
to “absorb” errors that do occur i.e. permit their detection and correction before harm 
occurs”.  In the past, research has focused on investigating systems effects on patient safety 
(Leape et al., 1995; Grout, 2007).   However, few have applied the human factors approach to 
investigating the medication administration process in detail.   
 
Several reviews have reported on the individual and systems factors that contribute to MAEs 
(chapter one).  In the most recent review by Brady et al (2009), the researcher emphasised 
the importance of six main contributory factors in relation to medication administration: 
different types of drug distribution systems, quality of prescriptions, deviation from 
procedures, medicines reconciliation, excessive workloads, and nurses’ knowledge of 
medications.  However, insufficient methods were reported and exclusion of known relevant 
studies in this area (Franklin et al., 2007; Dean & Barber, 2000; Taxis et al., 1999; Dean et al., 
1995) from Brady’s review limited interpretability of the reviewers’ findings regarding 
comprehensiveness and importance of the factors identified.   
 
In relation to specific studies, systems-related factors such as the work environment, 
equipment availability, processes of work, workflow, and interruptions have been found to 
contribute to an individual’s risk of making an error (Popescu et al., 2011; Westbrook et al., 
2010).  While it is important such system-wide causes of MAEs are identified, this only 
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provides us with information about what systems and processes do not work so well and not 
what does work well.  For example, studies of reworks and workarounds associated with 
medication administration suggest that these deviant processes are relatively common and 
can create ‘more holes in the system’, bypassing essential safety defence barriers, and 
thereby increasing the risk of an incident occurring (Halbesleben et al., 2008; Koppel et al., 
2008).   However, in some cases, such deviant processes may be considered as pre-emptive 
actions to increase efficiency and/or minimise potential for error (chapter 5) and may act as 
an indicator of underlying latent conditions for potential future incidents.  Thus, it is 
important to not only identify potential contributory factors to MAEs but also how 
individuals manage them within the limits and resources available to them.  The latter are 
additionally relevant given the ever increasing financial and resource constraints imposed on 
the NHS. 
 
Following the responses obtained from the recent national survey of medication systems in 
English NHS hospitals (chapter four), a number of potential system variations that may 
contribute to safer medication administration were identified.  In addition, observations 
during the earlier preliminary observational study (chapter two) and medication storage 
study (chapter five) identified a number of variations in how individual nurses carried out 
medication administration tasks.  To explore these further, the current study was developed 
to better understand how nurses’ medication administration practices may be affected, both 
intentionally and unintentionally, by different system factors.   
 
6.3  Aim and objectives 
The aim of this study was to describe systems factors that facilitate and/or hinder successful 
drug administration.  There were four objectives: 
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1) To describe individual nurse practices and workarounds that potentially influenced 
MAEs in different medication systems; 
2) To identify systems factors that facilitate and/or hinder medication administration 
workflow; 
3) To identify individual and systems factors that potentially affect the frequency and 
nature of interruptions and distractions that occur during medication administration; 
4) To make recommendations for potentially improving the system and process of 
medication administration to reduce MAEs, streamline workflow, and reduce 
unnecessary interruptions and distractions. 
 
6.4  Methodology 
This section describes five main methodological considerations in designing the study:  (1) 
the rationale for using an ethnographic approach, (2) recording observations, (3) data 
analysis – theoretical approach and conceptual framework, (4) assessing authenticity, 
plausibility, and criticality, and (5) minimising researcher bias. 
 
6.4.1 The rationale for using an ethnographic approach  
Three main qualitative research traditions were considered for use in this study, table 6.1.  
The central aims of each were considered and the ethnographic approach was considered to 
be the most appropriate as ethnography seeks to understand behaviours in context and is 
not bound by the limitations of self-reporting.   
 
Briefly, ethnography has been described as “a way of looking” (observing) and “a way of 
seeing” (experiencing) human social behaviour (the culture) (Wolcott, 2008).  It has its origins 
in anthropology and is about understanding the lived experience of people through 
immersion in their community and of observations in the real-world rather than under 
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experimental conditions (Greenhalgh & Swinglehurst, 2011).  Savage (2000) suggested a 
number of ways in which ethnography may be applied in health care, one of which was that 
ethnography can help to identify how an organisations’ formal structure, such as the rules, 
are influenced by an informal system that may be created by individuals or groups of 
individuals within the organisation.    
 
Table 6.1 Types of qualitative research approaches and considerations for their use in 
the  medication administration processes and systems (MAPS) study (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003) 
Research tradition Aims 
Appropriateness for the MAPS 
study 
Phenomenology/ 
ethnomethodology 
To understand the ‘constructs’ 
people use in everyday life to make 
sense of their world.  
 
Phenomenology seeks to uncover 
meanings contained within 
conversation or text while 
ethnomethodology is focused on 
methods and practices used by 
people to make sense of their 
world. 
Less appropriate – the overarching 
aim of the MAPS study was to 
explore how people interact with 
the world around them rather than 
how they interpret the world 
around them (although it was 
recognised that the two are linked). 
Symbolic 
interactionism 
(leading to 
Grounded theory) 
To explain how people behave as a 
result of the ‘symbolic’ meanings 
that people attach to action and 
things. 
 
Grounded theory takes the 
explanation further by studying 
how these ‘symbols’ relate to 
actions and things in certain 
situations and generating theory 
grounded in the data. 
Less appropriate – the MAPS study 
was focused on people’s behaviour 
as influenced by the practicalities of 
the systems rather than the 
meanings people attach to the 
systems.  Furthermore, the MAPS 
study was exploratory and not 
aimed at generating theory. 
 
 
Ethnography To understand the cultural 
knowledge, behaviour and artefacts 
of a group of people through 
immersion in their community. 
Most appropriate – see explanation 
in main text. 
 
 
The value of the ethnographic approach for the current study was that it allowed subtle 
behaviours (related to the medication administration process) that an individual (nurse) may 
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not be aware of, as well as explicit interactions and features to be identified within the 
context of the medication system used on the study wards.  This included an insight into how 
resources were being used, whether or not they were used as intended, what work processes 
and/or workarounds existed under certain situations, and their potential effects on 
medication safety.   
 
6.4.2 Recording observations  
Direct observation is the principal method of ethnographic studies.  Broadly, qualitative 
observational data may be recorded as text in the form of field notes by the researcher, as 
audio in the form of naturally occurring talk that has been taped, or as visual images in the 
form of video and photographs (Green & Thorogood, 2009; Silverman, 2011).  The decision as 
to how observations are recorded is largely dependent on the objectives of the study and the 
practicalities of the setting.  However, it is perhaps more useful to consider that: 
“The critical task in qualitative research is not to accumulate all the data 
you can, but to ‘can’ (i.e. get rid of) much of the data you accumulate.  
That requires constant winnowing, including decisions about data not 
worth entering in the first place.  The idea is to discover essences and then 
to reveal those essences with sufficient context, yet not become mired by 
trying to include everything that might possibly be described.” 
Wolcott (1990; p35) 
 
Bearing the above in mind, a mixture of field notes and photographs (rather than audio and 
video recording) was used to record the organisational practices of medication 
administration by nursing staff.  This approach enabled the researcher (MM) to follow and 
observe nurses relatively more discreetly as they worked and travelled to different parts of 
the ward and minimised researcher obtrusion on staff and patients.  Field notes comprised 
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both observations of and narratives from nursing staff as they carried out their routine tasks; 
this included ‘mapping’ the path of travel by nurses during the drug round.  Field notes 
collected in this way were relatively flexible and allowed some of the nurses’ rationale for 
their actions to be explored.  The level of abstraction was not determined a priori in order to 
explore interactions at different levels between ‘humans’ and ‘systems’; field notes 
documented include the smallest level of abstraction which Lofland and Lofland (1995) 
described as ‘practices’ (an activity that the participants regard as unremarkable normal 
feature of on-going life) to the highest level ‘lifestyles or subcultures’ (the global adjustments 
to life by large numbers of similarly situated persons).  Photographs were taken of the work 
environment and medication systems to facilitate recall and data analysis.   
 
Typically, ethnographic studies comprise mixed methods to combine qualitative and 
quantitative data.  Additional quantitative data were also recorded during observations to 
facilitate interpretation of sociotechnical interactions in different settings, and to enable 
some aspects of the current study to be compared with relevant studies in the literature.   
 
6.4.3 Data analysis – theoretical approach and conceptual framework 
Despite the use of some quantitative data, ethnography is a qualitative research tradition.  
All types of data are analysed qualitatively and concurrently (rather than focusing on field 
notes separately to photographs or separately to the quantitative data) to identify concepts 
and themes. This contributes to the understanding or explanation of the phenomena under 
study (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  Miles and Huberman (1994) defined three concurrent 
processes involved in analysing data: 
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• Data reduction is the process of  selecting, filtering, abstracting, reviewing, and 
transforming the data to allow inferences to be made that contribute to the 
final conclusion 
• Data display is the process of organising and compressing information to 
facilitate further data reduction and identification of themes that contribute to 
the final conclusions   
• Conclusion drawing/verification is the process of identifying patterns, deriving 
explanations, and testing the conclusions drawn for their ‘plausibility, 
sturdiness and confirmability’ (also known as validity) 
 
The processes described by Miles and Huberman (1994) formed the general approach used in 
the present study.  However, there are a number of specific methods that influence how the 
processes are carried out; table 6.2 lists five qualitative data analysis methods with a 
summary of the considerations for their use in this study.  Overall, the framework analysis 
approach was chosen as it allowed themes that were identified a priori to be used as an 
initial framework to guide data analysis; this was particularly useful for the current study 
which aimed to build on existing sociotechnical theory rather than generating new theories.   
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Table 6.2 Types of qualitative data analysis and considerations for their use in the 
medication administration processes and systems (MAPS) study (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Silverman, 2011). 
Analytic method Description Appropriateness for the MAPS 
study 
Content analysis  
 
 
Content analysis is an approach used to 
focus on the way themes are presented 
and involves identifying the frequency of 
their occurrence before linking the 
findings to external variables that may 
have contributed to their presence. 
Less appropriate – the MAPS 
study was more about identifying 
and understanding sociotechnical 
interactions 
Discourse analysis  
 
 
Discourse analysis is used to understand 
the way knowledge is produced through 
language, including examination of 
linguistic styles and words used in order 
to identify implicit theories and how 
people make sense of the world. 
Less appropriate – the MAPS 
study was more about identifying 
and understanding sociotechnical 
interactions 
Interpretative 
phenomenological 
analysis  
Interpretative phenomenological 
analysis is an approach used to 
understand an individual’s perception of 
a given phenomenon under certain 
situations and how the individual’s 
experiences contribute to their 
perceptions.   
Potentially appropriate, however 
the MAPS study was more about 
identifying and understanding 
both the systems and human 
aspects of sociotechnical 
interactions rather than being 
more focused on the individual’s 
perceptions. 
Grounded theory  
 
 
 
Grounded theory as a method of 
qualitative data analysis is a systematic 
approach for generating theory from 
data.   Data analysis is driven by an 
iterative process of data collection and 
constant comparisons to test evolving 
theories until no new information 
emerge.  As such, grounded theory is 
associated with sampling until data 
saturation. 
Less appropriate –the MAPS 
study was exploratory rather 
than to generate theory.   
Framework analysis  
 
 
Framework analysis is a matrix-based 
method that allows for themes to be 
identified within and between cases.  It 
also retains the context within which the 
data are analysed and allows for a priori 
themes to evolve during data analysis.   
Most appropriate – see 
explanation in text 
 
 
Framework analysis was developed at the National Centre for Social Research by Ritchie and 
Spencer during the 1980s (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).  It is a matrix-based analytic method for 
ordering and synthesizing data.  Initially, the method involves familiarisation of the data to 
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identify key ideas, and recurrent themes.  Next, a thematic ‘framework’ is produced, based 
on emerging themes from the familiarisation process or built on to an a priori thematic 
framework.  Both approaches are considered appropriate provided the development of the 
final thematic framework is led by the emerging themes.   In the current study, a thematic 
framework was identified a priori (figure 6.1) in order to facilitate data collection of specific 
aspects of sociotechnical interactions outlined in the objectives.  The next stage of 
framework analysis is to develop a preliminary coding scheme from the thematic framework.  
An alternating process of observation and data analysis is required to develop the coding 
scheme; this was done in the current study by building on the experience gained from 
previous observations during the data collection period.  This also allowed MM to observe 
the nurses in a manner which was flexible to their routines and identify specific areas for 
targeted observation at the next session.  Once the coding scheme is established, the codes 
are applied to the whole dataset (indexing) and the data rearranged according to the 
thematic content (charting).  Next, relationships between the codes are examined to identify 
and explore underlying associations between nursing staff practices and the medication 
systems used. 
 
Figure 6.1 Initial thematic framework for studying systems factors on workflow, 
interruptions, and distractions on the safety of the medication administration process. 
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6.4.4 Assessing authenticity, plausibility, and criticality 
Unlike quantitative experimental studies, ethnographic studies are evaluated on three main 
interpretive criteria: authenticity, plausibility, and criticality (Greenhalgh & Swinglehurst, 
2011).  Greenhalgh and Swinglehurst (2011; p4) described authenticity as “immersion in the 
case through extended fieldwork”, thus emphasising the importance of reporting evidence to 
demonstrate that this was the case.  In the current study, potential researcher bias was 
identified as a key factor that could have influenced authenticity; this is discussed separately 
in the next subsection.  Plausibility was described as “developing explanations of local 
phenomena which made sense to participants and drawing these together into a coherent 
overall narrative” (Greenhalgh & Swinglehurst, 2011); this is a highly subjective task which 
has no obvious right or wrong outcome, thus it is vital that criticality is also incorporated.  
Criticality is the systematic questioning of assumptions made in describing the explanations 
of the phenomena under study; this is a continuous process which helps to refine the 
explanations, and thus strengthen the findings.  As with any qualitative study, it is important 
to recognise that there is always some doubt about the significance of particular 
‘phenomena’; consequently, the report must provide explanations to support and identify 
the limitations of the researchers’ interpretation.  In the current study, both plausibility and 
criticality considerations formed a key component of the data analysis by the researcher; 
additional support to assess and explore these was provided by a PhD supervisor (BDF).  Data 
were analysed iteratively until both researchers agreed on the final themes. 
 
6.4.5 Minimising researcher bias  
Ethnographic qualitative data obtained via observation requires the researcher to ‘see’ 
beyond the mechanics of the human interactions that occur within a specific culture or 
environment.  To do this, the researcher must immerse themselves in the culture through a 
process of repeated data collection and analysis as “it is the analysis that drives the data 
collection… [and therefore] the researcher is shaped by the data, just as the data are shaped 
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by the researcher” (Corbin & Strauss, 1998).   The researcher needs to find a way to maintain 
a balance between objectivity and sensitivity in collecting and analysing the data.  Objectivity 
is required to ensure events are interpreted in an accurate and impartial manner.  
Subjectivity is required to explore the subtleties of practices observed and to identify 
potential connections between emerging concepts (Corbin & Strauss, 1998).  It is also 
important to be reflexive in the data due to potential influence of the observer on the 
individuals being observed. 
 
Researcher’s background 
An approach used in this study toward achieving the balance between objectivity and 
subjectivity was to recognise the viewpoints and preconceptions that I may have brought to 
the data in both data collection and analysis.  As a hospital pharmacist for over 10 years, and 
previous research experience observing nurses administering medications, I am familiar with 
the fundamental systems and processes of medication administration in hospitals.  My 
experience was advantageous in some ways as it facilitated the data collection process; I was 
probably more able to filter out and record relevant observations than an observer who is 
not familiar with NHS hospital medication administration related systems and processes.  
However, I may also have applied some tacit knowledge and/or assumptions from the 
hospital in which I work to the study site being observed.  In order to identify and rectify 
these potential preconceptions, I sought clarification from nursing staff about the typical 
work processes during convenient times of their choosing.  I also encouraged nursing staff to 
tell me their thoughts on the medication systems they were using, how they felt about being 
observed, and if there was anything I could do to improve. Feedback from nursing staff was 
recorded as part of the field notes, which subsequently provided additional guidance to me 
to further improve my data collection approach at each study site, and to facilitate some data 
analysis. 
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6.5 Methods 
6.5.1 Selecting study sites 
This was a follow up study from the national survey of medication systems in English NHS 
hospitals that was conducted in July 2011 (chapter four).  Purposive sampling was used as it 
is considered a necessary prerequisite in qualitative research in order to identify cases most 
likely to show the issues or processes under investigation (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).  The aim 
was to sample for maximum variation.   
 
First, one hospital was pre-selected by the researcher and both PhD supervisors for the 
following practical reasons: (i) ‘typical’ medication administration related systems and 
processes were reported to be in use from the survey (for example, use of paper drug chart, 
patient bedside medication lockers, drug trolleys), (ii) these were confirmed by the 
researcher and one of the PhD supervisors as both had a working knowledge of the hospital 
medication systems, (iii) the researcher had a substantive NHS contract with the hospital 
which minimised potential delays due to administrative processes, and (iv) the study had 
approval from the chief pharmacist.   
 
Other potential study sites were then identified using the following selection criteria to 
maximise variation in medication administration related systems and/or practices for 
observation in this study: (i) at least one of the hospital medication systems or practices 
reported by the respondent has not been reported by more than 9 other respondent 
hospitals, (ii) the hospital medication system or practice must relate to inpatient medication 
administration rather than discharge or other parts of the medication process, and (iii) the 
respondent must have given consent in the questionnaire to be contacted for a future study.  
An initial shortlist of 24 potential hospitals was identified by the researcher and through 
discussions with both PhD supervisors the shortlist was subsequently reduced to 13 
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hospitals.  Eleven hospitals were excluded as the systems or practices identified were 
considered to be mainly focused on facilitating hospital discharge (5), were standard hospital 
practice (4), or were used to potentially reduce turnaround times for inpatient medication 
supply (2). .  Relevant survey respondents were then contacted by the researcher and a brief 
telephone interview was conducted by MM to find out further information.  Responses were 
reviewed by the researcher and both PhD supervisors to confirm whether or not the 
medication administration systems and/or practices described were distinctly different to 
those at the pre-selected hospital.   Subsequently, nine hospitals were identified for 
inclusion; three were excluded as the researcher was unable to reach the respondent and 
one was excluded after information from the respondent revealed that reported systems 
were for facilitating patient discharge rather than for medication administration related 
activities.  A stepwise approach was used to invite study sites to participate, starting with 
hospitals located within commutable distance by public transport; this allowed the 
researcher to better plan data collection.  Respondents were telephoned and emailed up to 
three times over a four-week period to arrange for a brief interview and invite them to 
participate in the current study.  However due to time limitations, only five of the nine 
hospitals were invited to participate in the current study; four respondents could not be 
reached or were unavailable.  Of the five hospitals that could be reached, two respondents 
declined to participate in the study because organisational changes were taking place at the 
time and one respondent accepted in principle but was later excluded due to delays in 
administrative processes. The remaining two respondents agreed to participate in the study 
and together with the initial pre-selected hospital formed a total of three sites for inclusion in 
the current study.  Details of each study site are summarised in table 6.4 in the results 
section.   
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6.5.2 Participant consent 
Overall consent for participation was obtained from the chief pharmacist and other relevant 
staff at each study site; identification of a suitable ward was coordinated by the contact 
person (respondent from the national survey, chapter four) at each hospital.   A summary of 
the study protocol, participant information leaflet and consent form was provided to the 
contact person to facilitate local review and approval process.  An honorary NHS contract 
was set up at two sites; the researcher had a substantive NHS contract with the third.  
Following all relevant approvals, the researcher liaised with the site contact person and ward 
manager regarding data collection.  A participant information leaflet (appendix 14) was 
provided to all nursing staff observed on the ward and written consent was obtained 
(appendix 15).  The researcher went through the participant information leaflet with each 
nurse including the objectives of the study, participation was voluntary, and all data would be 
anonymised.    
 
6.5.3 Data collection 
A convenient sample of nursing staff were observed during a full range of drug round times 
over seven to ten consecutive days at each study site.  Data were collected by one 
pharmacist researcher MM, who observed nursing staff as they went about their usual 
routines.  Observations were divided into ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ drug rounds.  For 
both sets of observations, the researcher observed nursing staff as they went about their 
usual routines before, during and after scheduled drug rounds.  General characteristics of the 
drug rounds observed were documented for both sets of observations: time of scheduled 
drug round, duration of drug round, number of patients, and number of steps taken by 
nursing staff (using a pedometer, Yamax Digi-Walker SW-200).   
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During the first set of observations, which were qualitative in focus, detailed descriptions of 
the medication administration process and systems used were documented as field notes, 
photographs, ‘spaghetti diagrams’ (map of travel), and narratives.   In the second set of 
observations, the following quantitative data were documented:  details of the medicines 
administered, storage locations accessed, number and sources of interruptions and 
distractions.  Data collection was not focused on detecting MAEs but the number of 
opportunities for error was documented during the quantitative set of observations to 
determine an MAE rate of any MAEs that were detected.  Initial data collection forms were 
piloted and the following key changes were made: (1) a section for documenting the general 
ward activities at around the time of the drug round was added, (2) a section for 
documenting feedback from nursing staff was added, (3) a section to document the location 
of the nurse when an interruption or distraction was observed was added, and (4) a section 
was added to document the medication stage when an interruption or distraction was 
observed.  Separate data collection forms were finalised for use for the two sets of 
observations (appendices 16 and 17).   
 
6.5.4 Definitions 
Definitions, inclusion, and exclusion criteria for the quantitative data are summarised in table 
6.3.  Sources of interruptions and distractions were based on categories developed by Pape 
(2003) and were adapted for use in the current study (appendix 18). These are termed 
‘externally-initiated interruptions’ in the present study as the definition by Pape (2003) was 
based on the individual attending to an external stimulus. In addition, the externally-initiated 
sources of interruptions were separated into two main groups: ‘individual’ and ‘technical’ as 
described by (Biron et al., 2009).  This separation was useful as it organised the relatively long 
list of sources into smaller more practical lists for use during data collection, and as the 
origins of each group are distinctly different, Biron’s grouping allowed the sources to be 
analysed and interpreted accordingly.   Additionally, a separate ‘self-initiated interruptions’ 
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category was included to explore the potential effects of the individuals themselves on their 
own workflow.  
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Table 6.3 Summary of definitions, inclusion and exclusion criteria used in the 
quantitative part of the study.  
Definition Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
Externally-initiated interruptions 
A situation in which a nurse ceased 
the preparation, administration, 
and/or documentation task before 
it was complete in order to attend 
to an external stimulus (Pape, 
2003; Flynn et al., 1999). 
 See appendix 18  Self-initiated interruptions 
(see below) 
 Interruptions that occurred 
in between preparation and 
administration tasks, for 
example, attending to a 
telephone call after drug 
preparation was complete 
Self-initiated interruptions 
A situation in which a nurse ceased 
the preparation or administration 
task before it was complete 
without an observable external 
stimulus (developed for the current 
study) 
 Nurse initiating 
communications with 
persons, including the 
observer 
 See also appendix 19 
 
 Interruptions that occurred 
in between preparation and 
administration tasks, for 
example, attending to a 
telephone call after drug 
preparation was complete 
Distractions 
A stimulus from a source external 
to the nurse that was not followed 
by cessation of activity but by the 
nurse continuing productive efforts 
while responding in a manner that 
was observable (Flynn et al., 1999). 
 Nurse talks to someone 
while continuing with the 
task 
 Glancing up towards 
external source of 
distraction 
 Change in pace of task 
without other signs of 
distraction 
Opportunity for error (OE) This is 
the sum of all doses prepared, 
given or prescribed but omitted 
(Allan & Barker, 1990; Franklin et 
al., 2007).   
 Both the preparation and 
administration stages had 
to be observed in order for 
the dose to be an OE 
 Leaving a dose at the 
patient’s bedside for the 
patient to take themselves 
 Doses prepared and 
administered by the 
patient and/or carer 
Medication administration error 
(MAE) 
A deviation from the prescriber’s 
medication order as written on the 
patient’s chart or electronic 
medication administration record 
(Allan & Barker, 1990) 
 All doses prepared and/or 
administered that were 
observed irrespective of 
route of administration 
 All regular, ‘stat’, ‘when 
required’ doses 
 Errors prevented by the 
observer, patient or 
persons other than the 
nurse themselves 
 See also list of MAE 
subcategories in appendix 
20 
 Wrong time errors 
 Omissions for therapeutic 
reasons 
 Omission due to patient 
not on the ward 
 Procedural-related 
violations such as not 
checking the patient’s 
identity prior to 
administration 
 Oxygen 
 Nutritional supplements 
 Thromboembolic 
deterrent stockings 
 Leaving a dose at the 
patient’s bedside for the 
patient to take themselves 
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6.5.5 Data analysis 
All field notes were transcribed into Microsoft Word and quantitative data were transcribed 
into Microsoft Excel by the researcher in between drug rounds.  Early transcribing of field 
notes after observation was essential to maximise recall, elaborate on field notes, identify 
potential further areas to help focus subsequent observations, and to facilitate concomitant 
data analysis during data collection.  All site and participant identifiable data were entered 
into a separate Microsoft Excel document.   
 
The primary focus of data analysis was to identify themes relating to systems-based 
interactions between nursing staff and the systems used to carry out medication 
administration. All data were analysed using the framework analysis approach (Ritchie & 
Lewis, 2003).  Examples of data documented as field notes and photographs taken at each 
study site are provided in appendices 21-26.  An initial thematic framework based on the 
study objectives was produced during early data collection and analysis (figure 6.1).  The 
researcher re-read the field notes to become familiar with the data, separated the field notes 
into smaller code-able items, and then mapped these on to the thematic framework to test 
the comprehensiveness of the major themes and identify subthemes (appendix 27 shows an 
example of an expanded thematic framework created during data analysis). Descriptions of 
major themes and subthemes were amended repeatedly throughout the data collection and 
analysis process as more field notes were documented, transcribed, reviewed, and coded.  
BDF independently reviewed several iterations of the expanded thematic framework and 
coding scheme based on the field notes and verbal feedback from the researcher.   Once the 
coding frame was confirmed, all the field notes were indexed.  Indexed field note items were 
organised into a matrix in Microsoft Excel; each column represented a separate subtheme, 
each row for a separate drug round.  This allowed data to be analysed within drug rounds 
(across multiple columns) and across different drug rounds (down multiple rows).  Initial 
cross-cutting themes were generated by reviewing the expanded thematic framework 
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diagrams, data within the matrix, spaghetti diagrams, photographs, and medication 
administration related documents provided by participants at the study sites.    Additionally, 
BDF also indexed two sets of field notes from each study site (approximately 10% of all field 
notes recorded) to assess plausibility and criticality of the thematic framework, in addition to 
contributing to further developing the thematic framework.  The final thematic framework, 
coding scheme, major themes, subthemes, and cross-cutting themes were produced through 
further iterative processes by the researcher with support from BDF.   
  
Quantitative data were additionally summarised descriptively.  An MAE rate was calculated 
for non-IV doses and IV doses (McLeod et al., 2013) where the total number of MAEs was 
divided by the total number of OEs, multiplied by 100.  The second method for calculating 
MAE rates described in chapter three was not used as measuring MAEs was not the primary 
objective of the present study (McLeod et al., 2013).  An interruption rate per drug round 
hour was calculated (Biron et al., 2009; Relihan et al., 2010): the total number of 
interruptions per drug round was divided by the duration of the drug round in minutes, and 
then multiplied by 60.  A separate distraction rate per drug round hour, and a combined 
interruption and distraction rate per drug round hour was also calculated. 
 
6.5.6 Ethics approval 
Ethics approval was granted by the UCL School of Pharmacy in January 2011.   NHS ethics 
approval was not required as this study was considered to comprise service evaluation.   
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6.6 Results 
6.6.1 Overview 
Overall, a total of 85 hours and 43 different nurses on 56 drug rounds were observed across 
the three study sites. One nurse at site A initially declined to be observed, but later changed 
her mind during the end of the data collection period at the site concerned.  The nurse 
explained that she was newly qualified and required supervision initially to give medications 
but was later able to give medications unsupervised. Characteristics of study sites and a 
summary of data collected at each site are summarised in table 6.4.   During the quantitative 
observations, 458 doses were included as OEs (445 non-IV and 13 IV doses).  The MAE rates 
were 2.7% of non-IV OEs (95% CI, 1.2 to 4.2) and 30.8% of IV OEs (95% CI, 26.3 to 35.2). 
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Table 6.4. Characteristics of study sites and summary of data collected. 
Study sites Staffing 
Medication systems and 
administration processes Observations 
Site A 
 
27-bed vascular 
and cardiology 
ward in an 
acute hospital 
of an acute NHS 
trust, London 
 Ward: 24 RN 
 Observed nurse to 
patient ratio: 
o Day shift – 1:8 
o Night shift – 1:8 
 Nurse participants 
reported fewer 
staff than normal 
during the data 
collection period  
 Paper drug chart  
 4 x drug trolleys 
 RFID controlled electronic 
bedside medication cabinets 
 Nurse administered drugs to 
patients they were looking 
after 
 26 March to 3 April 2012 
 14 RN  
(inc. 2 bank/agency) 
 18 drug rounds (three at 
6am and five each at 
12pm, 6pm and 10pm) 
 Total 27 hours of 
observation, of which 
15 hours 20 min were 
during drug rounds; 
the remainder were 
before and after drug 
rounds 
Site B 
 
28-bed adult 
elective surgical 
ward in an 
acute hospital 
of a foundation 
NHS trust, 
London 
 Ward: 16 RN 
 Observed nurse to 
patient ratio: 
o Day shift – 1:6 
o Night shift – 1:6 
 Nurse participants 
reported fewer 
patients than 
normal during the 
data collection 
period 
 Trust-wide EPMA system 
since 2008 
 EPMA access: two desktop 
computers, three tablet 
devices, and one COW 
 2 x drug trolleys  
 RFID controlled electronic 
bedside medication cabinets 
 Nurse administered drugs to 
patients they were looking 
after 
 20-31 August 2012 
 13 RN 
(inc. 2 bank/agency) 
 20 drug rounds (four 
at 6am, five at 12pm, 
six at  6pm, and five at 
10pm) 
 Total 29 hours of 
observation, of which 
14 hours 13 min were 
during drug rounds; 
the remainder were 
before and after drug 
rounds 
Site C 
 
18-bed adult 
neurological 
rehabilitation 
ward in an 
acute hospital 
of a foundation 
NHS trust, East 
Midlands 
 Ward: 15 RN 
 Observed nurse to 
patient ratio: 
o Day shift – 1:9 
o Night shift – 1:9 
 Nurse participants 
reported fewer 
staff than normal 
during the data 
collection period 
 EPMA system since July 2012, 
trust-wide roll out in progress 
at time of data collection 
 EPMA access: one desktop 
computer, one laptop 
attached to the drug trolley, 
and two COWs 
 1 x large drug trolley 
 Conventional metal bedside 
medication lockers 
 Two nurses administered 
drugs to all patients together 
  ‘Opt-out’ patient self-
administration policy 
 HCAs facilitated with drug 
administration 
 No IV doses were prescribed 
(patients on this ward do not 
usually require IVs) 
 12-19 November 2012 
 16 RN 
(inc. 3 bank/agency) 
 18 drug rounds (two 
at 6am, four at 8am, 
four at 12pm, five at 
6pm, and three at 
10pm) 
 Total 29 hours of 
observation, of which 
20 hours 35 min were 
during drug rounds; 
the remainder were 
before and after drug 
rounds 
COW, computer on wheels; EPMA, electronic prescribing and medication administration system; inc. , 
including; HCA, health care assistant; IV, intravenous; RFID, radio frequency identification; RN, 
registered nurse 
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Overall, six main themes and 26 associated subthemes were identified from the framework 
analysis (box 6.1); examples of data coded under each can be found in appendix 28.   
 
 
Five of the six main themes were based on the initial thematic framework (figure 6.1), and 
the sixth was subsequently included to reflect the actual and potential effects of having an 
Box 6.1 Main themes and subthemes of factors that influenced medication safety, 
workflow, interruptions and distractions. 
  
1. Structure of the ward-based medication system and resources available 
1.1 Prescribing system 
1.2 System for documenting medication administration 
1.3 Ward-based medication storage 
1.4 Patients’ own drugs 
1.5 Medication ordering system 
1.6 Policies and guidance 
2. Medication system use in practice 
2.1 Actual and potential system-related problems identified by nursing staff  
2.2 Problem-led temporary deviations from intended use (workarounds) 
2.3 Non problem-led deviations from intended use  
3. Medication safety 
3.1 Patient as a medication problem alert system (for both actual and 
potential problems) 
3.2 Nurse as a defence for actual and potential medication problems 
3.3 Actual and potential inappropriate prescribing and prescribing errors 
3.4 Actual and potential strategies to increase medication safety 
3.5 Actual and potential medication administration errors 
4. Workflow (factors that influenced workflow) 
4.1 Medication ordering, replenishing, and security 
4.2 Medication administration support from and to other health care 
professionals 
4.3 Staff expectations, use of prior knowledge, and information transfer 
4.4 Patient’s clinical status, needs, and requests 
4.5 Shared resources required for medication administration 
4.6 Individual nurses’ approach to medication administration tasks (order of 
activities) 
4.7 Actual and potential strategies to streamline workflow or increase 
efficiency 
5. Interruptions and distractions 
5.1 Sources of interruptions and distractions 
5.2 Time and location of medication administration 
5.3 Nurses’ role, responsibilities, and relationships 
5.4 Actual and potential strategies to manage interruptions and distractions 
6. Observer-related effects 
6.1 Actual and potential effects of the presence of an observer on nurse/other 
staff/patient behaviour 
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observer on ward staff and patients’ behaviour.  From these, three cross-cutting themes 
describing the sociotechnical factors that facilitated and hindered successful drug 
administration were identified (each is described separately in the following sections):   
A. Structure-related configurations and features (section 6.6.2) 
B. Behaviour types of nursing staff (section 6.6.3) 
C. Patient interactions (section 6.6.4) 
Figure 6.2 shows the three cross-cutting themes in a conceptual diagram that was developed 
from the initial framework in figure 6.1.   
 
Figure 6.2 Conceptual overview of thematic factors that influence MAEs, workflow, and 
interruptions associated with the hospital medication administration process: framework 
comprises six main themes (numbered) and three cross-cutting themes (A to C) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
__ Main themes (1 to 6) 
--- cross cutting themes (A to C) 
      Arrows indicate direction of influence between main themes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Patient interactions 
2. Medication 
system use in 
practice 
1. Medication 
system  
3. Medication safety 
4. Drug round 
workflow 
5. Interruptions and 
distractions 
B.  Behaviour types of nursing staff 
A. Structure-related configurations and features  
6. Observer-related 
effects 
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As depicted in the conceptual diagram (figure 6.2), the cross-cutting themes overlap and 
transverse the six main themes in different ways.  ‘Structure-related configurations and 
features’ was conceptualised as the foundational theme that affected different types of 
nurse behaviour, which in turn, incited different types of patient interactions; each 
comprised components that exerted a positive and/or negative impact on medication safety, 
drug round workflow, interruptions and distractions.  Thus, the results are next focused on 
these three cross-cutting themes, supported with selected examples from observation field 
notes and feedback from nursing staff.   
 
 
6.6.2  Structure-related configurations and features  
Specific configurations (location and arrangement of human and material resources) and 
features (characteristics, interpretability, and pre-conditions for use) of structure-related 
aspects (Donabedian, 2003) of the medication system  acted as a physical constraint on some 
drug round tasks; these increased medication safety in some cases, but contributed to 
interruptions, distractions, impaired workflow, and medication problems in others (table 6.5, 
figures 6.3 to 6.5).   
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Table 6.5.  Examples of system configurations and features associated with potentially positive 
and/or negative impact on medication safety, interruptions, distractions, and workflow.   
 Observed potential positive effect Observed potential negative effect 
System configurations 
Location 
 
• A desktop computer was near the stock 
cupboard for oral medicines, thus 
allowing nursing staff to check the EMAR 
on their preferred device while 
preparing medicines that may not be 
available from the drug trolley (some 
nurses reported problems with the 
mobile EPMA devices and therefore did 
not take it with them into the treatment 
room to prepare intravenous 
medications) (site B) 
• Drug trolley was kept in the treatment 
room and was often replenished 
immediately prior to and/or after the 
drug round (site C) 
 
• Infusion pumps and stands were located in 
a separate room at one end of the ward 
away from the treatment room containing 
drugs and therefore potentially increased 
‘travel’ for nursing staff (site A) 
• A few medicines (for example, nebules and 
pre-filled syringes) were sometimes kept on 
the shelf at the bottom of the drug trolley 
in addition to inside the drug trolley which 
was accessible to passers-by (sites A&B) 
• The day room was located some distance 
away from the patient bed areas which was 
a particular problem on this ward as some 
patients were mobile and often in the day 
room during drug rounds; thus potentially 
increased ‘travel’ and opportunities for 
interruptions to nursing staff (site C) 
Arrangement • Some patients kept their inhalers and 
creams altogether in a small plastic box 
on the bedside table (rather than in 
different locations around the bedside) 
which seemed to make it easier for 
nurses to find those drugs (sites A&C) 
• Medications in the drug trolley were 
arranged such that the front (rather than 
the side) of most packs were facing the 
nurse to aid drug identification (sites 
B&C) (figure 6.3) 
• Some frequently used intravenous drugs 
(for example, paracetamol and 
metronidazole) were stored on the top 
shelves which made them less accessible 
than some other drugs (site A) 
• Some patient bedside medication lockers 
were positioned so that the locker opened 
towards the bed (rather than towards the 
nurse opening it) which made it more 
difficult for the nurse to access the 
contents (site C) 
System features 
Characteristic 
 
• The patient bedside medication locker 
was a removable drawer which could be 
moved to an alternative area while 
preparing medicines (for example, if 
there was limited space at the locker to 
place the drug chart or mobile EPMA 
device, or more than one drug was 
required from the bedside medication 
locker) (sites A&B) 
• Ward staff developed a standard form 
for documenting medication-related 
tasks that required follow-up after the 
drug round (site C) 
 
• Drug charts were misplaced (site A) 
• Reported unreliability of computer tablet 
devices and font size too small on laptop 
led to nurses reporting a preference for 
using the desktop computer on some drug 
rounds.  This meant that the EMAR was 
sometimes not used at the patient’s 
bedside or at the drug preparation location 
(site B) 
• Nurses had to stoop to open patient 
bedside medication lockers (site C) 
 
Interpretability 
of features 
 
• Paper drug chart was relatively intuitive 
to use (site A) 
• Medication orders were legible on EPMA 
system (sites B & C) 
 
• Drug administration code for ‘patient 
refused’ and ‘patient did not require’ were 
used interchangeably (site A) 
• EMAR screen did not show all or any 
additional information provided by 
pharmacy staff (site B&C) 
 
Pre-conditions 
for use 
• All stock cupboards were in one room 
which potentially facilitated medication 
retrieval during drug rounds (site A) 
 
• Password and training required to use 
EPMA system therefore could not be used 
by locum staff.  Instead, regular nursing 
staff printed out MARs for locum staff to 
use and transcribed medication 
administration documentation for them on 
to the EPMA system after each drug round 
(sites B&C) 
EMAR, electronic medication administration record; EPMA, electronic prescribing and medication administration 
system; MAR, medication administration record 
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Figure 6.3 Medicines in one of the drug trolleys 
at site B.  Medications were arranged such 
that the front (rather than the side) of most 
packs were facing the nurse to aid drug 
identification, retrieval, and facilitate 
replenishment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Spaghetti diagram showing path of travel by a single nurse during one drug 
round and the potential influence of systems configuration on drug round workflow at site 
B (map of ward not drawn to scale).  Nurse started the drug round by logging on to the tablet 
computer next to the drug trolleys at 21:05, placed tablet computer on drug trolley and wheeled it to 
each patient starting in C-bay.  Nurse went to the nurse base station area 13 times during the drug 
round: to look for master key to patient’s bedside medication locker (2 times), to look for medicines in 
stock cupboard (4), to access desktop computer to view and/or sign patient medication orders (5), to 
take a telephone call (1), and to prepare from the controlled drugs cupboard (2).  Nurse ended the drug 
round at the nurse base station double checking on the electronic prescribing and medication 
administration system that all the relevant doses had been signed. S02, site identifier code; DR022, 
drug round identifier code; N18, nurse identifier code; pts, patients; meds, medicines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 – MAPS study 
 
 
 
201 of 321 
Figure 6.5 Spaghetti diagram showing path of travel by a single nurse during one drug 
round and the potential influence of staff configuration on drug round workflow at site C 
(map of ward not drawn to scale).  At site C, two nurses typically worked together on the drug 
round to administer medications to all patients; one nurse ‘caller’ and one nurse ‘runner’. The map 
below shows the path of travel by the nurse ‘caller’ whom initially stayed with the drug trolley: she 
used the laptop attached to the drug trolley to access the patient’s electronic medication 
administration record, called out doses to the ‘runner’ to retrieve medications from the bedside 
medication locker and prepared some doses from the drug trolley.  After the doses had been prepared 
for the patient in room 6, the nurse caller went ‘ahead’ while the nurse runner remained to administer 
the doses; this process was repeated whenever a patient required assistance to take the medicines and 
led to a ‘single-nurse’ drug round for parts of the remaining round.  During the drug round, the nurse 
caller went to the nurse base station twice (to retrieve patient 6  folder to check oxygen saturation and 
to retrieve patient 5 folder for paper warfarin medication order) and treatment room once (to retrieve 
medication from the fridge) during the drug round. S03, site identifier code; DR045, drug round 
identifier code; N34 and N31, nurse identifier codes; pts, patients; meds, medicine; NA, not 
applicable; self-admin, patient self-administered medications. 
   
 
 
 
 
Optimisation of structure-related configurations and features that negatively impacted 
medication safety, interruptions, distractions, and workflow were recognised by some nurses 
as a potential area for improvement.  Some sub-optimal systems configurations and features 
were frequently reported by nurses as a hindrance to drug administration (table 6.5).  
However other sub-optimal configurations and features were not reported but revealed 
through observation; for example, when certain basic tasks appeared to be ergonomically 
challenging or awkward, the nurse seemed perplexed by the task, a deviation from policy 
was observed, or a more optimal configuration and/or feature was observed elsewhere on 
Chapter 6 – MAPS study 
 
 
 
202 of 321 
the same ward.  In general, few individuals sought to resolve the underlying structure-related 
problems or inefficiencies during the observed study period; in most cases, the individual 
seemed to have accepted the problems or inefficiencies and either worked with it, or worked 
around it: 
Nurse told me she sometimes likes to put two drug trolleys together so 
she can prepare the medicines more easily [implied medications were 
not always available from one drug trolley]. 
(Site A, nurse with over 1 year of experience on the ward) 
 
Nurse told me she preferred to use the tablet computer over the 
computer on wheels (COW) as she found the mouse pad tricky to use 
on the COW.  However, she preferred to sign for medication 
administrations at the desktop as the tablet computer was too small.   
(Site B, nurse with over 7 years of experience on the ward) 
 
Based on individual feedback and observations, the type of action taken to manage perceived 
medication system related problems or inefficiencies partly depended on individual 
behaviour types, which are described in the next section.   
 
 
6.6.3  Behaviour types of nursing staff  
As illustrated in figures 6.4 and 6.5, medication administration was not a linear process; each 
map showed the path of travel by one nurse during a single drug round (all 27 maps can be 
found in appendices 29-31).  In general, nurses encountered a number of drug round tasks 
which took them to locations other than the patient’s bedside (figure 6.6): examples include 
nurses going to another ward to borrow medicines during and outside pharmacy opening 
hours, to the day room to find the patient, the treatment room for medication and 
equipment, the nurse base station for patient folders, other parts of the ward to speak to 
other health care professionals, and to the kitchen to retrieve refreshments and nutritional 
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supplements.  Observed variation between individual approaches to drug round tasks on the 
same site suggests that medication administration workflow was not only influenced by 
structure-related configurations and features, but also by individual behaviours that 
appeared to be inherent and situation dependent; some of which included deviations from 
‘typical’ practice. 
 
Figure 6.6 Path of travel by one nurse during a morning drug round showing travel to 
several locations other than patients’ bedside at site A (map of ward not drawn to scale). 
S01, site identifier code; DR006, drug round identifier code; N06, nurse identifier code; pts, 
patients; meds, medicines.   
 
 
 
 
Inherent and situational behaviour types 
Broadly, nurses appeared to have a general inherent tendency to be either primarily ‘task 
focused’ (main goal of drug round was to administer drugs as efficiently as possible), or 
‘patient-interaction focused’ (drug round was more of an opportunity for the nurse to 
interact with their patients in addition to administering medications) during the drug round.   
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Both inherent behavioural types potentially increased and decreased aspects of medication 
safety, but differed in their general approach to drug round workflow, interruptions, and 
distractions.  Task-focused individuals generally used a more streamlined workflow and 
tended to react minimally to interruptions and distractions.  In contrast, patient-interaction 
focused individuals adopted a relatively less streamlined workflow, and were generally more 
proactive in response to interruptions and distractions.  Excluding urgent tasks, individuals 
who were primarily task focused generally carried out few non-medication administration 
related tasks during the drug round; when these tasks were identified during the drug round, 
the nurse either deferred it to the end of the drug round, or carried out the task when 
another task took the nurse to a convenient location to carry out multiple tasks. Conversely, 
individuals who were relatively more patient-interaction focused, appeared to proactively 
‘encourage’ communication with patients and/or other staff during the drug round; the 
patient-interaction focused individuals either multi-tasked, carried out the non-medication 
administration related task shortly after they completed the primary task, or stopped the 
primary task to carry out the non-medication administration related task.   
 
In general, the behaviour types exhibited were not fixed; individuals appeared to shift from 
one to another, depending on the needs of the patient, the medication system being used at 
the time, the task being carried out, and other situational circumstances at the time.  
Examples of nurse behaviour types are provided in box 6.2. 
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Given that nurses themselves were the third most common source of interruptions and 
distractions (figure 6.7), it is therefore likely that individuals’ inherent tendencies may also 
influence the potential for MAEs. However, the ‘direction’ of influence (positive or negative) 
on drug round workflow and MAEs also depended on the medication systems being used and 
the task that was being carried out at the time (situation dependent).   Consistent with the 
study by Pape (2003), ‘other nurses’ were the most common source of interruptions and 
distractions to the individual on the drug round, and the other nurses’ tendency to interrupt 
or not (as well as health care assistants and other individuals on the ward) also appeared to 
Box 6.2 Examples of inherent behavioural tendencies and associated influences on 
how systems were utilised, and how medication administration related problems, 
interruptions, distractions, and workflow were managed. 
 
Task focused  
• Nurse deferred a task for later.  As the nurse was at patient C3’s bedside about to move 
on with the drug round, patient C4 interrupted and asked the nurse to remove her 
Venflon®.  Brief discussion, nurse explained that she still had medications to give and 
will come back to see her later (site B) 
• Nurse grouped some tasks to do together rather than stop what they were doing.  
Whilst the nurse was preparing ketamine in the treatment room, she also picked up a 
box of tinzaparin and then some plastic cups (these were needed in the drug round 
earlier)  from the other drug trolley outside a patient bay before going back to patient 
G1 to administer the ketamine, then prepared the oral morphine sulphate solution, 
gave to the patient, then paracetamol, and then administered the tinzaparin to the 
patient (site A) 
• Nurse re-ordered some tasks to increase efficiency.  Patient was fast asleep and was 
due medication, N28 told N36 that she’ll “sign for it now so all the paperwork is done”, 
wrote a reminder to administer medications on a pre-printed job’s list form and said 
she will give the medications to the patient when he is awake  (site C) 
 
Patient-interaction focused  
• Nurse prioritised a non-drug round related activity over the drug round. N12 talked to 
the patient as she was administering slow IV bolus of co-amoxiclav.  Later saw another 
nurse helping patient G1 with his VAC dressing, N12  went to help, took about 20 min 
for N12 to go to TR, draw up saline flush, go back to G1 to try to unblock tube, got 
interrupted by another nurse several times, decided to change a vacuum-assisted 
closure dressing, prepared dressing trolley and changed dressing before returning to 
the drug round (site A) 
• Nurse dealt with a patient’s query straight away.  Patient asked the nurse about her 
aspirin, said she hasn’t taken it today.  Nurse stopped what she was doing to talk to the 
patient.  Patient said nurse last night gave her an injection to replace the aspirin, nurse 
confirmed that she will also give the injection (site B)  
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be partly influenced by the individual on the drug round.  Lastly, both the task-focused and 
patient-interaction focused behaviours were associated with some structure-based deviant 
local practices which had the potential to increase and decrease medication safety; these are 
described in the next section.   
 
Figure 6.7 Sources of interruptions and distractions during non-intravenous drug rounds (% 
of a total of 413 interruptions and distractions observed at the preparation, administration, 
and documentation stages of the drug round).  Median 5.5 interruptions per drug round 
hour, range 0 to 24; median 9.6 distractions per drug round hour, range 0 to 30; median 15.5 
interruptions and distractions combined per drug round hour.   
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Structure-related behaviour and deviations from ‘typical’ local practices 
Based on feedback from nursing staff and observations, a range of intentional deviant 
practices related to the ‘structure’ aspects of the medication systems were identified.  
Broadly, intentional non-conformer behaviour appeared to be of three main overlapping 
types: efficiency seeking, multi-tasking, and experienced practice-overriding.  Examples of 
each behavioural tendency observed and reported are listed in figure 6.8.   
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Figure 6.8 Different types of non-conformer behaviours with examples from individual 
nurse feedback and observations.  Each type of non-conformer behaviour and the potential 
relationship to the perceived level of difficulty of structure based change. IV, intravenous;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, efficiency seekers tended to deviate from typical local practice when they had 
perceived an inefficiency within the system, but also a potential solution to the problem; 
sometimes the deviant practice observed was part of an established tried-and-tested routine 
for the individual and at other times, it was more spontaneous.   By contrast, multi-taskers 
Experienced 
over-riders 
  
• “You’ll notice I’m also not checking wristbands because 
all the patients have been here for 100 years” (site C) 
• Nurses noted that they were supposed to wear a ‘do not 
disturb tabard’ during drug rounds but did not.  Reasons 
reported include: they did not think it worked (site A), 
raised concern about the cleanliness of tabards (site C), 
and found it made them too hot (site C) 
• Nurse rescheduled enoxaparin 18:00 to 22:00 during the 
drug round as found out that the pt last had the dose at 
14:00.  Enoxaparin was prescribed twice daily (site B) 
• Nurse found out from patient that he takes atenolol in 
the evening, went through other medicines, 
rescheduled atenolol and sitigliptin to 18:00 (site B) 
 
Multi-taskers • Nurses frequently used the desktop computers at the 
nurse base station during drug rounds to access 
patients’ medication administration records and 
remained logged into the system during drug 
preparation and administration: “please nobody log me 
off, I’m doing the meds” (site B) 
 
Efficiency 
seekers 
• Instead of taking the drug trolley to the patients as she 
did previously, this time the nurse started by retrieving 
the relevant patients’ drug charts (two were at the 
bedside as expected, one was later found near an empty 
bed in the same bay), then proceeded to prepare doses 
from two adjacent drug trolleys parked at the nurse 
base station.  N08 later told me that she sometimes 
likes to put the drug trolleys together so she can 
prepare the medicines more easily (site A) 
• Nurse put IV paracetamol tray in the drug trolley, 
deliberately left it there after 10pm drug round in 
preparation for the morning round (site B) 
• Nurse asked the patient if he applied his own creams, 
patient confirmed that he does, nurse left 2xcreams at 
the bedside for the patient to self-administer (patient is 
not on self-administration scheme), nurse signed for 
administration (looks like she administered them). (site 
C) 
Perceived 
system related 
problem or 
inefficiency was 
considered easily 
changed  
Perceived 
structure related 
problem or 
inefficiency was 
considered 
difficult to 
change or not 
changeable 
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also sought to maximise efficiency, but the ‘solution’ involved carrying out multiple tasks 
concurrently to the perceived problem rather than focusing on resolving the problem before 
moving on to the next task. Multi-tasking behaviour was frequently observed in individuals 
who were in charge of the ward during observed drug rounds, and also observed in 
individuals that were relatively experienced with typical local practices irrespective of their 
management role during the shift.  The experienced practice over-riders behaviour type was 
generally observed when the individual encountered a known recurring problem or 
inefficiency, and believed that in their experience, the resultant deviant practice posed no 
additional risk to the patient.   
 
Based on the systems and tasks observed that appeared to trigger each of the three non-
conformer behavioural types, a potential relationship with perceived level of flexibility for 
structure change was observed.  At one end of the ‘flexibility for change’ spectrum were 
problems and inefficiencies that were perceived to be easily overcome by adopting a 
different process, at the other end were problems and inefficiencies that were perceived as 
being more ‘difficult’ to change or could not be changed, and therefore individuals used their 
experience to override them (figure 6.8).  Relating to the latter, an alternative behaviour type 
was also observed, ‘critically conforming’; individuals with this behaviour identified a 
perceived problem or inefficiency but would persist (rather than override) the task: 
 
Two nurses discussed the problem of night staff giving morning meds 
at 6am.  They did not think it was a good idea as it is too early and 
not practical to do observations. Thought day staff should do drug 
rounds as think there is not much to do in the morning.  
(Site A) 
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6.6.4  Patient interactions  
As depicted in figure 6.2, interactions between patients and nursing staff resulted in an 
observable effect on medication safety and drug round workflow, with patients additionally 
being the second most common source of interruptions and distractions during drug rounds 
(figure 6.7).  Nurse-patient interactions potentially increased medication safety in some 
situations, and potentially reduced medication safety in others.  Consistent with the 
literature (Britten 2009), patients sometimes acted as a defence barrier to medication error.  
Specifically, the current study found three manifestations of the patient defence barrier 
(table 6.6).   
 
While patient interactions primarily related to relationships between nursing staff and the 
patient, a number of systems-related influences on these relationships were also observed: 
for example, nurses typically did not take the computer on wheels (sites B and C) or drug 
trolley (all sites) into patient side rooms, and individuals generally relied on their memory 
and/or brought medications out of the room to prepare doses thus potentially reducing 
patient involvement.  Patient involvement was also important not only as a potential defence 
barrier for MAEs but also to optimise their treatment.  The dose omission rate due to 
therapeutic reasons was 11.4% of OEs, much of which involved direct nurse-patient 
interaction during the drug round. 
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6.6.5  Practices observed that potentially increased medication safety 
A number of practices were observed that potentially contributed to increased medication 
safety, streamlined drug round workflow, and reduced interruptions and distractions.  These 
are listed in table 6.7.   
Table 6.6  Three observed manifestations of the patient defence barrier   
 Examples 
Patients helped 
nurses to 
identify 
potential 
prescribing 
errors 
• Nurse noticed on the drug chart that the patient had not received tinzaparin 
recently (there were two doses crossed off and one blank administration box), 
she asked the patient "do you know of any reason why you haven't been given 
the tinzaparin?" "I get it on dialysis" replied the patient.  Tinzaparin had been 
prescribed for once daily administration and there was no documentation on 
the drug chart to indicate that the patient was to receive this on dialysis days 
only. (site A)  
• Nurse told the patient what she was giving (included naproxen and 
omeprazole); patient explained he takes both at night: “only take it at night” 
“not morning?” “only take it at night” “ah they prescribed it for this 
morning…..I don’t know why [they] prescribed it for morning” explained to 
patient that she did not give these last night and so patient took the 
medications at the morning drug round. (site B)  
• Medication order did not specify which eye(s) the eye drop was to be applied.  
Nurse asked the patient, "your eye drops, do we do it for you or you do it?" 
"You do it" "Is it both of the eyes?"  Patient confirmed it was for the right eye, 
nurse administered it to the patient’s right eye (site A) 
• Patient highlighted discrepancy in pregabalin dose, told the nurse it should be 
250mg twice a day, but it was prescribed as 100mg twice a day, nurse 
documented this and talked to patient about changes in medications (site C) 
 
Patients helped 
nurses to 
identify 
potential  
medication 
administration 
problems 
• Patient told the nurse she could not break up the cocodamol and therefore did 
not take the dose that was given to her in the previous drug round.  The dose 
had been signed for but was not actually taken.  Nurse was aware, helped 
patient crush tablets by using two spoons (could not find tablet crusher on the 
ward).  Documented current dose not given (site B) 
• Nurse prepared a dose of metronidazole then realised that the medication 
order had been stopped on the chart and discarded the dose at the drug 
trolley (956-958).  Metformin dose prescribed was 500mg - 1g on chart and 
prescriber had written “1g OM” in additional section of chart for metformin.  
Nurse had prepared 500mg and given to patient but later corrected it when 
prompted by the patient and gave 1g in total.  (site A) 
Patient acted as 
a double-
checker 
• Nurse went straight to the patient’s bedside medication locker to retrieve the 
patient’s own gliclazide, omeprazole, metronidazole and pioglitazone.  During 
this time, the patient asked “is it metformin?” Patient told the nurse that the 
metformin was in the same packet as the gliclazide (site B) 
• Nurse prepped meds at the drug trolley and then took over to the patient, 
patient asked for “diclofenac”.  Nurse had not prepared this (site C)    
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Table 6.7 Practices that potentially contributed to increased medication safety, better 
workflow, reduction in interruptions and/or distractions on the sites observed.   
To increase 
medication safety 
• Ward staff developed a standard form for documenting medication-related 
tasks that required follow-up after the drug round (site C) 
• Two nurses went through each patient’s drug chart during handover to check 
for missed doses and/or queries with the patient’s medication (site A)  
To streamline 
workflow 
• Nurse retrieved additional medications from the stock cupboard prior to 
starting the drug round (all sites) 
• Fridge items were placed in the drug trolley prior to starting the drug round 
(site C) 
• Nurse checked EPMA at the nurse station prior to starting lunchtime drug 
round for doses that were due.  Nurse expected very few doses and did not 
use drug trolley on the drug round but prepared medications at the nurse 
station from the stock cupboard (site B) 
• Nurse asked the patients whether or not they wanted painkillers some time 
prior to the drug round and therefore knew in advance which patients needed 
painkillers and was able to go to those patients specifically during the 
lunchtime drug round (site B) 
• Drug trolley was kept in treatment room and was often replenished 
immediately prior to and or after the drug round (site C) 
• Medications in the drug trolley were arranged such that the front (rather than 
the side) of most packs were facing the nurse to aid identification (sites B and 
C) 
• Some patients kept their bedside medications together in a box which 
seemed to make it easier for nursing staff to find medications not stored in 
the bedside medication locker, for example, creams and inhalers (site C) 
• HCAs helped patients to take their medicines after the nurse had dispensed 
the relevant doses, this included nebulisers, application of creams (site C)  
• Nurse reconstituted multiple doses of IV Tazocin® (piperacillin and 
tazobactam) medications as knew each vial would take a long time to dissolve 
(site A) 
To reduce 
interruptions and 
distractions 
• Nurses sometimes wore a ‘do not disturb’ tabard (site C) 
• Ward staff placed a ‘ward screen’ at the entrance of a bay in which patients 
were being washed, this discouraged interruptions to anyone inside the bay 
(site C) 
HCA, health care assistants; HCP, health care professionals; MAR, medication administration record;  
 
6.7 Discussion  
6.7.1 Main findings 
Overall, six major themes, 26 associated subthemes, and three cross-cutting themes were 
conceptualised to summarise the systems based effects on the safety of medication 
administration.  The three cross-cutting themes were ‘structure-related configurations and 
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features’, ‘behaviour types of nursing staff’, and ‘patient-interactions’.  Consistent with the 
previous research described elsewhere in this thesis, variations in hospital ward medication 
systems exist but much more subtle variations than previously reported were identified and 
described in the present study.  Subtle structure-related variations in available resources, 
such as their specific location, arrangement, characteristics, features, and pre-conditions for 
use, appeared to influence individual behaviour and patient interactions, with some notable 
positive and negative unintentional consequences on medication safety.   
 
Based on the study findings, a number of systems-related nurse behaviour types were 
identified.  A focus on deviant behaviour from typical local practice led to a proposed 
relationship between the level of perceived difficulty for systems change and the type of 
non-conformer behaviour exhibited by individuals during specific medication tasks.  Analysis 
of deviant behaviour was based on nurses’ feedback during the observations and was 
therefore primarily associated with structure-based inefficiencies only and other reasons for 
deviant behaviour was not explored.  Nonetheless, the analysis of nurse behaviour types 
showed that potential latent conditions for MAEs can be identified by examining non-
conformity to typical local practices.   
 
6.7.2 Implications for practice 
Taking proactive measures to identify local and organisational conditions that need 
correction has been advocated as a navigational aid to help drive development of 
organisational resistance to operational hazards in health care (Carthey et al., 2001).  
Findings from the current study included identifying a number of practices that potentially 
contributed to increased medication safety (table 6.7).  Some of these practices were 
reported by staff, some were not; this emphasises benefits of an observational approach to 
‘looking’ and ‘seeing’ practices in natural settings.   The practices presented are intended to 
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stimulate review of existing systems and processes in a different way than previously carried 
out and are not necessarily suitable for every setting.  There may be differences in other 
settings that would result in some different sociotechnical interactions that might not have 
been observed on the three study sites.  However, the main cross-cutting themes were 
developed from observation and analysis across a wide range of nursing staff and therefore 
the concepts are likely to be more transferable to other hospital ward settings than individual 
practices observed.  More importantly, recognising the concepts such as sub-optimal 
structure-related aspects of the medication system need not be restricted to researchers, 
managers, or specialists. As the current study shows, many sub-optimal structure-related 
aspects were already known to at least one individual who worked within, or were exposed 
to, the structure.  This included patients in addition to ward staff.  Increasing patient and 
staff engagement in medication safety may therefore be an important method to increase 
medication safety.  Furthermore, many relatively cost-neutral and ‘low-tech’ suggestions 
were identified.  Additionally, the thematic framework in figure 6.2 may be transformed into 
a checklist to facilitate identification of structure-related areas for further optimisation.    
 
6.7.3 Comparison of quantitative findings with previous research 
The MAE rate for non-IV OEs identified in the present study (2.7%) was significantly lower 
than previously reported in a recent systematic literature review (5.6%; 95% CI 4.6-
6.7%),(chapter three; M
c
Leod et al., 2013).  This was unexpected as the definitions and 
methods used were comparable to the studies that were included in the review.  However, 
the lower MAE rate may be due to the relatively small sample of non-IV OEs observed in the 
present study (445 non-IV OEs compared to the 842-3576 non-IV OEs included in previous 
studies) (chapter three; M
c
Leod et al., 2013). 
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The present study identified a median rate of 5.5 interruptions per drug round hour and 9.6 
distractions per drug round hour.  The former is similar to the 6.7 interruptions per hour 
reported in the literature review by Biron et al (2009), which was based on a total of 2,622 
interruptions observed over 402.5 hours during medication administration by nurses in 14 
studies. The included studies were conducted in a range of acute care settings.  However, the 
definition for an interruption varied between studies (Biron et al., 2009).  Although the 
specific definitions were not described, Biron et al (2009) reported that different definitions 
were associated with a measurable difference on reported interruption rates, and that some 
used “interruptions” and “distractions” interchangeably. Thus, it was unclear whether or not 
the interruption rate reported by Biron et al (2009) included ‘distractions’, which was defined 
separately in the present study.  Combining interruptions and distractions resulted in a total 
of 15.5 ‘interruptions and distractions’ per drug round hour, which is higher than the 6.7 
interruption rate by Biron et al (2009).     
 
6.7.4 Strengths and limitations  
A strength of the current study was inclusion of multiple sites that used distinctly different 
medication systems; this sampling approach enabled the findings to reflect the diversity of 
‘typical’ and relatively ‘atypical’ local practices used by nurse participants of a range of 
experience to administer medications.  By using an ethnographic approach rather than self-
report, a number of ‘real-world’ practices, both obvious and subtle, were identified from the 
study sites were described.  Furthermore, feedback from nursing staff about the observation 
experience was generally positive which suggests the presence of the observer was not 
perceived to be a problem.  Some nurses and HCAs seemed particularly interested in the 
study and were extremely helpful and receptive towards the researcher.  Staff were generally 
quite open about their opinions of the systems relating to medication administration and 
provided invaluable additional insights into their rationale for the approach they took during 
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drug rounds.  Overall, the mixed-methods approach not only enabled triangulation of the 
main findings, but the quantitative data using methods and definitions from the literature 
allowed for more objective comparisons to be made with previous studies in this area.   
 
Sociotechnical interactions are complex; there are multiple interconnecting systems and 
processes that are not always apparent.  A limitation of the current study is that it only 
focused on those interactions related to medication systems used by nursing staff to 
administer medications to hospital inpatients, and thus did not consider the wider impact of 
structure optimisation on the work processes of other health care professionals.  In addition, 
other physical environmental factors such as noise, lighting etc. that have been associated 
with nursing errors and efficiency (Chaudhury et al., 2009) were also not explored as these 
were not the main focus of the current study.  Additionally, findings from the interruptions 
and distractions recorded in the current study indicate the presence of the observer had a 
measurable influence on nurse behaviour during drug rounds; this may have potentially 
influenced MAE rates but previous research suggests that this risk is low provided that the 
observer was discreet, non-judgemental, and tactful in their approach to observations 
(Barker & McConnell, 1962; Dean & Barber, 2001).  However the overall percentage of 
observer-related interruptions and distractions were substantially less than those from 
patients despite the observer’s continued presence, suggesting that any observer effects 
were potentially minimal but this cannot be confirmed.  Finally, another potential limitation 
was that data were collected by one observer.  Although the potential risk of observer bias 
was highlighted earlier as a potential problem, and subsequent efforts were made to 
maintain a balance between objectivity and subjectivity, the data collection and analysis are 
limited by the beliefs and experience of the observer. 
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6.7.5 Future research 
The findings of the current study have touched on the systems potential to influence 
behaviour and also the complex sociotechnical relationship on nurses’ behaviour and the 
potential for increasing medication safety.  Further research is required to better understand 
how safety-related behaviours may be proactively developed to identify latent conditions for 
MAEs, and to develop a method for identifying and monitoring these latent conditions to 
pro-actively prevent or ameliorate MAEs, ideally incorporating a range of stakeholders 
including patients.  Other potential future research directions include: 
• Evaluate the use of the thematic framework based checklist as a tool for identifying 
and monitoring structure-related configurations and features that can be further 
optimised in a range of settings 
• Explore the effects of interventions to reduce time spent on non-urgent, non-
medication administration related tasks during drug rounds 
  
6.8 Conclusion  
Overall, a number of subtle structure variations in available resources appear to influence 
individual behaviour and patient interactions, with some notable positive and negative 
unintentional consequences on medication safety.  Individuals (including patients) within 
different medication systems were found to be a good source for identifying actual and 
potential medication related problems and therefore potential targets for structure 
optimisation; some were intentional and revealed by studying deviant practices by nursing 
staff, while others were seemingly unintentional and were identified by using an 
ethnographic observational approach in this study.  Further research is required to better 
understand how potential underlying systems-based problems may be better identified and 
rectified to increase medication safety. 
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Chapter 7.  Overall discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
Since starting the research presented in this thesis, medication errors have continued to be a 
major patient safety concern in the UK.  A review of 526,186 medication incident reports to 
the NHS NRLS between January 2005 and December 2010 has revealed that 822 (0.9%) were 
associated with patient death or severe harm (Cousins et al., 2012).  Separately, a study 
involving a retrospective review of 1,000 adults who died in 10 acute hospitals in England 
identified drug or fluid-related problems as the third largest cause (21%) of preventable 
deaths (Hogan et al., 2012).  Additionally, the problem of dose omissions was highlighted in 
the recent high-profile public inquiry report on the failings identified at Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust (Francis, 2013a; 2013b; 2013c).  Medication errors pose a threat to all 
three dimensions of quality care (Department of Health, 2008): patient safety, clinical 
effectiveness, and patient experience, and therefore efforts to reduce medication errors 
continue to be a national priority in the UK (Cousins et al., 2012).   
 
Errors at the medication administration stage have continued to hit the national headlines 
(BBC, 2012a; 2012b; Britten, 2011; Barrow, 2012) with emphasis often attributed to human 
error at the ‘sharp end’.  However, evidence suggests that human errors at the ‘blunt end’ 
contributes to poor organisational systems, poorly designed work environments, and 
inadequate defence barriers, and thus also play a major role in the occurrence of MAEs 
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(O’Shea, 1999; Armitage & Knapman, 2003; Carlton & Blegen, 2006; Mcbride-Henry, 2006; 
Fry & Dacey, 2007; Hughes & Blegen, 2008; Brady et al., 2009; Chaudhury et al., 2009).     
 
There is much that health care can learn from the systems approach used to evaluate causes 
of major accidents in high-risk industries such as nuclear power and aviation (Kohn et al., 
1999; Department of Health, 2000a; J. Reason, 1995).  Unfortunately, complex interactions 
associated with medication administration processes and the small window of opportunity 
for detecting MAEs before medicines are administered to the patient limit the transferability 
of some industry-based approaches for systems improvement; this has been a challenge for 
developing effective systems-based intervention to reduce MAEs (chapter one).  
Furthermore, as health care systems and processes have generally evolved rather than being 
designed, it was suspected that variations exist within and between hospitals in the types of 
medication systems used to support medication administration.  Such potential variations 
pose an additional challenge for developing interventions that would be useful across the 
wider NHS.  Consequently, the overall aim of this thesis was to explore variations in hospital 
medication systems used to support medication administration and their effects on the 
safety of medication administration.   
 
In considering the methodological approach for this research, it became apparent that the 
core tasks and defence barriers associated with medication administration should initially be 
considered as a ‘whole’, rather than in isolation; this was to identify potential area(s) for 
exploring systems variation.  Additionally, a gap in the literature on methodological variations 
between quantitative MAE studies and their effects on reported MAE rates was identified, 
which warranted investigation to maximise transferability and interpretability of MAE rates.   
Separately, exploration of the extent of variations in hospital medication systems led to 
identification of a gap in the knowledge of how different ward-based medication storage 
systems were used to retrieve medications successfully.  This then led to further examination 
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of systems-based factors and their effects on medication safety, workflow, interruptions, and 
distractions. Overall, five main research questions were identified for investigation in this 
thesis: 
1. What are the main tasks and defence barriers associated with medication 
administration to hospital inpatients in the NHS? (chapter two) 
2. How do methodological variations between studies affect reported MAE rates in UK 
NHS hospitals? (chapter three) 
3. What variations exist (if any) in the types of medication systems used by staff in NHS 
hospitals to obtain, store, and administer medication for inpatient use? (chapter four) 
4. What variations exist (if any) in the types of ward-based medication storage and 
transport systems used by staff to retrieve medications for administration on general 
medical and surgical wards within one acute NHS trust? (chapter five) 
5. What systems-related factors facilitate and/or hinder safe medication administration 
in NHS hospitals? (chapter six) 
A summary of the main findings in relation to these five research questions is next discussed, 
followed by limitations, implications for practice, and future research.   
 
7.1  Summary of main findings  
7.1.1 Core tasks and defence barriers associated with medication administration 
to hospital inpatients in the NHS 
The first empirical study in this thesis identified five core tasks associated with medication 
administration to hospital inpatients: (1) checking a patient’s identity prior to administration, 
(2) administering a dose and not omitting it due to drug not being available, (3) preparing 
and administering a dose without error, (4) observing a patient take their medications, and 
(5) documenting of administration or reason for non-administration.  By combining these five 
core tasks with timeliness of medication administration, an overall quality filter of medication 
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was produced which revealed that 84.6% of doses were not administered according to the six 
standards of good practice.  An MAE rate of 4.3% for non-IV OEs was also identified.  Overall, 
four problem areas associated with medication administration were as follows: (1) there 
were discrepancies between prescribed time, scheduled drug round time, and actual drug 
round times, which suggests an underlying latent condition leading to ‘wrong time’ errors, (2) 
the patient’s identity was also not always confirmed prior to administration, which indicates 
an inadequately used defence barrier, (3) medication administration documentation was not 
always accurate, which indicates an active failure that may potentially transform into a latent 
condition for further MAEs, and (4) doses were not always available from the patient’s 
bedside medication locker or bedside area (no drug trolleys were used on the study site), 
which suggests that the ward-based medication storage system was potentially inefficient 
and may be considered to be a latent organisational failure for MAEs.  Thus, the findings from 
this study highlight the importance of considering MAEs within the context of systems and 
processes associated with medication preparation and administration.  In particular, the 
study revealed that 11.3% of doses were not available from the patient’s bedside medication 
locker or patient bedside area, but only 2.6% of all doses were actually omitted.  The former 
suggests the presence of a potential weakness in the ward-based medication storage system, 
and the latter suggests that nurse may be acting as a ‘buffer’ to counteract potential 
systems-based error-producing conditions.  Consequently, the findings from this study led to 
the conception of further studies described in subsequent chapters. 
 
7.1.2 Methodological variation and their effects on reported MAE rates 
A systematic literature review was conducted to summarise the methodological variations in 
UK MAE studies and to evaluate their effects on reported MAE rates.  Overall, three MAE 
definitions, 44 MAE subcategories, and four different denominators used across 16 UK-based 
observational studies were identified.  These illustrated the extent of methodological 
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variations that exist even within one country.  A novel meta-analysis of MAE rates was 
carried out based on meta-analysis methods used for experimental studies (Neyeloff et al., 
2012).  The calculations revealed that overall adult MAE rates were 5.6% for non-IV OEs (95% 
CI 4.6-6.7%), and 35% for IV OEs (95% CI 2-68%) in UK NHS hospitals.  The calculations 
accounted for the sample size of included studies and also produced a statistic for assessing 
the degree of heterogeneity between included studies; medication error rates have not 
previously been quantified in this way (Lewis et al., 2009; Ghaleb et al., 2006).  In addition, a 
number of methodological effects on MAE rates were quantified.  Most notably, IV doses 
were estimated to be five times more likely to be associated with an MAE than non-IV doses 
(OR 5.1; 95% CI 3.5-7.5).  In general, the findings emphasised the importance of 
methodological considerations when designing, reporting, and interpreting quantitative 
studies of MAEs and included reporting suggestions for future studies to facilitate 
consistency, interpretation, transparency, and comparability.  The review also confirmed that 
dose omission was the most common MAE subcategory reported for non-IV doses and that 
omissions due to drug being unavailable were common (accounting for 52-67% for non-IV 
dose omissions).  Overall, the findings support some inferences made by other researchers 
on the presence of methodological variations (Ferner, 2009; Ghaleb et al., 2006) and also 
contributed additional knowledge on the potential effects of these variations on reported 
MAE rates.   
 
7.1.3 Similarities and variations in medication systems in English NHS hospitals 
In the first national study of hospital medication systems in the English NHS, a number of 
systems were identified that were in use; the majority of hospitals used paper-based 
prescribing (87% of respondent hospitals), patient bedside medication lockers (92%), ward 
stock (94%), PODs (89%), and OSD supplies (85%).  These findings provide an important 
context for those seeking to develop and prioritise systems based interventions to reduce 
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MAEs that would be applicable across the NHS.  Additionally, a number of other system 
variations were also identified, particularly related to the transport of medicines during non-
IV drug rounds and whether or not non-OSD supplies were used for inpatients.  These 
findings highlight potential areas for further exploration to examine the advantages and 
disadvantages of these different variations, and therefore inform future developments in 
their design, application, and/or implementation.  For example, while it was suspected that 
variations between hospitals existed, it was more surprising to find that only 59% of hospitals 
used drug trolleys on the majority of their wards; published descriptions of UK NHS hospital 
drug distribution systems suggest that drug trolleys were previously standard practice on 
hospital inpatient wards (Dean et al., 1995; Brock & Franklin 2007).  Similarly, the reduction 
in use of non-OSD supplies to only 50% of hospitals was also unexpected as their use was 
once standard practice.  The prevalence of a number of key medication administration 
related policies and guidance were also identified.  In particular, 85% of hospitals had a 
double-checking policy for IV administrations and 58% for specific drugs or groups of drugs.   
Furthermore, a number of local initiatives to improve safety and efficiency of medication 
supply, storage, and administration were reported by 32 of 100 respondents.  Overall, 
findings from the national survey have contributed to addressing the knowledge gap on the 
extent of medication systems variation that exists in English NHS hospitals.  The findings 
provide information that can be used facilitate the development of potential interventions to 
reduce MAEs that are applicable across the NHS.   
 
 
7.1.4 Variations in medication storage and transport systems used during non-IV 
drug rounds between hospitals, within hospitals, and within the same ward 
An observational study that focused on the medication storage systems used by nursing staff 
to retrieve non-IV drugs led to the identification of a range of ‘temporary drug trolley’ 
Chapter 7 – Overall discussion 
 
 
 
223 of 321 
solutions that were used even within a single NHS trust with the same policies and guidance.  
Overall, one in nine doses was searched for by nursing staff in more than one location, 
supporting the inference in chapter two that medication storage facilities may be inefficient 
for dose retrieval during drug rounds.  However, exploratory analysis suggested that no 
single type of medication storage was associated with significantly higher dose retrieval rate 
than other storage types.  Furthermore, the study also found that nurses did not search for 
doses in the medication storage locations consistently.  Instead, some nurses appeared to 
have prior expectations about where the drug should be located and accessed those areas 
first, and/or retrieved all medications from the patient’s bedside locker, and/or placed these 
on the drug trolley or temporary drug trolley solution to minimise walking back and forth.   
Individual practice variation even on the same ward where nurses are working within the 
same environmental conditions suggested that a more in depth investigation was needed 
into how nurses use the systems available to them. 
 
7.1.5 Systems factors that facilitate and/or hinder successful drug administration 
in NHS hospitals 
Building on the findings on the national, local, and individual variations associated with the 
use of medication storage and transport systems during non-IV drug rounds, an ethnographic 
study was conducted at three different hospitals, each using different medication systems.  
Subtle structure-related variations in available resources, such as their specific location, 
arrangement, characteristics, and pre-conditions for use, appeared to influence individual 
nurse behaviour and patient interactions that had not been previously reported.  While some 
structure-related variations may have contributed to medication-related problems, different 
nurse behaviour types were also apparent; these were conceptualised to describe their 
potential contribution to medication safety, drug round workflow, and patient interactions.  
Analysis of nurse behaviour types showed that potential latent conditions for MAEs can be 
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identified by examining non-conformity to typical local practices.  Patients were also 
identified as a defence barrier for preventing MAEs, but this was also partly influenced by 
how individual nurses used the medication systems during the drug round, and how the 
systems were configured.   Overall, the findings from this study suggest that understanding 
potential systems based effects on MAEs is made more complex by the variation in 
sociotechnical interactions that exist in practice.   Research is required to better understand 
how safety-related behaviours and culture may be developed to increase medication safety. 
 
7.2  Main limitations 
This section summarises the main limitations across the individual studies.  In this thesis, a 
number of systems and process based variations associated with medication administration 
in NHS hospitals were measured and their potential effects on the safety of medication have 
been described.  However, there were also other human factors that were not measured 
because there was a practical limit to the number of variables that could be measured at any 
one time. These include: (1) environmental factors such as levels of light, noise, temperature, 
(2) individual factors such as stress, fatigue, knowledge, and (3) some organisational factors 
such as individual shift patterns.  Instead, the systems and processes that were investigated 
were identified from the findings in each consecutive study, with subsequent focus on ward-
based medication storage and transport system for several reasons.  First, ward-based 
medication storage and transport is an essential component of the systems used to support 
timely and successful dose retrieval; consequently ward-based medication storage and 
transport have the potential to substantially affect the frequency of ‘wrong time’ errors and 
dose omissions, which are the two most common subcategories of MAEs for non-IV doses 
(chapter three).  Second, an effective ward-based medication storage and transport system 
may reduce interruptions to nurses on the drug round (and therefore the risk of MAEs) by 
minimising excess travel for drug retrieval.  Third, there appeared to be many individual, as 
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well as inter- and intra-hospital, variation in the types of medication storage and transport 
used across the NHS which has not been previously described, and therefore warranted 
further investigation.   
 
Related to the limitations of measurement was that exploratory comparisons of MAE rates 
associated with different ward-based medication storage systems were not adjusted for 
potential confounding factors such as individual nurse participant variation in skills and 
knowledge.  To do so would require a much larger sample than that required for the primary 
objective of the medication storage study (chapter five), which was to explore intra- and 
inter-hospital variation in where medications were retrieved from during drug rounds. 
 
Another limitation was that clinical significance of errors was not assessed; this was related 
to the scope of individual studies but could have been conducted using a method such as the 
validated method by Dean and Barber (1999).  Additionally, the thesis was generally focused 
on non-IV administrations as these were most likely to be influenced by systems relating to 
medication storage; further research is required to explore the effects of systems variation 
on IV administrations.  Similarly, only medications administered by nursing staff were 
considered in this thesis as this is the main group of staff who administer medications in 
hospitals; it is therefore unknown how the same systems may or may not affect other health 
care professionals and patients who may be involved in drug administration.  Finally, despite 
every effort to minimise the potential for observer bias, the presence of an observer was 
found to have some effects on nurse behaviour (chapters two, five, and six); however there 
was no indication that this significantly influenced MAEs or other relevant findings.  In most 
cases, there was only one observer (MM) which may also contribute to potential observer 
bias, but this was considered to be limited based on the substantial inter-observer reliability 
identified in chapter five, and agreement with a second independent researcher in the 
framework analysis (chapter six).   
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7.3 Implications for practice 
7.3.1 Tackling MAEs in hospitals – tackling the problem while blindfolded?   
Since the publication of key national reports in the UK and worldwide (Kohn et al., 1999; 
Department of Health, 2000a; Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2002), 
health care policy makers and researchers worldwide have made several attempts to adapt 
strategies from high-risk industries such as aviation and nuclear power, among others, to 
analyse and reduce risk (Reason 1995; Vincent et al., 1998).  In drawing comparisons with 
high-risk industries, it has become apparent that the prevalence of errors and preventable 
patient harm in health care have changed little over the years (Vincent et al., 2008, chapter 
three of this thesis), and would be considered alarmingly inappropriate, as so vividly 
exemplified in the following from Berwick & Leape (1999; p136): 
 “Ladies and gentlemen, welcome aboard Sterling Airline's Flight Number 743, 
bound for Edinburgh. This is your captain speaking. Our flight time will be two 
hours, and I am pleased to report both that you have a 97% chance of reaching 
your destination without being significantly injured during the flight and that 
our chances of making a serious error during the flight, whether you are injured 
or not, is only 6.7%. Please fasten your seatbelts, and enjoy the flight.  The 
weather in Edinburgh is sunny.” 
 
As the authors point out, the safety statistics in airline travel are fortunately much better 
than the above, which were based on data for an adverse event (3.7% of hospital admissions) 
and serious preventable ADE (6.7% of hospital admissions) from the Harvard Medical Practice 
Study (Leape et al., 1991; Brennan et al., 1991); with 0.27 US airline fatalities per 1,000,000 
flights between 1990 and 1994 (Berwick & Leape 1999).  However, the source of the airline 
figures quoted was unclear. More recent data from the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (available from www2.icao.int/en/ism/iStars/Pages2/Accident statistics.aspx) 
reveal an accident rate of 4.2 per million departures and fatal accident rate 0.53 per million 
departures across the world in 2011.  Nonetheless, the figures are still substantially smaller 
than those in health care.    
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An important point highlighted in the frequently quoted IOM’s report is that there are a 
number of key differences between high-risk industries and health care (Kohn et al., 1999).  
First, front-line staff in high-risk industries are usually directly affected when an accident 
happens, while in health care, it is generally the third party, i.e. the patient, who is affected.  
Second, preventable harm in health care generally occurs to one patient at a time, rather 
groups of patients, thus making incidents less visible.   
 
For MAEs, the problem of visibility also arises from the narrow window of opportunity for 
detecting the error before it reaches the patient (Leape et al., 1995; Bates et al., 1995), and 
the reported difficulties of detecting MAEs in practice (Barker & McConnell, 1962; Allan & 
Barker, 1990).  Furthermore, if Reason’s famous Swiss cheese model is considered, then a 
myriad of potentially ‘invisible’ latent conditions are also likely to have contributed to a 
patient incident.  For example, findings from the study in chapter two revealed that 11.3% of 
doses due were not available from the patient’s bedside medication locker or bedside area, 
thus causing an interruption to the drug round workflow and resulting in the nurse having to 
search for medications elsewhere.  The reason for suggesting that this may be an ‘invisible’ 
latent condition is that while it may be reasonably expected that not all drugs would be 
available at the patient’s bedside, the frequency of occurrence and subsequent delays to 
drug administration may have become accepted as part of routine practice and not ‘seen’ as 
a potential area for improvement.  However, the findings from chapter two were based on 
observations on one ward only, and thus the generalisability of the findings is unknown.     
 
Furthermore, findings from this thesis revealed that there was also no single standard for 
determining what constitutes an MAE (chapter three).  This suggests some actions such as 
administering medications at the ‘wrong time’ are seen as errors by some researchers and 
not others, thus reducing the ‘visibility’ of MAEs.  Although the example of definition 
variations reflect those that were used by researchers, there is also evidence that nurses 
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have different perceptions of what constitutes an MAE (Osborne et al., 1999).  As part of the 
study by Osborne et al (1999), 57 nurses were asked to classify whether or not an error 
occurred in five scenarios.  Overall, 35-91% of nurses classified the scenarios as a drug error 
(across the five scenarios), and depending on the scenario, 14-91% of nurses would complete 
an incident report form.  This lack of consistency in what is considered an MAE together with 
difficulties of detection, and the presence of ‘invisible’ latent conditions are potentially 
important factors for why tackling MAEs in hospitals may be akin to the problem of “tackling 
the problem while blindfolded”.  These are also the reasons why the contributions of this 
thesis are likely to help health care professionals, policy makers, and researchers to ‘see’ the 
problem of MAEs more clearly, and therefore better able to develop interventions to reduce 
them.  To better illustrate the potential implications of this research towards reducing MAEs, 
specific examples from this thesis are discussed in the next section in relation to two aspects: 
(1) development of proactive measures for systems improvement, and (2) contribution to 
system and process redesign. 
 
7.3.2 Developing proactive measures to better ‘see’ potential areas for systems 
improvement  
It has been suggested that approaches for identifying measures for improvement need to be 
both reactive and proactive (Carthey et al., 2001).  Reactive measures provide important 
information about incidents that have occurred so that lessons may be learnt while proactive 
measures act as an early warning indicator of potential problems and latent conditions that 
may contribute to future incidents.  Past research has generally focused on the reactive 
measures of safety by describing MAEs, analysing incident reports, and investigating the 
causes of MAEs (Hughes & Blegen 2008).  However, findings from this thesis suggest that 
there are a number of ways in which proactive measures may be identified:  
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(1) Examine non-conformity to typical local practices. Findings from the MAPS study 
(chapter six) suggest that potential latent conditions for MAEs can be identified by 
examining non-conformity to local practices by nursing staff.  With further work, the 
thematic framework conceptualised in the MAPS study (figure 6.2, chapter six) may 
be transformed into a checklist for identifying proactive measures for improvements; 
for example, by asking the user to consider the location and arrangement of human 
and material resources of the system under review. 
 
(2) Encourage feedback from ward staff and patients. Ward staff and patients are a 
useful source of information for identifying actual and potential latent problems 
including sub-optimal structure-related aspects associated with the medication 
systems in use (chapters five and six).  Enhancing feedback from everyday users of 
the systems is likely to yield more practical insights for improvement and has also 
been advocated by other research to increase safety in other parts of the medication 
process (Burnett et al., 2011).  A strategy that was reported by a respondent of the 
national survey (chapter four) was the implementation of regular multidisciplinary 
walkarounds on inpatient wards.  This not only provided an opportunity for staff to 
directly feedback any concerns in an informal and supportive manner, but also the 
systems and processes could be seen with a ‘fresh pair of eyes’ by those working 
outside of the ward and thus potentially better identify ‘invisible’ latent conditions 
(i.e. also addressed the suggestion in (1) above).  Furthermore, this approach 
facilitated communication and discussions to create possible solutions for any 
problems that were identified, rather than let the problem continue and/or nurses 
having to persist with workarounds. 
 
(3)  Measure and monitor variation associated with medication administration 
processes (use of statistical process control or ‘SPC’ methods).  Technically, this 
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method can be considered both reactive and proactive.  It is reactive in that it 
involves measuring and monitoring events that have already happened, and 
proactive because it allows interpretation of the trends to predict whether or not 
variations were due to special causes (for example, to a specific new problem) or 
common causes (i.e. due to inherent variation within the system and process) 
(chapter one).  The benefits of SPC is recognised within the NHS and much practical 
information is provided by the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement 
(Institute for Innovation and Improvement, 2013).  However, specific measures of the 
medication administration process that could be monitored using SPC methods to 
identify potential problems were not provided.  Based on the findings in this thesis, 
two potential measures are suggested: (i) duration of non-IV drug rounds and (ii) 
number of physical steps taken during non-IV drug rounds.  Both of these can be 
easily measured (chapters two, five, and six), and may be sensitive to problems 
during the drug round, such as excessive interruptions and distractions (chapters five 
and six).  The SPC approach would facilitate interpretation of what would otherwise 
be crude measures of quality by factoring in the inherent variations associated with 
drug administrations.  Consequently, this method enables potential problems to be 
identified when the parameter being measured is over or under the expected limits 
of variation.  The use of EPMA systems in the NHS provides an opportunity to 
potentially incorporate regular monitoring (either with SPC or generally) of other 
quality and safety measures that are less practical to do currently but are more 
directly relevant to MAEs: for example, timeliness of time-critical dose 
administrations and dose omissions (chapter two). 
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7.3.3 Understanding the context to better ‘see’ how systems and process may be 
redesigned to reduce MAEs 
The problems of MAEs are substantial and previous research also suggests efforts to reduce 
errors should focus on systems and process improvement to redesign and ‘mistake-proof’ 
health care systems (Kohn et al., 1999; Grout, 2007).  However, before systems and 
processes can be redesigned, it is necessary to consider the context in which they are to 
function.   
 
Findings from the national survey, and medication storage and retrieval study (chapters four 
and five) revealed the extent to which inter- and intra-hospital similarities and variation 
exists in the systems and processes associated with medication administration.  These 
provide information for those who are designing systems-based interventions that can be 
applied across the NHS.  Additionally, findings from the MAPS study (chapter six), and the 
medication storage and retrieval study (chapter five), provide further insight into the 
variations in how existing systems were used in practice.  For example, observations from the 
medication storage and retrieval study in chapter five suggest that the same types of 
medication storage may be implemented and used in different ways on different wards, and 
even within the same hospital.  Consideration of design features to facilitate optimal 
implementation would therefore maximise the benefits of the system (or process) among all 
wards.   
 
 
7.4 Future research 
Throughout the course of this research, it has become apparent that increasing medication 
safety requires a multi-faceted approach, one which minimises latent error-producing 
conditions, strengthens and implements effective defence barriers, in addition to addressing 
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the causes of unsafe acts. Many of the findings from this thesis and other research in the 
area of patient safety has drawn on theories and techniques from a range of disciplines and 
carefully adapted principles from other complex and high-risk industries.  Consequently a 
number of future research suggestions identified throughout this thesis also incorporate 
aspects of improving safety using these methods.   Considering the overall findings and 
implications of this thesis, the additional research questions are as follows: 
(1) How can non-conformity to local practices be better explored for their potential to 
detect error-producing conditions and/or behaviours that affect the safety of 
medication administration? 
(2) How can ward-based medication storage systems be optimised to increase successful 
and efficient dose retrieval by staff and patients, and to facilitate accurate medicines 
reconciliation on admission and at discharge, while minimising wasted medicines?  
(3) How can feedback from staff and patients be facilitated and incorporated into 
routine practice to increase medication safety? 
(4) How useful are SPC charts for monitoring the quality and safety of drug 
administration and for detecting potential problems associated with the medication 
administration process? 
(5) What other proactive measures of quality and safety should be monitored to 
facilitate continuous quality improvement of medication administration? 
 
Based on the research, a key consideration would be involvement of individuals from a range 
of relevant disciplines and stakeholders in the medication administration process.  These 
include (but not exclusively or definitively) human factors expert, psychologists, designers, 
ergonomists, nurses, doctors, pharmacy staff, and patients.  The rationale is that each will 
bring a different perspective and thus together will provide a more comprehensive 
evaluation of the research.  Furthermore, having multiple stakeholders means the research 
team is more likely to identify potential interactions between loosely coupled systems and 
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processes which may not necessarily be obvious to a pharmacist, a nurse, a doctor, or a 
patient alone.   
 
7.5  Overall conclusions 
Overall this thesis has extended the current knowledge of systems-based variation and their 
effects on the safety of medication administration.  The extent of hospital medication 
systems in use across the NHS is now known which can be used to identify priority areas for 
developing systems-based interventions to reduce MAEs.  Additional insight into the places in 
which nurses searched for medications during drug rounds has revealed the importance of 
considering the types of ward-based medication storage facilities available, and nurses’ 
knowledge and assumptions regarding where different medications may be stored.  While 
some differences in hospital medication systems between wards might be expected, the 
findings in this thesis suggest that potentially unnecessary system variations, such as how 
specific types of ward-stock are located on different wards, may benefit from a degree of 
standardisation to minimise the risk of MAEs.  Furthermore, a detailed examination of how 
nurses worked within different hospital medication identified a number of actual and 
potential subtle systems-based effects on MAEs, medication administration workflow, 
interruptions, and distractions that have not been previously described. These had both 
positive and negative effects on the safety of medication administration and should be 
considered when developing and implementing systems-based interventions to reduce 
MAEs.  Further research is required to explore methods for identifying how different hospital 
medication systems can be optimised to increase medication safety without compromising 
on efficiency, particularly in relation to ward-based medication storage systems.   
 
In addition, this thesis has also extended the methodological knowledge on studying, 
interpreting, and reporting MAE rates.  The research contributed to the area by summarising 
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methodological variations between MAE studies in the UK and quantifying their effects on 
reported MAE rates.  This led to a set of methodological and reporting recommendations 
that can be applied to other countries.  Further research is required to evaluate the 
recommendations, however it is anticipated that these would be useful for making future 
MAE studies more transparent and comparable.   
 
An exciting challenge for future research is to explore methods for pro-actively monitoring 
the safety of the medication administration process, using comparable definitions and 
practical measures to act as an early warning indicator for potential error-producing 
conditions.  The aim should be to develop a method for detecting potential medication 
safety-related problems as they arise and as health care evolves.   
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Appendix 3 – Comparison of 110 strategies to increase postal questionnaire 
response rates, adapted from Edwards et al. (2009). 
 
No. Group 1 Group 2 
Number of 
trials (number 
of 
participants) 
Odds 
ratio 95% CI 
1 Horizontal orientation 
of response options 
Vertical orientation of 
response options 
1 (400) 3.12 1.63-
5.96 
2 Teaser on the 
envelope 
No teaser on the 
envelope 
1 (190) 3.08 1.27-
7.44 
3 Included a veiled 
threat in follow-up 
letters 
Did not include a veiled 
threat in follow-up 
letters 
1 (671) 2.09 1.49-
2.93 
4 More interesting or 
high salient 
questionnaire 
Less interesting or low 
salient questionnaire 
3 (2,711) 2.00 1.32-
3.04 
5 Monetary incentive No incentive  94 (160,004) 1.87 1.73-
2.03 
6 Special delivery 
service 
Standard delivery 
service 
15 (18,931) 1.76 1.43-
2.18 
7 Shorter questionnaire Longer questionnaire 56 (60,119) 1.64 1.43-
1.87 
8 Monetary incentive Non-monetary 
incentive 
13 (26,484) 1.62 1.39-
1.88 
9 Illustration on cover 
of questionnaire 
largely in black 
Illustration on cover of 
questionnaire largely 
in white 
1 (320) 1.62 1.04-
2.53 
10 Incentive given with 
questionnaire 
Incentive given on 
return of completed 
questionnaire 
24 (27,569) 1.61 1.36-
1.89 
11 Mentioned obligation 
to respond 
No mention of 
obligation to respond 
3 (600) 1.61 1.16-
2.22 
12 Easiest questions first Easiest questions were 
not first 
2 (3,182) 1.61 1.14-
2.26 
13 SMS reminder  Postcard reminder 3 (9,947) 1.49 1.23-
1.81 
14 More user-friendly 
questionnaire 
Less user-friendly 
questionnaire 
1 (3,540) 1.46 1.21-
1.75 
15 Provided another 
copy of the 
questionnaire during 
postal follow up 
Did not provide 
another copy of the 
questionnaire during 
postal follow up 
11 (8,619) 1.46 1.13-
1.90 
16 Contacted 
participants before 
sending questionnaire 
Did not contact 
participant before 
sending questionnaire 
47 (79,651) 1.45 1.29-
1.63 
17 Multiple stamps on 
return envelopes 
Single stamp on return 
envelopes 
1 (510) 1.44 1.01-
2.04 
18 Follow-up contact No follow-up contact 19 (32,778) 1.35 1.18-
1.55 
19 Factual questions Factual and attitudinal 
questions 
1 (1,280) 1.34 1.01-
1.77 
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No. Group 1 Group 2 
Number of 
trials (number 
of 
participants) 
Odds 
ratio 95% CI 
20 Provided assurance of 
confidentiality 
Did not provide 
assurance of 
confidentiality 
1 (25,000) 1.33 1.24-
1.42 
21 University 
sponsorship 
Non-university 
sponsorship 
14 (21,628) 1.32 1.13-
1.54 
22 Large monetary 
incentive 
Small monetary 
incentive 
37 (84,043) 1.26 1.14-
1.39 
23 Hand-written address 
label 
Computer-printed 
label 
7 (5,091) 1.25 1.08-
1.45 
24 Stamped return 
envelope 
Pre-paid business 
return envelope 
27 (48,612) 1.24 1.14-
1.35 
25 Cover letters bearing 
a hand-written 
signature 
Cover letters that had 
a scanned or typed 
signature 
14 (15,006) 1.24 1.08-
1.41 
26 More relevant 
questions at the start 
of the questionnaire 
More relevant 
questions were not 
placed at the start of 
the questionnaire 
1 (5,817) 1.23 1.10-
1.37 
27 Single-sided 
questionnaire 
Double-sided 
questionnaire 
4 (4,966) 1.22 1.01-
1.47 
28 Non-monetary 
incentive 
no  incentive 94 (135,934) 1.15 1.08-
1.22 
29 Personal (e.g. signing 
letters by hand) 
Not personal 58 (60,184) 1.14 1.07-
1.22 
30 Offered incentive first Offered incentive in 
subsequent mailing 
3 (7924) 1.14 1.02-
1.28 
31 First class postage Non-first class postage 2 (8,300) 1.11 1.02-
1.21 
32 Endorsement by 
eminent professionals 
in the field 
No endorsement by 
eminent professionals 
in the field 
1 (395) 0.63 0.43-
0.94 
33 Double postcard One page postcard 1 (600) 0.47 0.34-
0.66 
34 Asked participants not 
to remove an ID code 
Did not ask 
participants not to 
remove an ID code 
1 (100) 0.37 0.14-
0.96 
35 Priority stamps on 
return envelopes 
First class stamp on 
return envelopes 
1 (205) 0.26 0.14-
0.46 
36 Questionnaire sent 
one to five weeks 
after discharge from 
hospital 
Questionnaire sent 
nine to fourteen weeks 
after discharge from 
hospital 
2 (2,324) 2.26 0.69-
7.37 
37 Conventional mode of 
response technique 
Randomised response 
technique 
4 (7,345) 1.52 0.85-
2.72 
38 Sent from a GP Sent from a research 
group 
2 (1,106) 1.52 0.73-
3.15 
39 Questions ordered by 
time period 
Questions not ordered 
by time period 
1 (259) 1.48 0.84-
2.59 
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No. Group 1 Group 2 
Number of 
trials (number 
of 
participants) 
Odds 
ratio 95% CI 
40 High frequency 
response alternatives  
Medium frequency 
response alternatives 
2 (3,882) 1.40 0.58-
3.38 
41 Signature within the 
questionnaire 
No signature within 
the questionnaire 
2 (1,030) 1.34 0.97-
1.85 
42 Included a consent 
form 
Did not include a 
consent form 
1 (414) 1.32 0.89-
1.95 
43 Telephone reminder  No reminder 3 (13,922) 1.29 0.85-
1.96 
44 Larger font Smaller font 1 (650) 1.26 0.87-
1.82 
45 Open-ended 
questions first 
Other types of 
questions first 
1 (300) 1.26 0.73-
2.19 
46 Brown envelopes White envelopes 5 (8,637) 1.23 0.81-
1.87 
47 Requested the 
participant's signature 
Did not request the 
participant's signature 
1 (201) 1.19 0.65-
2.18 
48 Pre-notification via 
telephone 
Pre-notification via 
post 
7 (3,322) 1.18 0.77-
1.80 
49 Coloured ink Black or blue ink 3 (7,040) 1.16 0.95-
1.42 
50 Posting questionnaire 
to respondent's work 
address 
Posting questionnaire 
to respondent's home 
address 
2 (1,140) 1.16 0.89-
1.52 
51 Dot matrix printing Letter-quality print 1 (176) 1.15 0.63-
2.10 
52 Requested an 
explanation for non-
participation 
No request for an 
explanation for non-
participation 
2 (1,907) 1.14 0.83-
1.57 
53 Asked participants to 
respond on the 
questionnaire itself 
Asked participants to 
respond on a separate 
form 
1 (200) 1.13 0.57-
2.27 
54 Identifying feature on 
questionnaire 
No identifying-feature 
on questionnaire 
8 (4,134) 1.12 0.82-
1.52 
55 Included a statement 
that others had 
responded 
Did not include a 
statement that others 
had responded 
1 (468) 1.12 0.76-
1.65 
56 Booklet  Stapled pages 3 (5,681) 1.10 0.99-
1.23 
57 Provided a time 
estimate for 
completion of the 
questionnaire 
Did not provide a time 
estimate for 
completion of the 
questionnaire 
1 (600) 1.10 0.76-
1.58 
58 Large non-monetary 
incentive 
Small non-monetary 
incentive 
7 (10,730) 1.09 0.97-
1.22 
59 Stressed how 
responses would 
benefit society 
Did not stress how 
responses would 
benefit society 
10 (12,731) 1.09 0.92-
1.29 
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No. Group 1 Group 2 
Number of 
trials (number 
of 
participants) 
Odds 
ratio 95% CI 
60 Any sort of pre-paid 
return envelope 
No pre-paid return 
envelope 
4 (4,094) 1.09 0.71-
1.68 
61 Demographic 
questions first 
Demographic 
questions were not 
first 
4 (3,598) 1.08 0.94-
1.25 
62 Coloured letterhead Black and white 
letterhead 
1 (2,356) 1.08 0.91-
1.28 
63 Detailed cover letter Brief cover letter 1 (500) 1.08 0.74-
1.58 
64 Ethnicity of the name 
of the person was 
identifiable 
Ethnicity of the name 
of the person was not 
identifiable 
5 (5,959) 1.07 0.9-1.27 
65 Picture of researcher 
in the questionnaire 
No picture of 
researcher in the 
questionnaire 
4 (3,710) 1.07 0.76-
1.53 
66 Male investigator Female investigator 2 (3,146) 1.07 0.72-
1.58 
67 Listing response 
options in increasing 
order 
Not listing response 
options in increasing 
order 
1 (6,783) 1.06 0.94-
1.18 
68 Included an appeal or 
a pleading factor in 
the cover letter 
Did not include an 
appeal or pleading 
factor in the cover 
letter 
2 (1,251) 1.06 0.79-
1.42 
69 Signed by a more 
senior or well-known 
person 
Not signed by a more 
senior or well-known 
person 
10 (5,644) 1.05 0.89-
1.23 
70 Printed on colour 
paper 
Printed on white paper 14 (41,421) 1.04 0.99-
1.10 
71 Included 'don’t know' 
boxes 
Did not include 'don't 
know' boxes 
1 (1,360) 1.03 0.82-
1.29 
72 Told respondents that 
they would be 
contacted again if 
they did not respond 
Did not tell 
respondents that they 
would be contacted 
again if they did not 
respond 
7 (7,053) 1.02 0.91-
1.15 
73 Pre-contact by a 
medical researcher 
Pre-contact by a non-
medical researcher 
2 (924) 1.01 0.55-
1.86 
74 Deadline to respond No deadline to 
respond 
6 (5,661) 1.00 0.84-
1.19 
75 Identifying number Other identifier 1 (741) 1.00 0.68-
1.46 
76 Included a request for 
a telephone number 
Did not include a 
request for a 
telephone number 
1 (702) 1.00 0.65-
1.54 
77 Received on Monday Received on Friday 1 (460) 1.00 0.64-
1.56 
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No. Group 1 Group 2 
Number of 
trials (number 
of 
participants) 
Odds 
ratio 95% CI 
78 Cartoon in the 
questionnaire 
No cartoon in the 
questionnaire 
1 (280) 1.00 0.62-
1.62 
79 Stressed how 
responses would 
benefit the sponsor 
Did not stress how 
responses would 
benefit the sponsor 
8 (10,908) 0.99 0.86-
1.13 
80 Stressed how 
responses would 
benefit the 
participant 
Did not stress how 
responses would 
benefit the participant 
9 (13,175) 0.98 0.82-
1.16 
81 Follow-up interval less 
than 31 days 
Follow-up interval 31-
60 days 
2 (1,608) 0.97 0.75-
1.26 
82 Circle answer Tick box format 2 (1,125) 0.96 0.74-
1.26 
83 Questionnaire 
responses were 
anonymous 
Questionnaire 
responses were 
identifiable 
2 (2070) 0.96 0.66-
1.39 
84 Window envelope on 
questionnaire 
response 
Non window envelope 
on questionnaire 
response 
2 (11,781) 0.96 0.61-
1.49 
85 Stamps on out-going 
envelopes 
Franked out-going 
envelopes 
6 (13,964) 0.95 0.88-
1.03 
86 Most general 
questions at the start 
of the questionnaire 
General questions 
were not placed at the 
start of the 
questionnaire 
3 (11,435) 0.95 0.83-
1.09 
87 Included a 'sensitive' 
question 
Did not include a 
'sensitive' question 
10 (21,393) 0.94 0.88-
1.00 
88 Optional internet 
response 
No optional internet 
response 
1 (4,213) 0.93 0.82-
1.05 
89 Larger out-going 
envelope 
Standard out-going 
envelope 
1 (1,200) 0.93 0.74-
1.17 
90 Closed questions first Other types of 
questions first 
1 (300) 0.93 0.54-
1.59 
91 Commemorative 
stamps on return 
envelopes 
Standard stamps on 
return envelopes 
5 (5,461) 0.92 0.81-
1.06 
92 Study logo on several 
items 
Study logo on 
questionnaire only 
1 (1,000) 0.92 0.72-
1.18 
93 Offered participants 
the choice to opt-out 
Did not offer 
participants a choice to 
opt-out 
4 (3,555) 0.92 0.66-
1.28 
94 First class stamp on 
return envelopes 
Second class stamp on 
return envelopes 
1 (800) 0.91 0.69-
1.21 
95 Multi-option consent 
form  
Standard consent form 1 (200) 0.91 0.49-
1.68 
96 Offered survey results 
as incentive 
No offering of survey 
results 
12 (15,256) 0.90 0.76-
1.07 
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No. Group 1 Group 2 
Number of 
trials (number 
of 
participants) 
Odds 
ratio 95% CI 
97 Provided instructions 
for completion of the 
questionnaire 
Did not provide 
instructions for 
completion of the 
questionnaire 
1 (2,000) 0.89 0.74-
1.06 
98 Individual-item 
question format 
Stem-and-leaf question 
format 
1 (1,500) 0.88 0.70-
1.10 
99 University printed 
envelope 
University  not printed 
on the envelope 
1 (500) 0.88 0.61-
1.28 
100 Large paper Standard paper 2 (2,145) 0.88 0.56-
1.39 
101 Questionnaire sent 
with a supplement 
Questionnaire sent 
alone 
1 (1,795) 0.86 0.70-
1.07 
102 Telephone follow-up Postal follow-up 5 (2,254) 0.86 0.54-
1.36 
103 Stamped addressed 
return envelopes 
Addressed return 
envelopes (no stamp) 
1 (147) 0.86 0.45-
1.65 
104 Mailed on Monday Mailed on Friday 1 (504) 0.83 0.58-
1.17 
105 High quality or thicker 
paper 
Standard paper 2 (1,039) 0.80 0.6-1.06 
106 Check categories or 
specify numbers 
Check categories only 1 (740) 0.80 0.60-
1.06 
107 5-step response scale 10-step response scale 1 (654) 0.78 0.52-
1.19 
108 Included responses 
for relatives 
Did not include 
responses for relatives 
2 (4,943) 0.67 0.60-
0.76 
109 Matrix form in 
questionnaire 
Standard form in 
questionnaire 
2 (316) 0.58 0.29-
1.16 
110 Open-ended question Closed questions 3 (1,764) 0.31 0.09-
1.04 
GP, general practitioner; ID, Latin idem for identity; SMS, short message 
service 
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Appendix 4 – Comparison of postal versus on-line survey methods. *Costs were 
based on administering the questionnaire to 165 hospitals representing 165 
NHS acute hospital trusts in England (at 2011 price values) 
 
 Postal survey Internet-based survey 
Cost Approx. £197* 
INCLUDES: 
 Paper 
 Printing 
 Postage and envelopes 
 Return stamped envelopes 
EXCLUDES: 
Cost of follow-up questionnaires  
Approx. £220* 
INCLUDES: 
 12-month subscription for 
SurveyMonkey 
 Telephone calls to obtain chief 
pharmacist email addresses 
 
Time Required for: 
 Addressing and sending 
 Postal transit  
 Transcribing responses 
Required for: 
 Telephone calls 
 Downloading responses 
 
Addressing the 
respondent 
 Send to “Chief Pharmacist” (list 
of 165 trusts and addresses 
available from NHS Choices) 
 Requires an email address for 
link to questionnaire to be sent 
electronically 
 Or post an invitation to 
participate in the study that 
includes the web-link to the 
internet survey 
Ease of access to 
questionnaire 
Advantages: 
 Paper copies supplied  
 Disadvantages: 
• Paper copies may get lost  
Advantages: 
 Hyperlink included in email  
 Disadvantages: 
• Web-site of internet-based 
survey may be prohibited at some 
hospitals 
Ease of completion Advantages: 
 Easy to read on paper 
 No access to computer required 
 No access to internet required 
 Can be completed wherever 
Disadvantages: 
 Questionnaire may seem long  
 
Advantages: 
 Link to questionnaire available 
 Enables question filtering 
 Optional mandatory fields 
 Can go back and change answers  
Disadvantages: 
 Requires computer access 
 Requires access to internet 
Information security Risk of: 
 Questionnaire being lost in the 
post or misplaced by 
respondents 
Security ensured as: 
 Information held on secure web-
based software 
 
Ease of questionnaire 
design 
 Can design questions to any 
format 
 15 question templates available 
 On-line guidance available 
Ease of data 
management 
 Requires transcription of 
returned questionnaires into a 
database 
 ‘Live’ access to response data 
 Responses are downloadable 
and avoids transcription 
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Appendix 6 – Pre-notification letter for national survey 
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Appendix 7 – Cover letter mailed with the national survey 
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Appendix 8 – National survey follow-up letter to non-respondents  
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Appendix 9 – Response rate within each of the then 10 strategic health 
authorities (SHA) in England. n value represents the total number of acute and 
foundation National Health Service trusts in each SHA. 
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Appendix 10 – Response rate for each question part in the national survey 
 
Question
Number of responses (of 
total 100) Question
Number of responses (of 
total 100)
1 100 12(i) 100
2 98* 12(i i) 100
3 100 13(i)a 92
4 100 13(i)b 88
5 89* 13(i)c 93
6a 96 13(i)d 91
6b 96 13(i)e 91
6c 96 13(i)f 95
6d 96 13(i)g 95
6e 96 13(i)h 91
6f (optional) 3 13(i)i 99
7a 100 13(i)j 89
7b 99 13(i)k 89
7c 98 13(i)l  (optional) 0
8a 100 13(i i) 98
8b 100 14 99
8c 100 15a 100
9(i)a 95 15b 98
9(i)b 96 15c 80
9(i)c 97 15d 71
9(i)d 92 15e 72
9(i)e (optional) 3 15f (optional) 3
9(ii) 90 16a 97
10(i)a 95 16b 97
10(i)b 95 16c 97
10(i)c 91 16d 97
10(i)d 92 16e 97
10(i)e 91 16f 64
10(i)f (optional) 14 17a 99
10(ii) 94 17b 87
11(i)a 100 17c 97
11(i)b 100 17d 99
11(i)c 100 17e 98
11(i)d 100 17f 99
11(i)e 100 18(a) 89
11(i)f (optional) 10 18(b) 95
11(ii) 97 19 (optional) 32
*missing responses were amended using data retrieved from relevant trust websites 
Total number of respondents 100 (100%)
Total number of question parts 74
Number of question parts (excluding optional questions) 65
Median response rate per  part (excluding optional questions) 97 (97%)
Min (excluding optional questions) 64 (64%)
Max (excluding optional questions) 100 (100%)
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Appendix 11 – Drug trolley use in English NHS hospitals according to the then 
10 Strategic Health Authorities  
 
 Number of hospitals within the 
SHA that answered the question 
about use of drug trolleys 
Number of hospitals that 
used drug trolleys on the 
majority of wards (%) 
South Central 3 3 (100%) 
South East Coast 7 6 (86%) 
West Midlands 9 7 (78%) 
London 16 11 (69%) 
East of England 13 8 (62%) 
South West 10 6 (60%) 
Yorkshire and The 
Humber 
12 7 (58%) 
North East 5 2 (40%) 
East Midlands 7 2 (29%) 
North West 11 3 (27%) 
Total 93 55 (59%) 
 
Appendix 12 – Non one-stop dispensing (non-OSD) supplies used in English NHS 
hospitals according to the then 10 Strategic Health Authorities. 
 
 Number of hospitals within the 
SHA that answered the question 
about use of non-OSD supplies 
Number of hospitals that 
used non-OSD supplies on 
the majority of wards (%) 
South Central 2 2 (100%) 
East Midlands 7 6 (86%) 
London 16 11 (69%) 
North East 5 3 (60%) 
South West 11 6 (55%) 
South East Coast 7 3 (43%) 
North West 10 4 (40%) 
East of England 13 5 (38%) 
Yorkshire and The 
Humber 
12 4 (33%) 
West Midlands 9 2 (22%) 
Total 92 46 (22%) 
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Appendix 13 – Data collection form for the medication storage study 
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Appendix 13 continued 
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Appendix 14 – Participant information leaflet for the medication 
administration processes and systems (MAPS) study   
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Appendix 15 – Participant consent form for the medication administration 
processes and systems (MAPS) study 
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Appendix 16 – Data collection form for part 1 observations (qualitative data) of 
the medication administration processes and systems (MAPS) study 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
 
 
286 of 321 
Appendix 17 – Data collection form for part 2 observations (quantitative data) 
of the medication administration processes and systems (MAPS) study 
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Appendix 18 – Sources externally-initiated interruptions and/or distractions 
described by Pape (2003) and definitions used in the medication administration 
processes and systems (MAPS) study.  The sources have been additionally 
grouped into two main categories: ‘individual’ and ‘technical’ as described by 
Biron (2009). 
 
Source Definitions from Pape (2003) Definitions used in MAPS study  
Individual 
Physician  
 
Physician or other medical provider 
distracts or interrupts the nurse 
administering medications 
Physician interrupts or observably 
distracts the nurse preparing, 
administering, or documenting 
medications 
Other 
personnel 
Other personnel distract or 
interrupt the nurse administering 
medications 
Not used. 
Other patient A different patient interrupts the 
nurse or the nurse must stop 
administering routine medications 
to attend to a different patient 
A different patient interrupts or 
observably distracts the nurse during 
preparation and/or administration task 
Visitor A visitor or person other than an 
employee distracts the nurse 
administering medications 
A visitor or person other than an 
employee interrupts or observably 
distracts the nurse preparing and/or 
administering medications 
Other nurse Not used Another nurse interrupts or observably 
distracts the nurse preparing and/or 
administering medications 
Health care 
assistant 
Not used  A health care professional other than a 
doctor, nurse or health care assistant 
interrupts or observably distracts the 
nurse preparing and/or administering 
medications 
Other health 
care 
professional 
Not used  A health care professional other than a 
doctor, nurse or health care assistant 
interrupts or observably distracts the 
nurse preparing and/or administering 
medications 
Patient Not used  The patient interrupts or observably 
distracts the nurse during preparation 
and/or administration task 
Technical 
Phone call The nurse administering 
medications is interrupted by a 
phone call or places a phone call 
The nurse preparing and/or 
administering medications is 
interrupted or observably distracted by 
a phone call  
Missing 
medication 
The nurse administering 
medications encounters one or 
more missing medications from the 
patient’s drawer or the medication 
dispensing machine, which causes 
the nurse to take some action to 
retrieve the missing medication 
The nurse encounters one or more 
missing medications from the patient’s 
bedside medication locker, bedside 
area, drug trolley, or alternative drug 
trolley container used on the drug 
round, which causes the nurse to take 
some action to retrieve the missing 
medication from a location in a 
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Source Definitions from Pape (2003) Definitions used in MAPS study  
separate room to the patient (these 
are classified as an interruption and 
not as a distraction) 
Wrong dose 
medication 
The nurse administering 
medications encounters one or 
more wrong dose medications in 
the patient’s drawer or the 
medication dispensing machine, 
which causes the nurse to take 
some action to retrieve the missing 
medication 
Not used, these were included as 
‘missing medication’ 
Emergency 
situation 
Any emergency situation such as a 
code or a patient’s change in health 
that necessitates the nurse’s 
immediate action 
Any emergency situation such as a code 
or a patient’s change in health that the 
nurse has assessed as requiring 
immediate action (these are classified 
as an interruption and not as a 
distraction) 
External 
conversation 
Loud conversation going on in the 
area, or any conversation not 
related to medication 
administration that the nurse 
engages in 
Loud conversation going on in the area 
that appear to distract the nurse or the 
nurse stops the preparation and/or 
administration task to engage in the 
conversation 
External noise Loud noises audible to the nurse 
administering medications that 
appear to distract the nurse 
Loud noises that appear to distract the 
nurse or appear to cause the nurse to 
stop the  preparation and/or 
administration task 
Materials for 
administration 
or clarification 
Not used The nurse identifies the need to obtain 
one or more materials for 
administration which causes he/she to 
take some action.  It includes asking a 
colleague and/or contacting the 
prescriber for clarification of a 
medication order.  (These are all 
classified as interruptions and not as 
distractions) 
Other Not used  Other sources of interruptions that 
could not be categorised into one of the 
ones listed above 
 
Appendix 19 – Sources of self-initiated interruptions and/or distractions 
developed for use in the medication administration processes and systems 
(MAPS) study. 
 
Sources  Definitions developed for use in MAPS study  
Nurse Nurse ceases the preparation and/or administration task without 
an observable external stimulus (these are classified as an 
interruption and not a distraction).   
Observer Nurse initiates interaction with the observer 
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Appendix 20 – Subcategories of medication administration errors (MAEs) used 
in the medication storage and retrieval study 
MAE 
subcategory 
Description by Allan and Barker 
(1990)  
Definition used in the medication storage 
study (based on Franklin et al 2007 and 
findings from chapter three) 
MAE at the preparation stage 
Unordered/ 
unauthorise
d drug 
An unordered drug error occurs 
when a patient receives a 
medication for which the 
physician did not write an order.  
This includes those that result 
when a nurse switches 
medications for two patients; 
each patient is the victim of an 
unordered drug error (as well as 
an omission) 
Changed to “administration without a 
medication order” based on findings from 
the systematic literature review in chapter 
three.  MAEs should be classified as 
“administration without a medication order” 
if a drug is administered but  was not 
prescribed at all for the patient concerned 
(classified as a wrong drug error if drug X 
prescribed but drug Y given instead). 
Omission An omission error takes place 
when a patient has not received 
his or her medication by the time 
the next dose is due. 
Included.  A dose of medication that has not 
been administered by the time of the next 
scheduled dose (does not include doses 
omitted according to doctor’s instructions, 
nurse’s clinical judgement, or if the patient 
was not on ward).   
Wrong dose A wrong dose error typically 
occurs when the patient receives 
an amount of medicine that is 
greater than or less than the 
amount ordered. 
Included. The administration of the correct 
drug by the correct route but in a quantity 
that was not that prescribed  
Wrong drug Administration of the wrong drug 
was considered to an unordered 
drug error. 
Included. A wrong drug error occurs when an 
incorrect drug is selected against an existing 
medication order (does not include generic 
substitution or therapeutic substitutions in 
accordance with trust policy). 
Wrong 
dosage form  
Wrong dosage form errors 
involve the administration of a 
drug in a dosage form different 
from the one that was ordered 
Included.  Administration of the correct dose 
of the drug by the correct route but in a 
formulation that was not prescribed (includes 
administration of modified release when non-
modified prescribed, and vice versa).  Does 
not include administration of enteric coated 
drug instead of plain tablets if the patient 
states enteric coated is normally taken, or any 
appropriate purposeful alteration, such as 
substituting tablets with a soluble equivalent 
to help administration. 
Wrong time  A wrong time error occurs when 
the patient does not receive his 
or her medication within a 
predefined interval. 
Excluded.  Timing of drug administration in 
relation to the prescribed time was measured 
and reported but not included as an MAE. 
Wrong dose 
preparation  
Wrong dose preparation error 
occurs when a product is 
incorrectly manipulated before 
administration.  Examples include 
not shaking an oral suspension. 
Excluded.  If wrong dose preparation such as 
failure to shake a bottle of suspension 
resulted in a visible concentration gradient 
this is was considered a wrong dose error. 
Extra dose An extra dose error occurs when 
the patient receives additional 
dosage units to those that were 
Included.  The administration of an additional 
dose of a prescribed medication (includes 
administration of a drug more times in the 
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authorised, such as a dose 
administered after the order was 
cancelled. 
day than prescribed and administration of a 
dose of drug after it has been crossed off the 
chart). 
Drug 
deteriorated 
A deteriorated drug error is 
reported when the physical or 
chemical integrity of a 
medication dosage form has been 
compromised, as with expired 
drugs or IV medications requiring 
refrigeration that are left out of 
the fridge. 
Included.  Administration of a drug that has 
exceeded its expiry date or a drug with its 
physical or chemical integrity compromised. 
Other error 
at the 
preparation 
stage 
When the investigator believes 
that a medication error has 
occurred but does not fall into a 
predefined subcategory 
Included. 
MAE at the administration stage 
Wrong 
patient 
Not applicable New MAE subcategory based on findings 
from the systematic literature review in 
chapter three.  A wrong patient error occurs 
when the correct drug has been prepared for 
the correct medication order but 
administered to the wrong patient. 
Wrong 
route 
Wrong route errors occur when 
the correct form of drug is 
administered, but in the correct 
site on the patient’s body. 
Included.  The administration of the correct 
drug by a route or site that was not that 
prescribed. 
Wrong rate 
of 
administrati
on  
Wrong rate of administration 
errors can occur with infusions of 
intravenous fluids or liquid 
enteral products.   
Included.   
Wrong 
administrati
on 
technique 
Wrong administration technique 
errors involve using an 
inappropriate procedure during 
administration of a drug.  
Examples include wrong inhaler 
technique and not wiping an 
injection site with alcohol. 
Excluded.  Wrong administration technique 
errors such as wrong inhaler technique were 
considered a wrong dose, and not wiping an 
injection site with alcohol was considered a 
violation of procedure rather than an error. 
Other error 
at the 
administrati
on stage 
When the investigator believes 
that a medication error has 
occurred but does not fall into a 
predefined subcategory 
Included. 
IV, intravenous; MAE, medication administration error 
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Appendix 21 – An example of field notes recorded at site A for the medication 
administration processes and systems (MAPS) study 
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Appendix 22 – A sample of photographs taken at site A for the medication 
administration processes and systems (MAPS) study 
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Appendix 23 – An example of data collected at site B for the medication 
administration processes and systems (MAPS) study 
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Appendix 23 continued 
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Appendix 23 continued 
 
Appendix 24 – A sample of photographs taken at site B for the medication 
administration processes and systems (MAPS) study 
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Appendix 25 – An example of data collected at site C for the medication 
administration processes and systems (MAPS) study 
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Appendix 25 continued 
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Appendix 26 – A sample of photographs taken at site C for the medication 
administration processes and systems (MAPS) study 
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Appendix 27 – An example of an expanded thematic framework created during 
data analysis for the medication administration processes and systems (MAPS) 
study 
 
Appendices 
 
 
 
300 of 321 
Appendix 28 – Examples of items coded under each of the six main themes and 
26 associated subthemes were identified from the framework analysis in the 
medication administration processes and systems (MAPS) study. 
 
Main themes Subthemes Examples of coded items 
1. Structure of 
the ward-
based 
medication 
system and 
resources 
available 
1.1 Prescribing 
system 
 Nurse noticed that the drug chart had still not been recharted.  She said she 
had asked the doctors three times already. Today's doses had been 
documented outside the administration boxes (DR005, 6pm, lines 440-441, 
site A)(also coded as 1.2, 2.1, 2.1, 3.4, 4.7) 
 There are a number of ‘screens’ for viewing medications, the nurses use a 
different one to pharmacy staff and doctors (DR019, 12pm, line 25-26, site 
B) (also coded as 1.2) 
 EPMA system centrally located at nurse station and (DR039, 12pm, line 2, 
site C) 
1.2 System for 
documenting 
medication 
administration 
 Chart was not at bedside, N05 went to the desk and found drug chart 
(DR005, 6pm, lines 393-394, site A) 
 When I arrived on the ward, there was one nurse and one HCA at the nurse 
station. Nurse was checking medicines for a patient on the EPMA at the 
time (DR021, 6am, lines 225-226, site B) (also coded as 4.7) 
 CD cupboard located behind NSt, both nurses were there, nurse said “2.5 
isn’t it?” to the other nurse, the other nurse had gone to the COW and 
confirmed it was 2.5[ml] (DR019, 12pm, lines 87-88, site B) (also coded 4.3) 
 There was a large metal drug trolley with a laptop bolted on for drug 
rounds.  There are also two COWs, one at each end of the ward (DR039, 
12pm, lines 2-4, site C) 
1.3 Ward-based 
medication 
storage 
 One DT in TR unlocked (lock was unreliable, one nurse thought it was 
broken, another thought it was fixed) (DR001, 12pm, lines 21-25, site A) 
(also coded as 4.1) 
 Nurse disposed of the paracetamol outside C bay then went to D1’s 
bedside cabinet, unlocked top drawer, took the whole drawer containing 
PODs to the DT (DR022, 10pm, line 391, site B) (also coded 4.7) 
 Two doses were due, N32 signed for meds, then went to BL, dispensed 
meds for patient, N30 re-joined. [Noticed N32 pulled the DT instead of 
pushing – not sure if nurses generally pushed DT but the pulling suggested 
the DT was quite heavy] (DR043,10pm, lines 523-524, site C) (also coded as 
4.3, 4.6) 
 There were some POD/OSD in DT, and NRT for this patient in DT and nurses 
(DR042, 6pm, line 439, site C) 
1.4 Patients’ own 
drugs 
 Next, N09 prepared meds for E, could not find omeprazole 10mg in either 
DTs, went to pt to ask if PODs had been taken home by his wife.  Pt later 
said "I thought she left the big box here".  No meds found at bedside 
(DR011, 8am, lines 963-964, site A) (also coded as 2.1) 
 N11 prepared meds at DT first, then went to BL and prepared meds using 
PODs, skipped tramadol and continued using PODs then went back to DT to 
prepare tramadol (DR013, 8am, lines 1057-1058, site A) (also coded as 4.6) 
 She asked the patient if she wanted to take them now.  Patient asked if she 
can take her own as she can’t swallow tablets, her own are capsules (DR 
lines 622-623, site B) (also coded 3.1 and  4.4)  
1.5 Medication 
ordering system 
 Nurse went back to the treatment room, looked at chart G6, tried looking 
again for trimethoprim in the tablet cupboard, couldn't find any, then saw 
the Sister and asked if they have a stocklist.  Found laminated stocklist in 
pharmacy book, trimethoprim was not ward stock, nurse wrote in the book 
to order the drug then put chart back (DR005, 6pm, lines 456-458, site A) 
 Nurse commented on no enoxaparin 20mg, wondered if it had been 
ordered or if they do not keep it on the ward anymore, commented on 
ordering as “don’t want it missing for tomorrow” (DR024, 6pm, lines 682-
683, site B) (also coded as 2.1) (also codes as 4.7) 
 N18 locked up drug trolley, and went back to the nurse station to answer 
the phone (it was pharmacy) and ordered hydrocortisone (DR027, 6pm, line 
1057, site B) 
 N28 was multi-tasking, talking to Dr while calling out meds and 
documenting administration, wrote a note on the jobs list, ordered meds in 
pharmacy order book (DR040, 6pm, lines 201-202, site C) 
1.6 Policies and  Re tabards, nurse said "no point wearing them" (DR004, 12pm, line 374, 
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guidance site A) 
 Ward pharmacy technician told me that the bigger drawer was intended for 
storing medicines even though he knows some nurses use the smaller 
drawer for storing meds instead (DR014, 12pm, line 1165, site A)  
 Nurse told me that if she could change three things, she would have the 
drug trolleys be fully stocked, bedside locker be fully stocked and have 
Oramorph® in drug trolley (currently hospital policy at the time was to 
store it in the CD cupboard (DR022, 10pm, line 456, site B) 
 Room 3, “is it two and a half baclofen?”, “you tell me” N28.  The dose 
prescribed was 25mg = 2.5 x 10mg baclofen tablet.  This patient was on 
level 2 SAM.  Earlier the nurse told me that this patient still required 
supervision, he was on level 1 but now level 2 as he gets distracted.   The 
patient overheard and said he does not (re get distracted) (DR040, 6pm, 
lines 206-208, site C) 
 “Pretend we’re using the tabard” (DR043, 10pm, line 513, site C) 
2. Medication 
system use in 
practice 
2.1 Actual and 
potential 
system-related 
problems 
identified by 
nursing staff  
 Nurse came across a dose which she knew was not available on the ward 
(DR002, 6pm, line 147, site A) (also coded as 4.4) 
 N13 said out loud that the Sister's signature took up too much space 
(overlapped with next administration box) (DR016, line 1323, site A).   
 Nurse walked towards C bay, then back to the painkiller cupboard, 
prepared ondansetron, showed me empty blister that she found in the box 
(as an example of people not tidying up) and gave keys to the other nurse 
after she had finished (DR022, 10pm, lines 415-416) (site B) (also coded as 
4.6) 
 N28 noticed the laptop had not been charging and mentioned out loud that 
she hope there will be sufficient battery (DR039, 12pm, lines 40-41, site C). 
 Highlighted problem with package changes and understood that it was to 
do with money but said it can be a problem for them when looking for 
meds (DR048, 10pm, lines 1129-1130, site C) 
2.2 Problem-led 
temporary 
deviations from 
intended use 
(workarounds) 
 Drug chart was full, nurse signed for doses outside administration boxes 
(DR001, 12pm, line 83, site A) (also coded as 4.7) 
 Another nurse told the nurse in charge that one of her pts doesn't have a 
drug chart "shall I let the pt take their own drugs?" Nurse in charge said yes 
(DR015, 10pm, lines 1273-1274, site A) 
 N21 showed me an unadministered MST® order that was due at 00:20.  She 
explained that she gave the dose at 11 and because the MST was 
prescribed every 12 hourly, the next dose was not due yet and the other 
staff will have to change the timing to give it (DR025, 8am, lines 792-793, 
site B) 
 20:50 N22 started looking on EPMA and printing screen shots (note, not the 
same as the print out given by previous nurse observed).  Nurse told me 
she preferred this way “saves going backwards and forwards” and noted 
several IVs as many patients were post-op (DR026, 10pm, lines 882-884, 
site B) (also coded as 4.7) 
 Nurse told me that they were supposed to wear ‘do not disturb’ tabards 
but said she was too hot to wear it.  They are also made of plastic, don’t get 
washed and therefore gets quite dirty (DR039, 12pm, lines 51-52, site C) 
 EPMA alerted N32 that it was too early (dose due 18:00) and would not let 
the nurse sign for dose, N32 continued to call out meds and prepare doses, 
she told me she’ll wait (for the system to let her document) but then 
decided to move on to the next patient (DR051, 6pm, lines 1336-1339, site 
C) 
 Laptop had not been plugged in, nurses tried to use laptop but battery was 
low (it was beeping), so nurses decided to put a selection of meds in a 
basket and cups, Nutrison®, syringes etc. in another basket and put these 
on silver temporary trolley. (There was little hesitation, nurses knew what 
to do, ?done this before) (DR048, 10pm, lines 1049-1050, site C) 
 Room 6 08:56.  Nurse went to the NSt to check obs in patient’s folder (NSt 
was just opposite the patient’s room). N28 said to N31 “shall we do it from 
the POD?” [Nurses referred to the BL as POD] “Not got a table”.  N28 called 
out meds, N31 asked if can bring meds out, N28 repeated that there’s no 
table and so N31 prepared the doses from the BL (DR042, 8am, lines 428-
433, site C) 
2.3 Non problem-
led deviations 
from intended 
use  
 I saw two needles and one syringe attached to a vial of Tazocin® in a blue 
tray and two unlabelled capped syringes in another tray in the TR 
unattended, nearby drug chart indicated Tazocin® and co-amoxiclav were 
due (DR002, 6pm, lines 163-165, site A) 
 N05 retrieved ketamine solution from the CD cupboard, poured some of 
the solution into the cap of at bottle and drew up the required dose into 
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two syringes (not coloured) (DR005, 6pm, lines 440-441, site A) 
 She told me H does meds himself, he has a dosset box and proceeded to 
sign meds on the desktop PC (DR026, 10pm, lines 960-961, site B) 
 “You’ll notice I’m also not checking wristbands because all the patients 
have been here for 100 years” N28 told me (DR040, 6pm, line 40, site C) 
 09:21. N28 realised the patient was in the bathroom and said “will have to 
do it because we’re very late”.  N28 then ordered something in the 
pharmacy book.  N31 retrieved meds from the BL and placed it in DT.  One 
dose of Fybogel® was signed as omitted, nurse did not need to look for it, 
knew they did not have it.  N31 took meds to patient in the bathroom, N28 
said to leave it by the sink if she had to.  Four doses were due and signed 
(DR042, 8am, lines 455-457, site C) (also coded as 4.7) 
 Patient was behind curtain and therefore I did not observe.  Nurse went 
behind curtain and then back to DT/TR to sign for meds, knew the other 
nurse will give Diprobase®, signed for med even though didn’t give, signed 
also for chlorhexidine gel as said patient will get that when they brush his 
teeth (I saw chlorhexidine mouthwash at bedside not gel) (DR046, 6am, line 
860-862, site C) 
3. Medication 
safety 
3.1 Patient as a 
medication 
problem alert 
system (for 
both actual and 
potential 
problems) 
 Pt asked the nurse about a flush, nurse put down the injection and gave 
approximately 5ml saline flush before administering Tazocin® bolus over 
approximately 1 min (DR003, 10pm, lines 283-285, site A) (also coded as 
3.5) 
 Pt said there were eye drops in the fridge (DR006, 8am, lines 568-569, site 
A) 
 Metformin dose prescribed was 500mg - 1g on chart and prescriber had 
written 1g OM in additional section of chart for metformin.  Nurse had 
prepared 500mg and given to patient but later corrected it when prompted 
by the patient and gave 1g in total (DR011, 8am, lines 966-968, site A) (also 
coded as 3.5) 
 Nurse went to the bedside with C1 and explained what the tablets were.  
C1 told the nurse that she takes her own paracetamol, showed nurse and 
nurse removed the paracetamol tablets from the plastic cup (DR022, 10pm, 
lines 389-390, site B) 
 Patient highlighted discrepancy in pregabalin dose, told the nurse it should 
be 250 twice a day, nurse had 100mg BD, nurse documented this and 
talked to patient about changes in meds (DR047, 8am, lines 1067-1068, site 
C) 
3.2 Nurse as a 
defence for 
actual and 
potential 
medication 
problems 
 Day staff noted that F did not get heparin that was prescribed for 8am 
(chart not signed), asked the night nurse who was still there 07:54.  N09 did 
not see heparin was prescribed BD [neither had I].  Day nurse administered 
heparin (DR011, 8am, lines 994-995, site A) (also coded as 3.5) 
 N04 went to H2, prepared paracetamol then realised she had H3's drug 
chart when she saw metoclopramide and she knew this pt did not have 
metoclopramide, so went to H3 to finish preparing and administering meds 
(DR017, 6pm, lines 1376-1377, site A) (also coded as 4.4) 
 H 15:04 metformin, N18 changed timing to 14:00 on EPMA as she told me 
that she had asked the doctor to prescribe this in the first place, the patient 
had self-administered the dose earlier in the day (DR027, 6pm, lines 1083-
1084, site B) 
 18:00 paracetamol, “on hold”, “given 1g in theatre 15:30” record shows 
theatre staff documented this at 15:45 (DR027, 6pm, line 1090, site B)  
 N28 remembered the patient was on vancomycin, could not see it on 
EMAR, I intervened, N28 saw it but there were two medication orders for 
vancomycin, both for vancomycin 125mg capsule QDS but one had a red 
box indicating dose has not been given and it was past the scheduled time 
(06:00) and on the other one, someone had written “liquid” under the 
medication order [?pharmacist].  I could see there was liquid in the DT.  
Dose was prepared (DR042, 8am, 430-433, site C)(also coded as 2.1, 3.5, 
4.3) 
 N34 went through meds, saw vancomycin liquid prescribed for 6am not 
given, N34 was not sure about this, discussed it with N33 and decided to 
ring the night nurse to confirm whether or not a dose had been given.  
[night nurse confirmed the dose had been given] (DR047, 8am, lines 956-
957, site C) (also coded as 3.4 and 4.3) 
3.3 Actual and 
potential 
inappropriate 
prescribing and 
prescribing 
 Nurse thought tinzaparin 24,000 units was unusually high, knew there was 
a dosing chart on the SCR so went there to check, but it did not go beyond 
23,000 units, so nurse asked the Dr and left drug chart with him as Dr was 
also uncertain and needed to clarify (DR002, 6pm, lines 145-146, site A) 
(also coded as 4.6) 
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errors  Route of administration unclear on medication order, nurse asked pt which 
eye the eye drops was for, pt said both eyes and that he usually apply it in 
the morning and not at night nurse said she will get it changed and did not 
administer the dose [unclear if nurse knew that Xalatan® is usually 
administered in the evening and not in the  morning] (DR003, 10pm, lines 
182-185, site A) 
 Procal shot prescribed as "T", nurse told student it should be 30ml (DR004, 
12pm, line 332, site A) 
 Nurse asked B2 about his pain, he reported that it was very sore.  Nurse 
told the patient what she was giving (included naproxen and omeprazole), 
patient explained he takes both at night: “only take it at night” “not 
morning?” “only take it at night” “ah they prescribed it for this morning…..I 
don’t know why [they] prescribed it for morning” explained to patient that 
she did not give these last night and so patient took the meds this morning 
(DR021, 8am, lines 288-291, site B) (also coded as 3.1) 
 Pre-drug round - 20:30 Nurse spotted that C5 and C6 did not have 
enoxaparin prescribed.  She queried this with the nurse in charge of the 
previous shift (who was still on the ward at the time) and asked if the 
doctor was here and whether or not they need the surgical doctor to 
prescribe (DR026, 10pm, lines 879-880, site B) 
 Both nurses checked the observation chart, N28 then looked at the system 
for vancomycin and found that it was not prescribed yet, placed order in 
pharmacy book, asked Dr for dose, Drs were not ready to prescribe, they 
were still assessing the patient to see if vancomycin was needed (DR040, 
6pm, lines 207-208, site C) 
 Nurse checked EMAR, knew/expected vancomycin, looked for it on the 
screen, saw that it was not scheduled for 22:00 (was scheduled for 06:00, 
12:00, 18:00, 00:00) (DR043, 10pm, lines 537-538, site C). (also coded as 
4.4) 
 N28 identified a potential prescribing error, the patient was prescribed 
clindamycin and erythromycin, paused, then N29 re-joined the DR, N28 
called out meds while N29 looked in BL inside the room (not observed 
while in room, but I could hear the conversations).  N28 saw a Dr nearby 
and asked Dr to stop the clindamycin [self-initiated interruption] (DR040, 
6pm, lines 194-197, site C) 
3.4 Actual and 
potential 
strategies to 
increase 
medication 
safety 
 19:38 I found out from Sister that they have been tightening down on 
omissions by introducing a drug chart check on handover.  The nurse has to 
go through the drug chart with each other to account for all the doses due 
during the shift (DR008, 6pm, line 807, site A) 
 'N11 told A3 that she will come back to give gliclazide after breakfast 
arrives (DR013, 8am, line 1059, site A) 
 After the drug round, N18 went through each patient systematically to 
check all the doses had been signed for, signed some doses that had not 
been signed for earlier (DR022, 10pm, lines 436-438, site B) 
 Nurse went through her thought processes with me and her routine of 
double checking patient’s medicines on the desktop PC after the drug 
round to check whether or not her patients had had fluids prescribed.  She 
wanted to make sure she was prepared for patients that had just had an 
operation in case their observations showed a drop (? Fluid ? BP), implying 
that she expected to see IV fluids prescribed and if not, then she would 
follow this up by handing over to the other nurses [I think this nurse may be 
a bit reluctant to contact the prescriber directly, possibly because she is 
‘bank’, maybe because she knows she is not familiar with the teams and/or 
because she prefers to let the regular nurses know what is going on] 
(DR024, 6pm, lines 688-693, site B) (also coded as 4.4) 
 N34 told N33 that a patient’s baclofen was missed at 6am, said they will 
need to tell nurses that there are a few 6am doses to administer (DR047, 
8am, lines 998-999, site C) 
 08:36 Room 8.  N33 asked the patient to tell her what she needed, N33 
would get them out.  Patient called each drug by generic name, N33 took 
them out from the BL, N34 signed (DR047, 8am, lines 933-934, site C) 
 17:10 room 8. “What do you need?” N34 greeted the patient and asked 
patient to tell her what meds she needed (?to test patient, general 
conversation?).  Patient started listing her meds “oxybutynin, bisoprolol, 
green antibiotic, enoxaparin” (patient pronounced names of meds well).  
N34 went to the BL (located on the left side of the patient, furthest away 
from centre of room and had little space), retrieved meds, then went to the 
EMAR to sign for administration, “do you need zinc as well?” N34 asked the 
patient, “yes , sorry”, N34 went back to the BL to retrieve drug for the 
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patient to self-administer (doses were not confirmed but there had been 
no changes from yesterday) (DR045, 6pm, lines 738-742, site C) 
3.5 Actual and 
potential 
medication 
administration 
errors 
 This time the Tazocin® had not fully dissolved and there was still powder 
left at the bottom of the vial.  The nurse drew up what she could and 
administered it to the patient B5 over approx. 1min, flushed approx. 5ml 
post bolus (DR003, lines 277-279, site A) 
 Back at B5 bedside, nurse realised she had picked up another patient's eye 
drops by mistake (same drug), told pt and went back to fridge to get B5's 
eye drops, she had seen it earlier and wasn't sure why or how she picked 
up the wrong ones (DR006, lines 570-571, site A) 
 I think the nurse must have asked the patient about painkillers earlier on 
(~12pm) and so knew A1 did not require any painkillers, because the nurse 
did not go to A1 but did document “not given” against medication order for 
paracetamol and ‘patient refused the medication’ for  diclofenac (DR023, 
12pm, lines 557-560, site B) 
 N28 signed EPMA for doses given while the other nurse prepared and 
started PEG admin, noticed some 8am meds not signed, walked over to a 
different nurse (same bay), whispered something, then came back to DT, 
paused, was about to sign, the other nurse said she can do it, N28 paused 
and then said she will let her sign it later, then saw an enteral supplement 
was due, offered the patient different flavours, returned what was not 
needed to DT, back to patient, gave enteral supplement to patient, 
momentarily distracted by the other nurse (was still administering the 
carbocisteine down PEG) (DR039, 12pm lines 92-96, site C) 
 Five doses were due, one was omitted due to drug not being available 
(erythromycin) (DR043, 10pm, line 535, site C) 
4. Workflow 
(factors that 
influenced 
workflow) 
4.1 Medication 
ordering, 
replenishing, 
and security 
 Drug not available, nurse borrowed meds from another ward (seemed to 
be routine) (DR003, 10pm, line 200, site A) (also coded as 2.1) 
 N04 went to find keys for SCR found no Tazocin® in cupboard, placed 
telephone order for 15 vials from pharmacy, then went to the ward next 
door and borrowed 5 vials (DR004, 12pm, lines 360,361, site A) 
 N07 prepared 2 doses then asked patient if they wanted a laxative, pt said 
no, N07 documented "6" [code for patient refused, “5” is the code for not 
required by patient] in chart then prepped 2 remaining doses (DR009, 6pm, 
lines 825-826, site A)  
 Bedside cabinets next to each patient, PODs are stored in the unlocked 
drawer at the top of the cabinet (DR019, 12pm, lines 5-6, site B) 
 Pre-drug round, nurse opened the drug trolley, went through the 
medicines, putting empty boxes and blisters in the plastic bin bag attached 
to the drug trolley and replenished tramadol from the stock cupboard 
(asked another nurse who was at the nurse station to get the box for her) 
(DR022, 10pm, lines 353-354, site B) 
 Before starting the drug round, nurse looked through the drug trolley and 
replenished it with medicine pots and purple enteral syringes (DR039 12pm 
round, line 45, site C) 
4.2 Medication 
administration 
support from 
and to other 
health care 
professionals 
 Nurses worked together, verbal communications were sometimes very 
brief "vancomycin for B1", "waiting for level" (DR001, 12pm, lines 28-30, 
site A).   
 Meds prepped from both DTs, asked HCA "did you do my BMs?" when 
came across metformin prescribed.  BMs had not been taken, the machine 
was broken and the HCA was in the process of finding another one (DR011, 
8am, lines 964-966, site A) 
 Then asked a nearby nurse the drug name on the chart as she could not 
read the doctor's handwriting.  The other nurse confirmed it was 
dihydrocodeine (DR016, 12pm, lines 1323-1325, site A) 
 Nurse then walked round to the drug trolley, helped another nurse look for 
meds before going back to the cupboard to look for gabapentin for the 
other nurse (DR022, 10pm, lines 416-417, site B) 
 Nurse went back to the NSt PC, checked meds due for B5, got interrupted 
by another nurse who wanted a double sign for fentanyl (noticed both 
nurses tend to sign before giving) (296-297) (DR021, 8am, lines 296-297, 
site B) 
 Room 4, N28 “out of [patient’s name] cupboard, gabapentin 400” that’s the 
lot, to the other nurse   [Nurse signing for meds is different to nurse 
preparing meds, Nurse preparing meds rely on the other nurse to read out 
medication order] (DR039, 12pm, line 90, site C) 
 The other nurse (the one that was supposed to be on the drug round) 
started using the COW and prepped meds ahead of N28.  When N28 signed 
on, she found the doses had been signed for already then moved on to the 
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next patient.  This happened twice, then N28 said she could not work like 
this [she was losing track with which patient had been given meds], and 
asked the other nurse to check meds in the BL while N28 looked for meds 
in DT and worked together for the last few dose (DR039, 12pm, lines 99-
101, site C) (also coded as 4.3, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7) 
 N33 “[patient’s name] when the girls are done with you can you call me to 
put the cream on?” HCA said she can do it, N33 told HCA where each of the 
two creams needed to be applied (DR047, 8am, lines 917-918, site C) 
4.3 Staff 
expectations, 
use of prior 
knowledge, and 
information 
transfer 
 Paracetamol was prescribed "po/iv" with IV circled, nurse prepared tablet 
after checking handover sheet and pt's temperature chart (DR001, 12pm, 
lines 70-71, site A) 
 Nurse knew drug was not available in advance and took no further action 
on drug round to retrieve drug (DR002, 6pm, line 122, site A) 
 Nurse went straight to bedside locker and found a bag of PODs, did not 
look in the DT at all (DR003, 10pm, lines 179-180, site A) 
 While the nurse was preparing meds for B2 earlier, B1 had arrived on the 
ward from theatre.  The nurse told me this patient probably won’t need 
any meds now.  She will hold off tramadol for B2 as patient is nauseous and 
told me that this patient had a hernia operation and therefore did not want 
to give tramadol in case it makes him sick and make him “heave” (172-174) 
(DR020, 6pm, site B) (also coded as 3.4 and 4.4) 
 Patient asked the nurse about her aspirin, said she hasn’t taken it today.  
Nurse stopped what she was doing to talk to the patient.  Patient said nurse 
last night gave her an injection to replace the aspirin, nurse confirmed that 
she will also give the injection (DR024, 6pm, lines 627-629, site B) (also 
coded as 4.4) (also coded as 3.1) 
 N28 set up the nebuliser but was missing the connecter “where has the air 
thingy gone” and then went to search for it in room 2, retrieved it from 
another patient’s bedside, and set it up.  [Quite a narrow space to get 
behind patient to air socket on wall] (DR039, 12pm, lines 96-98, site C) 
 N32 worked through the prescribed list, saw ketoconazole shampoo not 
signed at 18:00, nurse signed retrospectively and said she had given it 
earlier.  N32 told N30 that she just need gabapentin 400 (indicating for N30 
to retrieve this from the BL).  N30 took the liquid meds and went to the BL.  
“Not bladder washout every night is it?” N32 said out loud to N30, N30 
confirmed that it was not for every night and that the patient had it last 
night.  There was no gabapentin in the BL, N30 remembered a patient in 
room 5 had some but was gowned up so N32 went to borrow dose from 
another patient (DR043, 10pm, lines 552-557, site C) (also coded as 3.5, 4.2, 
4.4, 4.6) 
 22:07 room 3.  N32 looked up meds on EMAR, then went straight to the BL 
and prepared meds from there.  Two doses (DR043, 10pm, line 559, site C) 
4.4 Patient’s 
clinical status, 
needs, and 
requests 
 'Pt insisted he should also be having another small tablet, (gliclazide was 
prescribed for 6pm not 12pm), nurse eventually gave pt the gliclazide 
(DR001, 12pm, lines 64-66, site A) 
 N14 tend to look at the drug chart first before starting to prepare meds.  
She introduced herself to the pt, asked the pt if they were still taking the 
ointment for the nose, pt said no, N14 asked why and pt explained he 
doesn't have any, the tube is empty (DR018, 10pm, lines 1485-1486, site A) 
 Nurse asked the patient about paracetamol and tramadol, patient just 
wanted paracetamol, not tramadol and agreed to taking cyclizine after the 
nurse explained that it was not a painkiller but a replacement for the other 
anti-sickness (DR024, 6pm, lines 644-645, site B) 
 Pre-drug round - 16:43 N18 checked on the EPMA for painkillers for a 
patient that approached her at the NSt (1013). Nurse18 asked another 
nurse to help and give the painkillers (because she was dealing with a 
patient’s discharge, D3)  (DR027, 6pm, lines 1043-1044, site B) 
 N30 told me that bisacodyl is due at 8am but she was not going to give, day 
staff to give.  However, if the patient was due to have physio then she 
would have given it, and explained that it was important to do so to ensure 
the patient opens their bowels before therapy.  N30 administered 
chlorhexidine mouthwash using a lollipop sponge and applied it to patient’s 
lips and gums (DR041, 6am, lines 344-346, site C) (also coded as 4.6) 
 N35 asked the patient if he needed paracetamol, patient said yes, she 
asked if he was in pain, he said no, “so why do you need paracetamol?”, 
nurse talked to patient as she prepared the meds and discussed not taking 
paracetamol now but to let her know if he needs it later, asked patient to 
cut tablet in half (patient due to be discharged), nurse asked the patient to 
let her know when he’s ready to take the meds as she wanted to check his 
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swallow (DR047, 8am, 1075-1078, site C) 
4.5 Shared 
resources 
required for 
medication 
administration 
 Nurse looked for drug charts, Dr had drug chart, nurse waited (DR001, 
12pm, line 88, site A) 
 Searched for keys to SCR, asked nurse in charge and looked in drawer 
(540,567).  Borrowed IV co-amoxiclav from another ward (DR006, 8am, 
lines 542-543, site A) 
 Nurse then went over to B2 and explained to me that she would normally 
bring the chart to the patient but because the other nurse was using it, she 
didn’t do it on this occasion) [‘chart’ meant EPMA in this situation] (DR020, 
6pm, lines 161-162, site B) 
 Nurse moved to another PC as the other nurse wanted to use the same PC 
(DR021, 8am, line 300, site B) 
 The other nurse (the one that was supposed to be on the drug round) 
started using the COW and prepped meds ahead of N28.  When N28 signed 
on, she found the doses had been signed for already then moved on to the 
next patient.  This happened twice, then N28 said she could not work like 
this [she was losing track with which patient had been given meds], and 
asked the other nurse to check meds in the BL while N28 looked for meds 
in DT and worked together for the last few doses (DR039, 12pm, lines 98-
101, site C) 
 22:27 N32 checked meds, prepared liquid from the DT, gave to patient then 
went to the BL to get neb.  N30 went to give meds via PEG to the patient.  
Another patient also needed neb (nurses only had one nebuliser connector 
device? “Air thingy”).  Interruption – looking for “air thingy”, should be two 
but only have one currently.  N32 said that’s it (confirming that there was 
only one currently available) (DR043, 10 pm  lines 583-585, site C) (also 
coded as 4.6 and 5.1) 
4.6 Individual 
nurses’ 
approach to 
medication 
administration 
tasks (order of 
activities) 
 Nurse prepared IV prior to starting the non-IV drug round (DR001, 12pm, 
lines 35-40, site A) 
 N09 went to the kitchen to get Ensure® when she came across the 
medication order on the chart (instead of writing down and retrieving it at 
the end of the drug round) (DR011, 8am, lines 959-960, site A). 
 Nurse went back to the computer to look up other meds due, went to the 
treatment room and prepared G5%, went back to the NSt to document the 
batch number and expiry of G5% on EMAR (explained to me that she could 
use the details from this bag as it came from the same box as the G5% she 
put up earlier (DR021, 8am, lines 307-309, site B) 
 Nurse checked on the system what dose of tramadol the patient had 
previously (100mg) and prepared 100mg (patient was prescribed 50-
100mg) and entered “given PO” on the system.   She then went to C3, 
greeted patient and asked about their pain and told patient what the 
medications were in the plastic cup (DR026, 10pm, lines 889-892, site B) 
 18:00 paracetamol 1g PO/PR/IV signed not given 19:00 [but I know nurse 
had asked patient before 18:00] (DR020, 6pm, line 213, site B) 
 There were seven doses due including three creams, N32 explained she 
signed for it as the patient will put it on later then N30 went to the day 
room to give the patient his meds (DR043, 10pm round, lines 524-525, site 
C) (also coded as 4.7) 
 N28 asked the patient if she wanted Laxido®.  N29 prepared the Laxido® 
whilst N28 prepared enoxaparin from the DT.  The nurses were very quick 
and both were preparing meds at the same time so it was quite challenging 
to observe and keep track of meds that had been prepared, signed etc.  
N28 signed for enoxaparin and added an extra comment “checked by 
[N29’s name]” on the EMAR (DR040, 6pm, lines 189-191, site C) 
4.7 Actual and 
potential 
strategies to 
streamline 
workflow or 
increase 
efficiency 
 Nurse checked whether or not observations had been done prior to drug 
round (DR001, 12pm, line 54, site A) 
 Nurse reconstituted multiple vials of Tazocin® "it will probably take about 
20 min before it dissolves" and then prepared vancomycin and 
metronidazole (both for the same pt) whilst waiting for Tazocin® to dissolve 
(DR003, 10pm, lines 243-246, site A) 
 Sometime between 17:20 and 18:00 she had checked with B5 about their 
pain and the patient did not require any analgesics so no meds were 
needed for this patient (DR020, 6pm, lines 165-166, site B) 
 Nurse then retrieved paracetamol and diclofenac from cupboard (cupboard 
not locked throughout drug round, nurse explained she will lock it after as 
still got “bits and pieces” to do) (DR021, 8am, lines 296-298, site B) 
 Before starting the drug round, the nurses opened DT, logged on to laptop, 
retrieved two bottles of medicine from the fridge and placed inside DT 
(DR043, 10pm, line 513, site C) 
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 N36 asked HCA if she could give meds to the patient (meds that had already 
been prepared) (DR050,12pm, line 1251, site C) 
5 Interruptions 
and 
distractions 
5.4 Sources of 
interruptions 
and distractions 
 Another nurse interrupted N08 and asked her if she had seen a patient's 
VAC dressing leads (DR010, 10pm, line 905-906, site A) 
 N04 then got interrupted by a Dr and then by a pt walking past.  
Afterwards, she said "I hate it when I get distracted when I'm doing 
medicines" [N04 was looking for the pot of medicines for G3 that she had 
earlier] (DR017, 6pm, lines 1412-1414, site A) 
 Nurse was interrupted by HCA whilst giving meds, then continued talking to 
HCA and clicked screen to view the next patient’s meds at the same time 
(DR019, 12pm,  lines 61-62, site B) 
 As nurse finished and started to wheel COW and drug trolley out of D bay, 
HCA came over and asked if the nurse was still doing the meds, and if so, 
she will come back to ask her a question afterwards, nurse said yes but 
then asked why, HCA told her about a phone call regarding a patient and 
nurse dealt with query with HCA there and then[there is recognition that 
the nurse should not be interrupted during the drug round but it is not 
always clear when a nurse is still on the drug round or not and the nurse 
may allow/encourage interruptions?] (DR019, 12pm, lines 101-104, site B) 
 Dr interrupted nurses, noting nurse did not have a tabard on. Drs knew not 
to interrupt and explained they knew they shouldn’t interrupt the nurse 
even though she didn’t have her tabard on.  Nurse explained she was 
menopausal and it was too hot to wear the tabard. Dr called out to nurse 
that he had discontinued the clindamycin, nurse said not discontinued on 
the system, Dr said the nurse needs to refresh the screen, nurse said she 
will do it later (DR040, 6pm, lines 198-201, site C) 
 Outside room 7, nurse told me the keyboard was too high to type; screen 
was too low and small.  She said she had lots to ‘moan’ [re EPMA] about 
whilst continuing to check meds due on the EMAR (DR039, lines 76-77, site 
C) 
5.5 Time and 
location of 
medication 
administration 
 Opportunistic interruption by another nurse whilst N03 was in TR retrieving 
fludrocortisone for pt on drug round (DR003, 10pm, lines 197-199, site A) 
 Whilst in the TR, N05 noticed the phone had been ringing for a while and 
said she suspect it is the ‘CathLab’ (chasing her?), N04 suggested that N05 
finishes her meds first before dealing with Cathlab or otherwise it will not 
get done (DR005, 6pm, lines 461-463, site A) 
 06:53 Nurse started non-IV drug round by looking up the patient’s meds on 
the desktop at the NSt.  She was interrupted by the pre-admission nurse 
regarding a handover and staffing.  Nurse started to read the EMAR whilst 
talking to the pre-admission nurse, checked 08:00 meds that were due 
(DR021, 8am, lines 276-278, site B) 
 Whilst at the computer, the nurse was given the phone by another nurse 
who was on another phone (with pharmacy to request more gabapentin 
stock) (DR022, 10pm, lines 423-424, site B) 
 N33 took COW and blue tray to the day room and gave meds to the patient.  
There were three other patients in the day room having their lunch with 
assistance from the HCAs (DR044, 12pm, lines 627-628, site C) 
 Nurse greeted various staff as they walked past whilst looking up meds on 
EMAR (DR056, 8am, line 1751, site C) 
 17:15 N20 logged in to desktop EPMA, started going through medication 
screen.  Dealt with telephone query in between and engaged in discussions 
with colleagues whilst going through meds (DR024, 6pm, lines 593-594, site 
B) 
5.6 Nurses’ role, 
responsibilities, 
and 
relationships 
 Nurse asked some pts if they wanted painkillers but not all (DR001, 12pm, 
line 76, site A) 
 Kitchen staff told the nurse the food was getting cold, nurse was 
responsible for giving out food (DR002, 6pm, lines 125-126, site A).   
 Then a hospitality staff interrupted, asked the nurse if F is NBM and the 
nurse confirmed that he is due to be NBM from midnight not now.  Straight 
after, the HCA came over and asked the nurse if C4 can eat (initially a 
distraction, then turned into an interruption when the nurse stopped what 
she was doing) (DR024, 6pm, lines 653-655, site B) 
 Interruption by student nurse regarding C4.  Nurse dealt with query 
“because her blood pressure is going down, we just need to keep the 
cannula in case we need to give her fluids” (DR024, 6pm, lines, 629-630, 
site B) 
 N28 asked HCA if she was okay (HCA was hovering), nurse talked to HCA 
whilst on screen to next patient’s meds (NR) whilst at pt’s bedside (DR050, 
12pm, lines 1271, site C) 
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5.7 Actual and 
potential 
strategies to 
manage 
interruptions 
and distractions 
(also coded as 
5.1) 
 G4 interrupted to ask for codydramol, N03 acknowledged then carried on 
looking at chart at DT (DR007, 10pm, lines 631-632, site A)  
 Ward seemed fairly quiet except for phones ringing.  Nurses generally did 
not answer phones straight away even if they were next to the phone - it 
depended on what they were doing at the time (DR012, 12pm, 1003-1004, 
site A) 
 Nurse was interrupted by other nurses at the NSt whilst preparing meds, 
brief conversation before continuing to prepare meds (multi-tasking) and 
putting meds away whilst still talking to the other nurses (DR023, 12pm, 
lines 521-523, site B) 
 As the nurse tried to leave C3, C4 interrupted and asked the nurse to 
remove her Venflon®.  Brief discussion, nurse explained that she still had 
meds to give and will come back to see her later (DR024, 6pm, lines 669-
670, site B) 
 N28 was multi-tasking, talking to Dr whilst calling out meds and 
documenting administration, wrote a note on the jobs list, ordered meds in 
pharmacy order book. 17:42 “Right I’m all yours” to Drs, N28. Drs told N28 
that the dose of levetiracetam had been reduced, diazepam PRN was 
added for one patient.  For another patient, peppermint oil capsule had 
been started and for a third patient, vancomycin had been started. (Drs 
were on their ward round) (DR040, 6am, lines 201-204, site C) 
6 Observer-
related effects 
6.4 Actual and 
potential 
effects of the 
presence of an 
observer on 
nurse/other 
staff/patient 
behaviour 
 Pt asked why N12 was asking for his name when he knew she knows it 
(DR015, 10pm, line 1214, site A) 
 N11 talked a little as she was preparing meds, difficult to know if this is 
what she does or whether she did it for my benefit.  She did say later that 
she did everything the same as normal and did not really notice that I was 
there (DR013, 8am, lines 1080-1081, site A) 
 Later on, I saw N07 going to prepare IV meds, I thought she was going to go 
back and do 2pm oral drugs but she wasn’t and said she was feeling 
uncomfortable with being watched so I stopped the observation (DR014, 
12pm, lines 1133-1134, site A) (also coded as 4.6) 
 N21 described the drug round as normal.  She said it was okay being 
observed but also said she was a bit anxious (DR025, 8am, line 852, site B) 
 This nurse talked to me throughout the drug round, even though I had told 
her the same thing as the others, I think she just finds it more natural to 
talk to me than to pretend I’m not there. She usually talked to me when 
preparing meds in the treatment room, showed me some of the vials.  I find 
it more difficult not to talk to the nurse when in the treatment room as 
there is nobody else there.  I also know this nurse is a chatty nurse from 
having met her on previous rounds (DR026, 10pm, lines 930-933, site B) 
 Outside room 7, nurse told me the keyboard was too high to type, screen 
was too low and small.  She said she had lots to ‘moan’ [re EPMA] about 
whilst continuing to check meds due on the EMAR (DR039, lines 76-77, site 
C) (also coded as 2.1) 
 N32 asked me how to pronounce levetiracetam and then told me “I always 
say Keppra®”, asked if that was a brand name whilst documenting 
administration for the patient (DR051, 6pm, lines 1354-1355, site C) 
Abbreviations: BD, ‘bis in die’ meaning twice daily; BL, bedside medication locker; BM, refers to measuring blood sugar; 
CD, controlled drugs; COW, computer-on-wheels; Dr/Drs, doctor/s; DT, drug trolley; EMAR, electronic medication 
administration record; EPMA, electronic prescribing and medication administration system; G5%, glucose 5%; HCA, health 
care assistant; IV, intravenous; meds, medicines; neb, nebule; NBM, nil by mouth; NSt, nurse base station; NRT, nicotine 
replacement therapy; Oramorph®, morphine sulphate oral solution; PC, personal computer; PEG, percutaneous 
endoscopic gastrostomy; PO, ‘per os’ meaning orally; PR, per rectum; PRN, ‘pro re nata’ meaning ‘when required; Pt, 
patient; QDS, ‘quarter die sumendus’ meaning four times a day; SAM, patient self-administration of medication scheme; 
SCR, stock cupboard room (synonymous to TR); TR, treatment room. 
Codes: DR(number), drug round identifier code; N(number), nurse identifier code; some patients are referred to according 
to their bed number which was documented as a single letter or a single letter with a number. 
Branded drugs: Diprobase®, a branded emollient; Ensure®, a branded dietary supplement; Fybogel®, isphagula husk; 
Keppra®, levetiracetam; Laxido®, macrogol; MST, morphine sulphate tablets; Nutrison®, a branded dietary supplement; 
Tazocin®, piperacillin and tazobactam; Venflon®, a cannula; Xalatan®, latanoprost. 
Other: [ ] indicate additional thoughts from observer MM made at the time of observation. 
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Appendix 29 – Maps of travel by the nurse during drug rounds observed at site 
A for the medication administration processes and systems (MAPS) study.  S01, 
site 1; DR[number] indicates drug round code; N[number] indicates nurse participant 
code; pts, patients. 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
 
 
310 of 321 
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Appendix 29 continued 
 
 
Appendix 30 – Maps of travel by the nurse during drug rounds observed at site 
B for the medication administration processes and systems (MAPS) study.  S02, 
site 2; DR[number] indicates drug round code; N[number] indicates nurse participant 
code; NA, not applicable; pts, patients. 
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Appendix 30 continued 
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Appendix 30 continued 
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Appendix 31 – Maps of travel by the nurse during drug rounds observed at site 
C for the medication administration processes and systems (MAPS) study.  S02, 
site 2; DR[number] indicates drug round code; N[number] indicates nurse participant 
code; NA, not applicable; pts, patients. 
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